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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis proposes a theoretical and historical reconstruction of the ‘Great Divergence’ 
between Europe and China. In contrast with both the dominant narrative on the ‘Rise of the 
West’ and its main detractor, the California School, the dissertation enquires critically into 
the categories of ‘China’ and ‘Europe’ and contests their temporal and spatial homogeneity. 
In this, the thesis proposes a unique way to overcome Eurocentrism in International 
Relations and to sociologically understand similarity and dissimilarity in development. 
 
The thesis reveals facets of Eurocentrism which are overlooked in all approaches engaging 
with the issue of divergence and informing the IR literature (neo-institutionalist economic 
history, neo-Weberian Sociology, World-Systems Theory, mode-of-production analyses, 
and the California School). These Eurocentric conceptual anachronisms are: the 
naturalisation of the European international system; the understanding of Europe as a 
homogenous entity; the postulate of a universal rationality; and the ontologising of 
analytical categories derived from the Western experience. The thesis’ methodology, 
informed by Political Marxism, overcomes such Eurocentrism through its unique reading of 
Marx, leading to a socialising of geopolitics and rationality, and theorising the specific 
nature of developmental trajectories, thereby enabling the productive transfer of its method 
to non-European contexts. 
 
From this anti-Eurocentric standpoint, the thesis submits an alternative narrative on the 
trajectory of Imperial China from the 7th to the 19th Centuries. Re-problematising the 
contested and changing nature of China’s authority relations and political geography as 
stemming from social conflicts around politically-constituted power challenges the Realist, 
English School’s, and California School’s assumptions of its stability, hegemony, and 
immutability widely held to have prevented take-off. Such a convergence between 
Continental Europe and China until the 19th Century, contrasting with the IR assumptions 
of a series of Chinese absences and European structural exceptionalisms, highlights the 
Anglo-Continental 17th Century divergence as a unique resolution of social conflicts, 
essential to Europe-China comparative strategies.  
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Introduction 
 
The ascent of China as a great power has attracted considerable attention within the 
discipline of International Relations (IR) in recent decades on account of its non-conformity 
to Realist expectations of instability coinciding with the rise of great powers. Debates 
around Asia’s potential exceptionalism in this regard began in the nineties: ‘Will Europe’s 
past be Asia’s future?’ (Friedberg, 2000), or is ‘Asia’s past […] Asia’s future’ (Huntingdon, 
1996)? In mainstream IR, the issue of the rise of China has been connected to the renewal 
of examinations of similarity or dissimilarity between ‘Eastern’ and Western trajectories. 
Confronted with the puzzle of China’s non-conformity to expectations of Western or 
traditional IR theory, the latter has been argued to be unable to account for the geopolitical 
diversity of international systems (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Wohlforth, 2007). China’s 
recent ‘peaceful rise’ might be as unique as was its trajectory and its regional order in a 
historical perspective (Buzan, 2010; Kang, 2007). Indeed, we are witnessing a return to 
historical enquiry into China’s allegedly distinctive identity in order to comprehend its 
exceptional pattern of rises and falls, from its imperial history to its recent rise.  
 
Enquiries into similarity and dissimilarity between China and Europe have parallel roots in 
a core debate of Historical Sociology (HS). The revisiting of debates over the timing, 
nature, and distinctiveness of the emergence of modernity in Europe, through its 
comparison with China’s history, was rekindled in IR by Kenneth Pomeranz’s Great 
Divergence. The prevalent ‘Rise of the West’ paradigm maintains that the European 
trajectory was unique, as did the classics of comparative sociology, chiefly Karl Marx and 
Max Weber. The California School’s investigations have been organised against such 
narratives which traditionally emphasised what China lacked and so prevented a European-
like take-off. This debate on China’s development was interwoven with the issue of 
Eurocentrism in IR and HS, as this gave rise to the following questions. How does IR’s 
traditional focus on the European experience affect our wider understanding of world 
history? How are categories constructed, agency revealed, and history understood when we 
enquire into non-Western developmental paths? Does it lead us to understand China’s 
historical trajectory as based on singular forms of internal and regional ordering antithetical 
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to Europe’s, as argued by the English School? Or is the replacement of the discourse on 
European exceptionalism better done through retracing centuries of Eurasian similarity, as 
claimed by the California School? Such questions might also underline the need to 
seriously engage with Sinology’s ‘China-centered’ model and its attempt ‘to reconstruct the 
Chinese past as the Chinese themselves experienced it rather than in terms of an imported 
sense of historical problem’ (Cohen 2003: 186). 
 
To answer these related concerns on divergence and Eurocentrism, this thesis proposes to 
enquire into the very basis of the questions asked. The assumptions behind the traditional 
question ‘What respectively explains rise and non-rise in Europe and China?’ contains in 
itself all the notions which must be radically historicised, socialised, and politicised to 
resolve some of the more surreptitious aspects of Eurocentrism. I suggest that mobilising 
literature from outside IR is necessary to elucidate the question of historical divergence, 
understood in terms of geopolitical orders and state-formations, in order to go beyond an 
understanding of the non-Western world simply in terms of its deviation from a (European) 
naturalised path. This thesis therefore provides a historical account of the social and 
geopolitical dynamics of the Chinese Empire between the 7th and the 19th Centuries and 
compares these dynamics with those of early modern Europe. Its crucial mode of 
interrogation, informed by the theoretical framework of Political Marxism (PM), however 
differs from the California School’s. This task is indeed undertaken in the context of the 
wider, anti-Eurocentric, objective of evaluating the historical grounding of analytical 
categories. The thesis’ crucial findings therefore go beyond the California School’s 
postponing of the timing of the emergence of modernity after an era of Eurasian similarity. 
Instead, I claim that such a comparison must start by interrogating the socio-political 
categories of Europe and China over time and space, which are still held as self-evident in 
the California School’s analyses. Overall, it is argued that continental Europe had much 
more in common with Imperial China until the 19th Century, than with England from the 
17th Century onwards. Still, I maintain that China’s trajectory is best understood through its 
sui generis political and geopolitical orders varying over time, rather than through a 
dichotomous or analogous comparison with Europe, whose constituent units must moreover 
be submitted to a similar analysis.  
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In this introduction, I will first engage with the four meanings given to Eurocentrism in the 
discipline of IR. Secondly, I will assess the impact of the ‘Great Divergence’ debate on IR 
and HS enquiries for understanding social change and the construction of categories. This 
will lead me to introduce PM’s ‘English-centered’ stance on the ‘Rise of the West’, which I 
argue is imperative to enable in turn a ‘China-centered’, anti-Eurocentric history of 
Imperial China’s development. I will conclude by presenting the outline of my thesis’ 
argument.  
  
1. The issue of Eurocentrism in International Relations  
Given the wide-spread interest having recently arisen in IR in the debates around 
Eurocentrism1, it would be beyond the scope of this introduction to cover all contributions 
to this broad problematique. I will primarily focus on this issue as formulated within HS 
(conceived in a broad sense) or engaging on its grounds, as this is the field in which my 
contribution is to be located2. The working definition of Eurocentrism to be used 
throughout the thesis is as follows: Eurocentrism means the understanding of world history 
through the prism of European modernity. This definition is sufficiently open to incorporate 
the main anti-Eurocentric critiques, as well as my own later refinement of some of its 
overlooked facets. In the literature, there are four main meanings given to Eurocentrism, 
which are however often seen as inter-related3: (1) the normative postulate of European 
superiority; (2) the stadial conception of history; (3) the Western-informed categorisation of 
the world; and (4) the non-consideration of non-Western contributions to the ‘Rise of the 
West’.  
 
The first meaning of Eurocentrism is closely related to Edward Saïd’s (1978: 2) definition 
of Orientalism, as the institutions and practices that discipline ‘the Orient’ by defining it as 
the reverse image of ‘the West’. Orientalism implies an ‘ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between “the Orient” and […] “the Occident”’. In its milder versions, 
                                                 
 
1
 See, among others, Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Jones, 2006; Hobson, 2012;  
2
 This therefore excludes most notably some Postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism. 
3
 This categorisation is partly inspired by Wallerstein (1997) and Matin (2011). 
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such Eurocentrism is understood as attributing exceptional and inherent properties to 
Europe. This in turn explains the incommensurability of these developmental paths and the 
‘superior’ forms this led to in the West. Eurocentrism’s second meaning, the stadial 
conception of development, refers to a universal theory of history, modelled on the 
European trajectory, which all are deemed to have to follow. This assumes the linearity of 
development, in which non-Western societies are relegated to the ‘imaginary waiting-room 
of history’ (Chakrabarty, 2000: 8). Some ‘historicist’ readings of Marx, as a theory of 
predefined modes of production succeeding one another in a teleogical fashion, are the best 
example of this meaning. The third definition of Eurocentrism points to writers’ inability to 
understand non-Western forms of development, whether due to the Western anchoring of 
their theories and categories or to their neglect of alternative forms of development. The 
agency, dynamism, and historicity of the non-West are thus seen as systematically 
downplayed, either by one-sided comparisons or by the absence of analysis of the non-West 
(Frank, 1998; Hobson, 2004; Pomeranz, 2000; Wong, 1997). Best labelled as 
‘Eurocentredness’, this ignores parallel (‘proto-modern’) or comparable (given a broader 
definition of variables) developments outside Europe, most of the time seen as being later 
hindered by European imperialism. The fourth meaning of Eurocentrism criticises more 
precisely the endogenous explanations of the emergence of Western modernity and the 
methodological nationalism this entails. A perspective looking exclusively through the 
‘European tunnel of time’ (Blaut, 2000) blurs the causal role of interconnections. Analyses 
of interconnections would highlight non-Western contributions to modernity, and the 
‘mutually constitutive’ character of social development (Matin, 2013: 355; Anievas and 
Nisancioglu, 2013). This fourth type of Eurocentrism overlooks crucial factors needed to 
explain the ‘Rise of the West’ which originated outside Europe, mainly riches gained from 
colonisation and ideas and institutions imported through earlier instances of globalisation. 
The non-Western world is thus posited as exterior to, instead of constitutive of, key 
processes in Western development (Bhambra, 2011). 
 
How these problems have particularly affected the Marxist tradition from which my 
theorisation is derived, as well as which further Eurocentric problems are overlooked in IR, 
will be developed later in the thesis. For now, I want to sketch out how my argument deals 
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with these four types of Eurocentrism, before turning, in the next section, to my original 
contribution to the debate on Eurocentrism. Each of these four Eurocentric issues has to 
been engaged with seriously. Overall, I claim that these theoretical issues have to be 
resolved on empirical grounds, through historical investigation. They will therefore 
resurface periodically throughout the thesis, in order to give them the full treatment they 
deserve. My findings lead me to affirm, against the first meaning of Eurocentrism, that 
European homogeneity must not be assumed and that, therefore, there could not have been 
inherent properties leading the West into modernity. Secondly, my historical enquiries on 
Imperial China’s trajectory and early modern Europe’s social diversity, focusing on their 
specificities and the open-ended nature of the social changes they witnessed, challenge any 
universal theory of successive stages. Thirdly, because of this method, my investigation 
into similarities between continental Europe and China follows the reciprocal comparison’s 
prescriptions4. Finally, the analysis of the emergence of capitalism in England I use 
remained vulnerable to the critique of its ‘internalist’ perspective. Potential non-Western 
contributions to this transition are, however, to be ruled out on empirical, rather than 
normative or theoretical, grounds5. This is not an endeavour pursued in the thesis, rather 
revolving around the potential anti-Eurocentric transfer of PM categories and method to a 
key case of comparison between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. After all, ‘Eastern agency’ does 
not matter only in assessing its importance in the ‘Rise of the West’. How all this can be 
formulated positively in order to contribute both to anti-Eurocentric theory and comparative 
study, and how this relates to the PM method, is demonstrated in the following section. 
 
2. The significance of the ‘Great Divergence’ debate within theories of transition  
The ‘Great Divergence’ problematique has its roots in a crucial debate in HS and IR, that is, 
the advent of the modern world and the geopolitical dynamics it gave rise to. The new 
formulation of this perennial puzzle by the California School likewise engages with the 
topic of the origins of such social change in Europe, but tests more consistently one of its 
reverse claims, that is, the alleged non-development of Imperial China. Traditional 
                                                 
 
4
 Reciprocal comparison implies ‘viewing both sides of the comparison as ‘deviations’ when seen through the 
expectations of the other, rather than leaving one as always the norm’ (Pomeranz, 2000: 8). 
5
 Key PM contributions to such assessment of extra-European factors in the transition include Brenner (1976) 
and Wood (2001). 
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enquiries since Marx and Weber have indeed been motivated by the question ‘Why 
Europe?’ The California School has reformulated this by asking ‘Why not China?’, and 
more crucially ‘why Europe is not China, not only why China is not Europe’ (Pomeranz, 
2000: 2). The ‘Great Divergence’ debate has therefore brought many interesting lines of 
historical enquiry into prominence within IR, if only by displacing the primary referent in 
terms of comparison (Wong, 1997).  
 
The debate around whether China historically followed a path similar to Europe has also 
entailed the evaluation of the adequacy, when applied to the history of China, of many of 
the traditional models used to explain European patterns of social, economic, and 
geopolitical change. The commercial model, the demographic model, price theory, the 
geopolitical competition model, the balance of power theory, and the model of international 
society have all been tested for their potential importation to the East, with uneven success 
(Pomeranz, 2000; Frank, 1998; Lee and Wang, 1997; Rosenthal and Wong, 2011; Hui, 
2005; Kang, 2010b; Wohlforth, 2007; Zhang and Buzan, 2012). IR theorists trying to 
resolve the enigma of Chinese development have however also been confronted by 
‘indigenous’ models. The most noteworthy explanatory models used in traditional Sinology 
include the ‘state/gentry’ mode of analyses (Chang, 1962; Ho, 1962) and the ‘dynastic 
cycles’ paradigm inspired by Chinese official historiography (Yang, 1954). The ‘Great 
Divergence’ debate has therefore led IR enquiries on China to confront a wide variety of 
literature, thus bringing HS back into important discussions within the discipline. At a 
broad level, a central issue of the ‘Great Divergence’ debate - and of this thesis - is how to 
account for similarity or dissimilarity in different places over time, in light of recent 
developments in the field of China’s history. This necessarily invokes the issue of the 
origins of social change, but also of spatial categories of analysis. It is worth revealing what 
respectively distinguishes the California School and PM in these debates within economic 
history, political development, and IR, especially regarding the impact of these issues for 
anti-Eurocentric enquiries. 
 
Narratives of the ‘Rise of the West’ have traditionally enquired into, unsurprisingly, the 
spatial entity of the West. Since it is the singularity of its breakthrough into modernity for 
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which an explanation is sought, enquiries have naturally been made into its distinctive 
characteristics. A series of different factors have been proposed as having dissolved 
traditional societal organisations in Europe, in a process which has given rise to state forms 
and economies as we know them today. Models have been developed across disciplines and 
amongst contending theoretical approaches in order to explain how demographic growth 
(Postan, 1966), urbanisation (Pirenne, 1969), potential multipolarity (Kennedy, 1987), 
and/or intensification of exchange (Braudel, 1979; Lopez, 1976) set medieval Europe, as a 
whole, on a distinct path. 
 
One narrative particularly stands out by contesting this widespread understanding of 
modern development as arising from a process common to multiple European countries. In 
what has been called the ‘Brenner Debate’ (Ashton and Philpin, 1987), the economic 
historian Robert Brenner (1976) engaged with the empirical paradox that different Western 
countries did not demonstrate to the same extent the outcomes predicted by the 
demographic or commercial models, most significantly modern growth. In order to 
overcome this conundrum, he proposed to look comparatively into demographic and labour 
productivity trends. Brenner demonstrated that Adam Smith’s own criteria for assessing 
modern development (systematic specialisation and innovation aimed at profit-
maximisation) were present only in the 17th Century English countryside6, and this was 
further confirmed through the debate on English agrarian relations (Allen, 1992; Wrigley, 
1983). This implies that different societies can have been faced with similar patterns, such 
as the ‘commercial revolution’ and the 14th Century demographic devastation, and yet they 
produced diverging long-term results in their transitions out of feudalism, such as 
capitalism (England), Absolutism (France), nobility militarisation (Prussia), or ‘second 
serfdom’ (Eastern Europe).  
 
Such an understanding of the diverging European trajectories calls for the introduction of 
agency within theories of social development. This is the case as modern development can 
                                                 
 
6
 Later on, Brenner (2001) has argued that capitalist development had also occurred in certain Dutch 
provinces during the same period. Wood (2002b) and Post (2002) disagree with Brenner on this debate within 
PM.  
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no longer be assumed to follow from pan-European structural mechanisms (Teschke and 
Knafo, forthcoming) or to naturally and gradually evolve out of the commercialisation of 
society (Wood, 2002a). Since capitalism arising out of medieval Europe was the exception 
rather than the rule, what has to be understood is the specificity of the historical process 
which uniquely occurred in England (Brenner, 1982; Comninel, 2000; McNally, 1988). PM 
suggested that the transition to capitalism was foremost a transformation of agents’ 
relations to social institutions, such as the market or the state. Such transformation 
proceeded from contingent outcomes of specific social conflicts opposing lords and 
peasants in their access to products and production. This was a process which historically 
entailed the divorce of the peasantry from its means of subsistence, and uniquely 
transformed the traditional political constitution of the means of accumulation. 
 
We could say, without already covering an issue which will be discussed across the thesis, 
that PM’s ‘Anglocentrism’, which has been argued to lead it toward Eurocentrism 
(Wallerstein, 1999: 38-41), might also be its very strength. PM’s initial and most important 
contribution has indeed been to argue against teleological and determinist theses on 
European uniqueness. PM did not simply replace ‘Europe’ by ‘England’ in a similarly 
flawed narrative, as Blaut (2000) suggested in his critique of Brenner. It rather proposed an 
innovative, agential conception of social change. Brenner’s enquiries are however 
Eurocentred, to the extent that they have been largely based on differences amongst social 
property relations within Europe. This thesis seeks to expand the range of PM enquiries to 
differences within Eurasia. A key contribution of the California School has been to 
popularise works from Sinology demonstrating Imperial China’s high level of urbanisation, 
commercialisation, and fertility control (Lee and Campbell, 1997; Li, 1988). This thus runs 
contrary to what would be expected from the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives, according to 
which such phenomena were European singularities. I claim that such discoveries must 
serve to further illustrate the various ways these market, familial, and rural-urban relations 
can be institutionalised in wider patterns of social relations. This reiterates the necessity for 
historical investigations of the variegated agential, and conflictual, relations by which the 
reproduction of social life is organised and contested. Here as in the ‘transition debate’, this 
has to be done prior to attributing logically derived consequences to such patterns. For it is 
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far from given that trade and demographic pressures lead to a causal, or pre-determined, 
outcome, and that they were sufficient conditions for the emergence of modernity. Such a 
perspective on the implications of the ‘Great Divergence’ debate reveals, I will argue, the 
close relation between this classic question of economic history and central IR issues, as 
they both make causal claims about the structural effects of commercial and demographic 
patterns or the international system.  
 
The initial ‘Brenner Debate’ developed within the field of comparative social analysis, and 
has thus tended to ignore the geopolitical setting of the transition. Upon a call for 
integrating geopolitical elements into the ‘internalist’ studies of PM (Teschke, 2005), the 
approach has subsequently better defined the imbrications of the international relations of 
Europe with its social property regimes in the plural. PM has therefore made a crucial 
contribution on the manner in which the central categories of IR, namely the state and the 
international system, have historically emerged and have been theoretically constructed. 
This important debate divides into two tendencies of the California School broadly 
conceived, which moreover overlaps with the types of anti-Eurocentric strategies they 
mobilise. On one side, some contributors to the ‘Great Divergence’ debate have engaged 
with the definition of political and geopolitical forms attributed to the West, by retracing 
their origins to the non-Western world and/or by finding in such places social forms 
equivalent to those of Europe. This has led to the widening of some crucial IR categories, 
such as sovereignty (Hobson, 2009), world-systems (Abu-Loghod, 1989; Frank, 1998), or 
international systems (Buzan and Little, 2000), in order for them to be able to accommodate 
non-Western experiences. On the other side, those California Scholars who have not 
primarily sought to find in Asia proto-modern political and geopolitical forms traditionally 
associated with Western modernity, like Pomeranz and R. Bin Wong, have instead put 
forward the anti-Eurocentric strategy of ‘reciprocal comparison’. Such assessments of the 
West according to China’s criteria have, however, left intact the traditional framework of 
comparative enquiries. 
 
My own, PM-informed, anti-Eurocentric strategy is the opposite of the ‘proto-modern’ 
strategy which generalises, through space and time, Western forms of development, which 
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are then taken as analytical starting points and referents for comparison. My approach 
simultaneously goes beyond Pomeranz and Wong’s working with the conventional IR 
definitions of the concepts of international system and state as universal and transhistorical. 
I rather seek to radically historicise and specify the multiplicity of paths of state-formation 
within Europe, whilst emphasising the social origins of its geopolitical dynamics. The same 
method is used for deciphering the historical trajectory of Imperial China within its own 
geopolitical context. In this way, I aim to find the specificities of social institutions by 
conceptualising them as historical praxes, which in turn necessitates enquiries into the 
changing semantic meaning of concepts in their time/space contexts.  
 
Moreover, my agency-led reconstruction of the variegated development of social 
institutions, such as authority relations and geopolitical orders, is crucial for avoiding the 
replacement of ‘methodological nationalism’ (or internalism) with ‘methodological 
internationalism’. This characterises the California School’s anti-Eurocentric strategies, 
which do not reflect epistemologically on their underlying assumptions of the universality 
of political development and political geography. This ultimately ontologises (Western) 
history, especially in the form of the expected effects of the ‘international’ (Teschke, 
2014)7. For it might be the case that using this apparently neutral language as general 
abstraction, in order to make sense of diverse concrete historical developments, merely 
universalises categories based on a specific narrative of the European experience. Crucially, 
this assumes that the presence of structural variables, from the market and demographic 
patterns to hierarchical or anarchical orderings, leads to determined outcomes – and when 
they do not, this has to be explained by the ‘deviation argument’8. Such ‘general theories’ 
were what led to the European uniqueness conundrum in the first place. In this light, 
specifying the agential and sui generis development of political and geopolitical orders, 
within Europe and Eurasia, is a key element to an anti-Eurocentric theory, and IR is the best 
place to argue for such a social theory of the ‘international’.  
 
                                                 
 
7
 I use the term ‘ontologising’ for strategies which reify historical processes by overlooking their social 
origins, and consequently give them the status of universal features of social life. 
8
 This implies resorting to additional and exogenous factors in order to explain deviations from causal effects 
which are expected to be universal. 
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3. Plan of the thesis  
The theoretical part of the thesis aims to problematise the issue of Eurocentrism in IR 
works engaging with similarity and dissimilarity amongst the Western and the non-Western 
worlds. This is be done, in turn, from the broader field of the three main traditions 
contributing to the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives; then to the Marxist tradition my analysis 
stems from; to, finally, the particular theoretical approach I operationalise in the thesis. This 
theoretical discussion leads me to affirm that contrasting understandings of the non-Western 
world derive from the different assumptions held about the European world, be it in the 
form of methodological assumptions deriving from the ontology of the world (the 
conditions of emergence of analytical categories); theories of history (change over time); or 
units of analysis (spatial constructions).  
 
Chapter One submits the three main narratives on the ‘Rise of the West’ (neo-institutionalist 
economic history, neo-Weberianism, and World-Systems Theory (WST)) to a critique on 
the grounds that they exhibit the following characteristics of traditionally overlooked facets 
of Eurocentrism: (1) the naturalisation of the European international system; (2) the 
understanding of Europe as a homogenous entity; (3) the postulate of a universal rationality 
based on Western experience and; (4) the ontologising of analytical categories according to 
this same experience. It argues that the main challengers of this over-arching model, the 
California School, likewise failed to overcome Eurocentrism originally redefined this way, 
whilst being at the same time unable to sociologically re-problematise the origins of the 
‘Great Divergence’. 
 
Chapter Two evaluates how the theoretical tradition my thesis relies on, Marxism, has faced 
the issue of understanding the non-Western world, from Marx’s own works to 
contemporary understandings of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) and the tributary 
mode of production. It is claimed that Marx’s work is amenable to multiple readings, 
especially regarding theories of history, and that an anti-Eurocentric understanding of 
Marx’s contribution should emphasise its historical, relational, and agential method. 
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Chapter Three examines the potential and pitfalls of my theoretical approach, PM, in 
relation to Eurocentrism. PM’s specific understanding of Marxism is illustrated by locating 
its heritage and contributions in two core debates, within English Marxism (in social 
theory) and against Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) (in IR). Its anti-
Eurocentric potential is argued to stem from its emphasis on class struggle and specificity, 
and its commitment to radically historicising analytical categories. 
 
The empirical part of the thesis aims to reveal that, because they rely on Weberian-informed 
Sinology, IR works on China make empirical propositions which are not only invalid for 
the 2000 years of Chinese history they generally encompass, but also for all and each of the 
dynasties taken separately. This is accomplished by divorcing China’s crucial social 
institutions from a sociology of power, which is exclusively applied in the European 
context. The organisation of the empirical chapters reflects this thesis’ double objective of, 
on the one hand, showing the reification at work in the theoretical construction of Chinese 
difference in terms of political and geopolitical orders, and, on the other hand, providing an 
alternative historical account of its trajectory which radically politicises and historicises the 
‘state’ and the ‘international’ as historically-created and contested social practices. My 
theoretical and historical enquiries into the history of China’s allegedly more ‘stable’ eleven 
centuries proceed in two parts, chronologically separated by the transition from the Song 
dynasty to the Yuan dynasty. Each part begins with critical theoretical engagements with 
the main IR claims about the period in question. Chapters Four and Six are thus devoted to 
demonstrating the need for alternatives to the prevalent imposition of a modern vocabulary 
on Chinese social forms. Chapters Five and Seven offer reconstructions of China’s history, 
concluding with a comparison with the trajectories of continental Europe, illustrating the 
similarities in their pre-modern, contested political geographies and uses of state power.  
 
Chapters Four and Five enquire into Chinese social and geopolitical relations between the 
7th and 13th Centuries. Chapter Four engages with works from Realism, the California 
School, and the English School via a critique of their ontologised categories of the Chinese 
World Order and the Confucian Order deemed to be at the root of China’s divergence from 
Europe. The chapter interrogates what the ‘international’, ‘empire’, and ‘state’ socio-
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historically meant for agents in Imperial China and proposes a phenomenology of ‘all under 
Heaven’ whereby such social forms are seen as arising from contentions around power, 
rather than being understood as geopolitical or normative givens. Chapter Five proceeds 
from there to a historical reconstruction of the Chinese trajectory during the Sui, Tang, 
‘Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms’, and Song periods. The chapter retraces the social 
origins and variations of the institutions of the tribute-system and office-system, which are 
generally naturalised as stable features in the literature.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven engage with Late Imperial China’s history between the 13th and 
19th Centuries. As this is the period the California School engages with, Chapter Six 
critically evaluates their application of the commercialisation model to China’s history. It 
suggests that a phenomenology of the administration through benevolence better 
reconstructs Chinese agents’ relations to crucial social institutions of the period, such as the 
market, lineages, and the not so stable and peaceful Confucian state. Chapter Seven 
provides a historical narrative, informed by these findings, of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing 
dynasties’ intertwined social-property-relations, contested authority relations, and wider 
geopolitical relations. It leads me to re-problematise the ‘non-rise’ of China not as a 
historical anomaly compared with Europe as a whole, but as an occurrence similar in this 
regard to continental Europe’s trajectory. 
 
The thesis concludes by extrapolating the implications of the argument for understanding 
the 19th Century, that is the period of the ‘Great Divergence’ per se and the period which 
saw the West and China coming into closer contact. It is argued that the California and 
English Schools’ incapacity to explain China’s non-rise, and 19th Century decline, is closely 
linked to their reification of Imperial China’s history demonstrated throughout the thesis. 
Such IR works generally prove insufficiently critical of the Weberian-informed Sinology 
which has been incorporated within the classical neo-Weberian ontologising of the 
international. This ultimately reproduces, rather than contests, the ‘Rise of the West’ 
narratives’ dichotomised perspective on Europe and China. In contrast, my historical 
reconstruction discards any narrative based on the expected effects of structural or 
normative pressures by socialising their origins and contestations in order to comprehend 
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their sui generis constitutions and explain their divergent outcomes. In short, this provides 
IR theory with an alternative understanding of historical geographies of development and 
non-development. 
 
A note on sources on China’s history is needed before concluding this introduction. For 
reasons both of the type of enquiry and language fluency, the literature engaged with 
originates mostly from the Anglo-American world. This thesis also makes references to 
French scholars’ original works, whether for their contributions to Sinology or to the AMP 
debate they formed an important part of. When available, translations of Chinese and 
Japanese historians’ works are mobilised for the instances in which they have provided 
important contributions to the historiographical debates. Beyond the issue of language, the 
quality of sources on Imperial China obviously varies depending on the period, the region, 
and the type of events and processes. When deemed necessary, this will be an issue engaged 
with in the relevant empirical chapters. It has to be noted that historical enquiries have 
however been greatly facilitated following the opening of China’s records and archives in 
the 1980s, most importantly the Ming-Qing Archives in Beijing (Bartlett, 2007). Although 
this thesis aims to a certain extent to contribute to a China-centered history, it mainly 
focuses on the way the legacy of the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives have framed the questions 
asked about, and the answers given to, China’s ‘divergence’ in the English language 
dominated field of IR. In order to provide an alternative historical reconstruction of 
Imperial China’s trajectory in light of this issue, available translated sources and works 
written in French or English have been considered, if not ideal, at least sufficient. 
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Chapter One – Beyond the Eurocentrism of the 'Rise of the West' and the ‘Great 
Divergence’ Narratives 
 
Narratives of the ‘Rise of the West’ prevalent in the social sciences have often been accused 
of presupposing the superiority of Europe by identifying inherent advantages, which have 
teleologically led to its prominence since the era of colonial empires. Postcolonial studies 
and a growing number of works clustered in the World History nebula argue that this 
Eurocentric perspective – common to the Liberal, Marxist, and Weberian literatures - 
embodies a blatant Orientalism that portrays the ‘East’ or the ‘Rest’ as the reverse image of 
European success. The actual picture is more subtle, but we must recognise that myths 
about the stagnation of the non-Western world are pervasive and that the analysis of its 
‘non-rise’ is grounded in assumptions about what went ‘right’ in Europe. 
 
There are many non-Western paths which are relevant for comparative enquiries into social 
development. The Indian subcontinent and the Near/Middle East have attracted particular 
attention, among other things for their enduring empires and extensive networks of 
exchange in the ‘afro-Eurasian ecumene’ (Hodgson, 1974). Yet, China is still given a 
prominent place in the literature, partly due to recent political reasons, and partly due to the 
academic puzzle of its highly civilised and long-lasting culture, imperial unity, and early 
bureaucratic structure. This is highlighted by the influential works of the California School, 
moreover stressing China’s parity with early modern Europe in terms of ‘living standards’ 
and productivity. The renewed interest in the study of China carries in its wake the ‘Great 
Divergence’ question, and this involves the re-thinking of the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives’ 
assumptions about an early European ‘take-off’ due to its inherent properties. The thesis 
likewise provides for a historical comparison between the trajectories of pre-modern 
Europe and Imperial China, albeit whilst grounding the reasons for their similarities on an 
eminently different postulate. I contend that, excluding the special case of Britain, both 
were cases of limited growth and contested political and geopolitical forms. I will argue for 
a comparative study leaving behind the ideal-typical opposition between an enlightened and 
dynamic Europe and a universal Chinese empire enabling or disabling growth. Before this, 
however, a review of traditional and anti-Eurocentric narratives on ‘rise’ and ‘non-rise’ is 
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needed in order to identify the Eurocentric pitfalls such a historical reconstruction must 
avoid. 
 
The exceptional nature of the rise of Europe has been explained by reference to the 
presence of either Roman law, geopolitical competition, certain modes of production or 
types of government, geographical or environmental settings deemed to be favourable to 
secure property rights or the spread of new technologies or exchange relations (Anderson, 
1974; Jones, 1981; Landes, 1998; Mann, 1986; North and Thomas, 1973; Tilly, 1990; 
Wallerstein, 1974; Weber, 1978). These characteristics, on their own or in variable 
combinations, have mostly been assumed as unique to Europe. HS has indeed been inward 
looking for a long time, and mainly focussing on European exceptionalism. In the last 
decade or so, following a growing unease with the absence of the non-European world in 
HS, there have been attempts to overcome these deficiencies, but I shall argue that they 
remain only partly successful as they do not sufficiently question their understanding of 
Europe.  
 
Marx and Weber, the two main theoretical canons of HS, have been criticised as proponents 
of such European exceptionalism. Both their works entail an environmental determinism 
and rely on since-outdated empirical material (Anderson, 1974; Blaut, 2000), but their 
theories of history best illustrate their Eurocentric conceptions of the ‘East’. Weber (1958) 
drew a causal relation between ethics of world religions and development, leading him to 
assert Western superiority in matters of rationality. Such ‘idealist’ stance sits uneasily with 
‘materialist’ explanations of the emergence of Western modernity as the configuration of 
social relations or types of domination (Weber, 1978). Weber and scholars subsequently 
drawing on his work (e.g. Duchesne, 2011; Hall, 1986) thus picture the ‘East’ either 
through the claim that its religions froze state/society relations, or through the assertion of a 
patrimonial organisation of society unlike that of the West. In the more common 
understanding of Marx’s Eurocentric view of the non-Western world, the ‘East’ is seen as 
stagnant, pertaining to the classless AMP, and at a stage of development less ‘advanced’ 
than that achieved by the West. Therefore, only upon the impetus of encounters with the 
West could the ‘immutableness’ of the East be overcome, the latter then being able to climb 
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the ladder of pre-defined stadial development. I shall demonstrate throughout this literature 
review that remnants of such Eurocentric conceptions of the ‘East’ still lurk in the works of 
contemporary Weberians and Marxists. 
 
This chapter critically reviews the three traditions in social sciences informing the IR 
understanding of the problems of the ‘Rise of the West’ and, more specifically, of the 
divergence between China and Europe: (1) neo-institutionalist economic history; (2) neo-
Weberian HS; (3) WST; and (4) the California School9. In evaluating their ability to avoid 
the charge of Eurocentrism, I will argue that they all fail to properly frame the comparative 
issue of China’s ‘Great Divergence’ because of their simplistic representation of ‘Europe’. 
Even the approach with the most promising anti-Eurocentric objective and potential, the 
California School, cannot evade this. Such misleading representations include: (1) the 
naturalisation of Europe’s ‘structural’ features leading to its political and military 
superiority; (2) the conception of Europe as a homogenous, internally un-differentiated 
spatio-temporal entity, thereby occluding its regionally and temporally specific ‘take-off’; 
(3) the un-problematised social origins of a specific type of rationality (i.e. homo 
economicus) assumed to diffuse in space and time to all institutions and dimensions, which 
is moreover held as a universal criteria; and (4) the bias towards universalised categories of 
analysis, whose congealing of historical praxes misleads comparative strategies and 
transferring of analytical categories to sui generis non-European cases.  
 
This critique is based on PM’s empirical contributions and theoretical insights. One the one 
hand, Brenner’s distinction among variegated European trajectories in the early modern 
period questions the validity of the category of ‘Europe’. On the other hand, analytical and 
methodological implications of his account of the transition to capitalism in medieval 
England can be drawn for an anti-structuralist understanding of social change as open-
ended conflicts around property and power. This sets the stage for the following theoretical 
chapters, in highlighting how such insights depart from the legacy of Eurocentrism in 
                                                 
 
9
 Mode-of-production analyses of the ‘Rise of the West’, such as Anderson (1974) and Banaji (2010), also 
subscribed to the four Eurocentric pitfalls identified here. This will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three, 
which will address such challenges more specifically within the Marxist tradition, to which my own analysis 
subscribes. WST diverges sufficiently from analyses of modes to be discussed here. 
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Marx’s own works and the wider Marxist tradition, and thereby allow for conceptually 
securing the basis of an alternative account of China’s ‘divergence’ through a revision of 
PM. My overall argument is that the structuralist understandings of ‘Europe’ and ‘China’ as 
discernible spatial and temporal entities come at the cost of downplaying the socio-political 
contestations around property and power. Yet, these contestations are the key to understand 
China and Europe’s similarities and differences, and to explain the ultimate sources of 
Europe’s divergence from China (and not the other way around) following a long period of 
broadly similar developmental trajectories. 
 
Following the further theoretical exploration of such overlooked Eurocentrism in Section 
One, pioneering works (Douglass North, Michael Mann, and Immanuel Wallerstein) and 
subsequent anti-Eurocentric applications of these three prominent traditions to the case of 
China (Eric Jones, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, and Eric Mielants) will be put under scrutiny. This 
literature review leads me to identify, as a conclusion to Section Two, a ‘Rise of the West 
legacy’ common to all these authors. Section Three introduces the contributions of 
Pomeranz and Wong. It highlights their limits in re-problematising the origins of the ‘Great 
Divergence’ due to their endorsing of the Eurocentric anachronisms to which the un-
problematisation of social processes led the original ‘Rise of the West’ narratives. 
 
1. The overlooked sources and consequences of European exceptionalism  
This section discusses facets of Eurocentrism insufficiently addressed by the literature 
focusing on this topic, Eurocentrism being broadly defined as the understanding of world 
history through the prism of European modernity. To four overlooked Eurocentric pitfalls 
uniquely theorised through PM insights, I oppose four critical anti-Eurocentric 
methodological claims.  
 
The first pitfall is the naturalisation of Europe’s differentiae specificae, its international 
system. This un-problematisation of the social character of geopolitics, held to be a decisive 
factor in the ‘Rise of the West’, reifies a social feature into a naturalised characteristic 
supposed to explain the ‘Great Divergence’. To this methodological conundrum, I oppose 
that the European geopolitical pluriverse has to be anchored in socio-political conflicts over 
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land and people. I argue for a move beyond the simple opposition between a European 
dynamic multi-state system to what amount to a geopolitical vacuum in Imperial China, due 
to the alleged absence of such a system. Space must be conceptualised as social praxis for 
each case. 
 
Closely related to this is the understanding of ‘Europe’ as a homogenous category. All ‘Rise 
of the West’ narratives reviewed here see it as a Europe-wide phenomenon, located in its 
decentralised and fragmented character, and end in subsuming the fate of Europe as a whole 
under one ideal-type. Yet, comparative analysis shows that ‘pan-European’ structures, such 
as the ‘international’, far from isomorphising responses from polities, led them to diverge, 
due to the mediation of such processes through social conflicts. Recognising that capitalism 
emerged specifically in Britain, rather than this being a pan-European phenomenon, forces 
us to look for agential, rather than structural, origins to singular developmental paths. 
 
The third problem with the literature on the ‘Rise of the West’ is the implicit postulate of a 
universal rationality, as experienced in Europe. To be Eurocentric, this does not need, 
however, to be the kind of Western superior rationality found in certain works of Weber 
(1958), or more recently of Duchesne (2011). Since this rationality is argued to originate in 
the Antique world, it becomes difficult to sociologically elucidate why only in the second 
half of the second millennium did this give birth to modernity. In the works evaluated here, 
rationality is postulated rather than explained. Moreover, it is postulated according to the 
specifically capitalist model of rationality. I contend that we must socialise and historicise 
specific rationalities by enquiring into the forms which power takes socio-historically and 
the socio-institutional contexts providing the background on which agents act from and 
upon, as they engaged into social activities which pitch them against other agents.  
 
Finally, HS has not yet been able to come to terms with the issue of the ontologising of the 
categories of analysis. This is brought about by the reification of social processes, from the 
national/international to state/society and political/economy dichotomies. Such a 
transhistorical ontology is indeed based on the anachronistic universalisation of processes 
whose complex (and by no means absolute) formations pertain to European capitalist 
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modernity. A sui generis vocabulary revealing contestation around power – as embodied in 
polity and political geography in the pre-modern era - is needed to counter the timeless and 
abstract language of IR based on European modernity. This language has eluded agency 
and developmental specificities and created a series of anachronisms attributing universal 
interests to agents and transhistorical causal mechanisms to systems. This is why generic 
categories will be avoided in the thesis. Although useful as heuristic devices, concepts such 
as ‘state’, ‘territory’, ‘war’, ‘geopolitics’, ‘political’, and ‘economy’ necessitates the 
clarification of their meaning in specific places and time.  
 
2. European ‘exceptionalism’ and the ‘Rise of the West’ 
This section critically evaluates the traditional neo-institutionalist, neo-Weberian, and WST 
narratives on the rise of Europe so as to highlight the background against which subsequent 
HS has compared Chinese and European histories. All share reified conceptions of states, 
geopolitical environments, and agents’ motivation which are derived from their 
misinterpretation of the dynamics at work in the emergence of European modernity. I will 
conclude by laying out the theoretical foundations of the ‘Rise of the West legacy’ which 
leads these scholars to endorse Eurocentric anachronisms, both in their rendering of world 
history and in their analytical strategies.  
 
2.1 Traditional economic history  
For all their dissimilarities, North and Jones rekindled, outside their own field, interest in 
the ‘Rise of the West’ as a long-term process conceived in terms other than those of the 
emergence of the Industrial Revolution. For them, the ‘Rise of the West’ is related to 
‘intensive’ economic growth, conceptualised as the rise of per capita income. Both retrace 
its genesis to the medieval era, by investigating the development of institutional 
arrangements conducive to such sustained growth. 
 
2.1.1 North and Thomas’ classical contribution 
Using neoclassic economic theory, North and Thomas (1973) explain the ‘Rise of the West’ 
by the enforcement of property rights pertaining to an ‘efficient economic organization’ 
making the private and social rates of return correspond, i.e. encouraging economies of 
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scale and innovation and perfecting the functioning of the market by reducing transaction 
costs. Historically, these authors look for instances in which it was in the interest of 
governments to create and maintain such institutional arrangements. For them, 
demographic and trade expansion brought down feudalism across medieval Europe and 
created a market economy within nation-states. It was ultimately Holland and then Britain 
that succeeded during the 17th Century in establishing the first institutions beneficial to the 
increase of productivity, as these states’ strategies to augment their revenues coincided with 
the creation of efficient institutional arrangements. They thus build on postulates from both 
the commercial and demographic models, explaining the impact of such trends through a 
Rational Choice framework10. 
 
This neoclassic economic model nonetheless implicitly based its argumentation on 
geopolitical factors. In unravelling the unique relation between growth and freedom in the 
West, North (1993: 12, 2005: 137) contends that the singularly fragmented character of 
Europe was the ultimate foundation of its distinctive trajectory, intervening as an 
exceptional source of constraints and opportunities. Firstly, the higher number of distinct 
political entities increased the chances that one would try policies conducive to growth. 
Secondly, Europe was more ‘creative’, due to the diffusion of innovations among its single-
belief structure body (i.e. Christianity). Thirdly, its states were more compelled to ‘do well’, 
not only to ensure their survival - confronted as they were with fiscal crises induced by 
systemic war - but also due to the risk that wealthy ‘constituents’ might move elsewhere. 
Finally, North underlines the role of Europe’s autonomous towns – autonomous due to the 
lack of a ‘large scale order’ that could monopolise decision-making processes. This 
autonomy legacy favoured the bargaining of revenues in return for property rights and 
control over taxation. By contrast, centralised China stagnated because none of these 
incentives for the ruler to enforce property rights were present in the long run. China thus 
figures at the end of the scale of the ‘democratisation’ of policy-making (North, 1993: 8-9), 
as even more ‘despotic’ than the Spanish Crown.  
                                                 
 
10
 Rational Choice Theory has its roots in neoclassic economics (Becker, 1976; Buchanan, 1969; Olson, 
1965). It is characterised by its methodological individualism and its use of game theory. In a nutshell, 
abstract individuals seeking the maximisation of their gains should make rational decisions towards this goal 
based on a set of preferences and information. 
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This generalising thesis faces many pitfalls. In the first place, North over-estimates the 
propensity of a freer ‘market economy’ to naturally create incentives to specialise and 
innovate simply through the increase of trade, something which is characteristic of the 
commercial model (Wood, 1994). Moreover, the reliance of this theory on the demographic 
model11 renders it unable to explain the diversity of outcomes to which similar instances of 
population growth and decline led12. The same critique applies to their factor of unevenly 
successful bargaining with representative bodies. They provide little historical evidence of 
this causal relation (Jones, 1974). There is no real attempt to comprehend the very different 
political relations, among European entities, between central powers and cities or 
‘representative bodies’, in order to back this very general theoretical claim. 
 
More generally, incentives for actors to act rationally, in terms of economic behaviour, are 
assumed to follow from the removal of feudal impediments. In North’s narrative, merchants 
and powerful representative bodies had naturally known best which property rights were 
inherently conducive to growth – the rights guaranteeing an open market and exclusive 
rights to use labour, land, and capital without others benefiting from it, as opposed to the 
Crown’s privileging of guilds and monopolies. However, North leaves open the crucial 
issue of understanding why certain actors would prefer some rights over others, an issue 
that only inquiries into different socio-economic organisations can engage with. Were all 
landlords or merchants fighting for the same rights all across Europe? In short, as in many 
works inspired by the rational choice model, omniscient and abstract individuals abide by 
transhistorical and de-contextualised objectives.  
 
2.1.2 Jones’ European ‘Miracle’ and the Chinese instance of Recurring Growth  
Unsatisfied with North and Thomas’ attempt which was weakened by the impossibility to 
corroborate its generalisations due to the absence of a class of phenomena like the Western 
                                                 
 
11
 This model has been popularised by Postan (1966) and Ladurie (1966). According to such a Malthusian 
model applied to pre-industrial societies, demographic ‘checks’ naturally arise after population increases due 
to the need for more land in limited-growth economies, leading to cyclical patterns of long-term economic 
development. 
12
 Jones (1989: 33) adds that North cannot explain why the Chinese high population density did not lead to 
similar patterns as in Europe. 
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experience, Jones opts for a comparative study. He adopts this strategy to provide for 
general, i.e. ‘non-local’, explanations for recurring (intensive) growth, a phenomenon 
which did not occur only in the West. More than mere counter-examples, China and Japan 
are crucial instances in the discovery of answers to the growth riddle, requiring an 
understanding of reversions to extensive growth as well as successful long-term intensive 
growth. Only Europe managed to thwart ‘negative forces’, i.e. rent-seeking behaviour, a 
necessary step for sustained intensive growth. Europe’s ‘competitive politics’ succeeded in 
taming rent-seeking behaviour natural to kings. Economic change and innovation are 
ultimately explained by (geo)political factors (Jones, 1981: 125, 1989: 177)13: the amalgam 
of competition for subjects and power among states and within them. The European 
geopolitical pluriverse led to the creation of singular types of governments which were 
conducive to intensive growth. However, Jones insists carefully that the endurance of the 
state-system is in itself a ‘miracle’, in the sense of it being an ‘aberration’ (Jones, 1981: 
225).14 Caught by the imperatives introduced by the state-system, European states were 
more (economically) ‘purposeful’ compared to their Asian counterparts (Jones, 1981: 110) 
and less prone to despotism.15  
 
Since the standard economic indicators (such as income per head) are hard to establish for 
these pre-industrial eras, Jones (1989: 30-39, 169-170) favours the examination of broad 
trends to deduce the presence of growth, such as a century-long increase of consumption, 
the use of new techniques, the increase of productive work outside the agricultural sector, 
and structural changes such as industrialisation. All these, and more, were also found in 
Song China (960-1279), as well as a balance between the creation of public goods and 
freedom of the market that came close to Europe’s later achievements. This progress, 
                                                 
 
13
 However much emphasis Jones puts on tracing the portrait of environmental settings as well as religion and 
culture, they still merely shaped the form of growth, without being its origin (e.g. Jones, 1989: 176; 87-106). 
Technical changes are viewed as depending on the socio-political structure and not as a source of 
transformation (e.g. Jones, 1989: 72).  
14
 He infers its ‘positive’ effect on growth from history and not from some a priori. 
15
 Jones’ argument is similar to North’s third argument outlined above. Constant military threat and the 
permanent ‘exit option’ of their populations led European states to negotiate with groups (foremost 
merchants). Economic change is foremost seen as a Europe-wide phenomenon: ‘The emergent nation states 
were too alike in fundamentals, and too good at imitating one another, too affected by the same stimuli’ to 
give rise to the need to differentiate among them, which would amount to the trees overshadowing the forest 
(Jones, 1989: 39, 169). 
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however, was halted by the Mongol invasions, and with no European-like aristocracy or 
merchants putting pressure on the central government, this kind of single empire was 
content with ‘balanced non-intensive growth’ powered by spatial expansion (Jones, 1989: 
142).  
 
Jones identifies a clear occurrence of massive achievements in the non-Western world. 
However, Jones’ insufficient problematisation of agents’ motives results in analytical 
anachronisms which hinder his comparison between Europe and China. The liberal 
assessment of the European nobility as the opposite of ‘rapacious interests’ (i.e. as contrary 
to rent-seeking behaviours) and of merchant groups as promoting the ‘end of arbitrariness’ 
disregards the persisting personalised character of states and the economy of political 
privileges in Europe. Europe was no different in this regard from China. Precisely because 
they were caught in a pre-modern ‘state-system’ (Teschke, 2003), the European states were 
the opposite of a ‘lean government’ rationalising its governance and strengthening its 
economy through a ‘growth ethic’, extracting less and returning more (Jones, 1989: 132-
133, 176-177).  
 
In Jones’ work, the ‘proper’ balance between a freer market and public goods is both an 
indicator of intensive growth and the causal explanation of its emergence. This confusion is 
due to the fact that Jones (1989: 47) explicitly claims that there is a natural tendency for 
growth to go from being extensive to intensive. On the one hand, this thesis sits uneasily 
with Jones’ explanation of successful recurrent growth in Europe. In North’s as in Jones’ 
narrative, what is ultimately at the core of the ‘Rise of the West’ conceived in terms of an 
increase in productivity is the granting of political rights arising from pressures emanating 
from interaction within a system of plural polities. On the other hand, this inclination to 
presuppose rather than to explain social processes is especially prone to Eurocentrism, as 
the advantages of Europe then become the explanans rather than the explanandum. In the 
end, Jones has to resort to an external, contingent, and naturalised feature as the explanation 
of success or failure in this natural tendency toward sustained growth: military pressures 
indirectly kept in check rent-seeking behaviour (in Europe) and invasion indirectly 
unleashed it (in China).  
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2.2 Historical Sociology  
In contrast to economic historians, HS focuses on the rise of nation-states rather than 
growth per se. Neo-Weberian HS is primarily concerned with the emergence of Western 
macro-social processes such as state-formation, war, and revolution (Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 
1975, 1992). 
 
2.2.1 Mann’s geopolitical model 
Mann’s contribution to the explanation of European exceptionality in the very long term 
(going farther back than the 11th Century) is his theory of social power. According to Mann, 
power takes four forms in which networks are overlapping: ideological, economic, military 
and political (the IEMP model). These forms of power can be deployed in extensive or 
intensive ways, and in authoritative or diffuse manners.16 Theoretically, Mann posits four 
fundamental needs of human society and investigates historically how they gave rise to 
different forms of social power, each according to its own logic. Society was being 
complexified as these distinct collective goals gave rise to institutionalised social 
stratification.17  
 
The emergence of the European capitalist nation-states, as a ‘gigantic series of 
coincidences’ (Mann, 1986: 504), happened at the intersection of cumulative changes 
within each of these spheres. Three processes (‘preconditions’) culminated in the 
centralised and territorialised national state, characterised by its military and fiscal 
                                                 
 
16
 Ideological power pertains to the organisation of meaning, rituals and norms. Mann (1986: 24) defines 
economic power as ‘the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, 
transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature’. Military power is understood as the 
organisation of defence and aggression. Political power refers to ‘regulations and coercion centrally 
administered and territorially bounded – that is, to state power’ (Mann, 1986: 26). Extensive power designates 
the size of the population and territory which power can reach, while intensive power refers to the extent of 
the mobilisation and organisation of people. Power is authoritative when it imposes compliance, and it is 
diffused when adhesion is spontaneous and un-coerced.  
17
 Mann defines such distributive power as ‘exploitative’, i.e. the power of one actor over another in a division 
of labour. This power derives from the implementation of ‘functional’, collective power deployed towards 
accomplishing collective goals. 
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efficiency and coordinating power, especially in its ‘organic’ form18: (1) the (‘necessary’) 
‘normative pacification’ of Christianity; (2) the medieval local dynamism which rendered 
the economy intensive; and (3) the decentralised yet competitive geopolitical structure of 
Europe. Mann (1986: 377, 526) delivers the answer to the neo-classic riddle in providing an 
explanation of the kind of regulation necessary for competition. Once the actors are set in 
an ‘acephalous’ social organisation, providing a minimal order without unleashing political 
predation over economic resources, capitalism arises out of exchange. Once set going, this 
maturation of the economy gave birth to capitalist classes’ in need of more regulation, 
which coincided with states’ increasing need for more revenues in a context of geopolitical 
competition. The singular European reliance on Christianity, as the source of an 
‘infrastructure of extensive power’, is opposed to the ‘compulsory cooperation’ (imperial) 
path that the non-Western world followed. China figures as an ideal-type (out of four 
covering socio-institutional arrangements throughout world history) of strong despotic 
power with low infrastructural power (Mann, 1986: 538).19 
 
Lack of problematisation of distributive power, however, results in the absence of any 
analysis of the social basis of the power of agents. Such an enquiry would undermine 
Mann’s theoretical assumptions about the dissociation of the economic and the political as 
different logics in pre-capitalist societies (Brenner, 2006).20 Mann indeed postulates the a 
priori separation of the multiple realms of the social world in his analysis (based on the 
fetishisation of the formal dissociation between the economic and the political in 
capitalism), before the historical evaluation of its conditions of possibility (Wood, 1981). In 
addition, such a model leads to over-determination and poor explanation, the juxtaposition 
of cumulative phenomena belonging to each sphere dissolving in pure empiricism. In short, 
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 Organic states are those that are ‘nearly-unitary’, collaborating with dominant classes so as to become ‘the 
centralized organizer of a ruling class’ (Mann, 1986: 416) and taking the role of ‘normative pacification’ upon 
themselves. They thus have extended infrastructural reach and social mobilisation. Britain is an early example 
of such a state. 
19
 This ideal-type is argued to cover all China’s history, crudely encapsulated under ‘three relatively early 
bursts of social development (Han, Tang, and Song), followed by dynastic cycles, stagnation, and eventual 
decay’ (Mann, 1986: 538). Mann’s references to the non-Western world are scarce, since he renounces classic 
Neo-Weberian comparative sociology. 
20
 In such societies, Mann however has to recognise empirically that the contested institutionalisation of social 
power based on exclusion relies on unequal means to implement it – which is, in the case of pre-capitalist 
economic appropriation, ‘extra-economic’ means. 
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Mann’s findings on the exceptional European degree of autonomy of spheres (on which his 
comparison with China is based) are historically problematic. Not only does this reify the 
‘economy’, but also the ‘international’, the second exceptional European feature crucial to 
Mann’s understanding of the European miracle. 
 
Mann’s Realist conception of the international has been qualified as ‘a simplistic ‘M-alone’ 
model of the international’ (Halliday, 2006: 513; Hobson, 2006; Hobson and Hobden, 
2002). It cannot be otherwise and cannot be resolved from an IEMP perspective, since the 
international is ‘logically derivative’ from the territorialised and centralised circumscription 
of the political (Lapointe and Dufour, 2011: 14). Mann’s model lacks a ‘social theory of 
war’ (Teschke, 2003), and thus an analysis of the genealogy of medieval elites’ strategies of 
reproduction of their social power. Their transhistorical and predetermined objectives are 
reminiscent of the Rational Choice model. Consequently, it becomes difficult to understand 
the variations in domestic responses to similar ‘international’ dynamics. Mann’s ultimate 
conflation of despotic/infrastructural states under one ideal-type illustrates this (Teschke, 
2003: 122). Since this is an a-socialised ontological given, geopolitical competition falls 
outside the explanatory reach of the model. Yet, de-essentialising such alleged European 
‘exceptionalisms’, by understanding them as social practices, is a crucial step toward 
overcoming Eurocentrism.  
 
2.2.2 The Chinese state-system 
Hui (2005) seeks to circumvent the Eurocentric interrogations of HS by arguing that their 
theses should also be able to properly explain the Chinese trajectory, i.e. beyond its 
conceptualisation as an anomaly or deviance from the Western path considered as the basis 
of what social development should be. Hui builds simultaneously on the works of IR 
Realists, the HS of Charles Tilly, and system and Rational Choice theories. Hui’s primary 
objective is to understand why similar interstate competitive environments in Ancient 
China (the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, from 770 to 221 BC), and early 
modern Europe (1495-1815), led to two different results: modern sovereignty or universal 
empire. According to her, diverging outcomes in terms of state-formation occurred due to 
the manner in which ‘domination-seekers’ (‘state’) and their ‘targets’ (‘society’) reacted to 
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the opportunities and constraints arising from the ‘international’21.  
 
In China, the successful contender of this early state-system, the Qin state (221-206 BC), 
ultimately achieved a universal empire because of its ‘self-strengthening reforms’ 
(increasing ‘state capacity’ through monopoly over the means of violence and 
rationalisation of administration and taxation), combined with ruthless strategies of 
domination against contending states. We thus see the emergence of an early bureaucratic 
state22. Hui turns the conventional narrative of European success on its head: in similar 
contexts, it was China which adopted the more ‘successful’ methods to enhance state 
power. However, those “unmistakingly ‘modern’ practices and institutions” (Hui, 2005: 
222-223) did not last as the ‘countervailing mechanisms’ of resistance and rising costs 
caught up with the empire. It then resorted to ‘self-weakening’ methods like European 
states undertook (dependence on other resources-holders such as mercenaries, money-
lenders, tax-farmers, and offices-buyers). From then onwards, Imperial China encountered 
succeeding periods of unification and division23. As in Europe, in periods of division or 
during the reign of weak rulers, two phenomena occurred: ‘state-society bargains’ (material 
welfare, legal protection, and freedom of expression ensuring the cooperation of the people 
for war and preventing their use of the ‘exit option’), and prosperity through trade (the state 
being too weak to impede it). This is opposed to universal empires’ repression and rising 
cost. In short, war pressures induced ‘liberty and prosperity’, while the absence thereof, 
upon the achievement of ‘universal empire’, led to ‘totalitarism’ (Hui, 2007).  
 
Hui does not succeed in building the agential theory she seeks because of the Eurocentric 
anachronisms which sneak back in through her conceptions of the ‘state-society’ and 
‘international-domestic’ dichotomies. The explanatory weight allegedly put on the bargains 
that ‘domestic’ agents achieved, the choices of reforms that were made, and the conflictual 
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 Five causal mechanisms governed international politics: state reforms, political stratagems, balance of 
power, rising costs of expansion and administration, and counterbalancing strategies. The type of reforms 
undertaken is in turn explained by timing, initial and environmental conditions, and path-dependence. 
22
 See also Zhao (2004) and Kiser and Cai (2004). 
23
 Hui does not sufficiently address the question of the source of this alternation between division and 
unification in Imperial China beyond the Ancient period. She falls prey to the flaws in traditional Sinology’s 
‘dynastic cycles paradigm’, to be criticised in Chapter Four. 
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relations between ‘domination-seekers’ and ‘targets’ (Hui, 2005: 34) rapidly disappears, in 
favour of ‘historical-institutionalist’ factors and ‘initial and environmental conditions’ 
constraining agency. The reason she has to resort to such naturalised factors is that her 
Tillyian definition of resource-holders, ‘society’, does not allow her to identify their 
motives and therefore the object of their struggle with the ‘state’ – i.e. over the social 
surplus extracted from producers, an agent totally obliterated from her HS. As with Mann, 
the ‘international’ logic compels ‘reforms’. By neglecting to theorise why this is so – 
because ‘governing’ was enmeshed in simultaneous exploitation and domination dynamics 
in pre-modern eras – both authors resort to a dichotomised and simplistic vision of 
geopolitics, in which the ‘international’ exists in the form of a state-system – and thus 
compels reactions - or does not exist at all. In the latter case, geopolitics completely 
vanishes from the theory and ‘domination’ is then seen as exercised against ‘domestic’ 
actors, therefore conforming to another logic. This stems from an anachronistic conception 
of pre-modern spatiality and a decontextualised conception of agents’ rationality 
characteristic of neo-Weberian HS.  
 
2.3 World-Systems Theory 
Even if he shares with ‘Rise of the West’ narratives the analysis of a Europe-wide 
phenomenon, Wallerstein innovates by theorising hierarchy. WST proposes an account of 
unequal international relations and their impact on the development of states, preserving 
from the Annales tradition the study of the longue durée and the global scale.24 In 
Wallerstein's work, the world-system, characterised by its autonomy and its role in 
structuring the division of labour, is conceived as the only analytical unit enabling us to 
grasp the dynamic of interaction between societies. World-economies and world-empires 
are defined by the dimensions that link together the societies of a world-system, 
respectively economic or political-military networks. World-empires, in which economy is 
devoted to sustaining bureaucracies, are governed by logics of expansion and contraction, 
until their decline due to imperial over-reach. The contrasting European world-economy 
emerged out of the crisis of feudalism, which was resolved by territorial expansion. This 
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 WST indeed builds partly on the Dependency School (Amin, 1970; Frank, 1969) and the French École des 
Annales (Braudel, 1969, 1979). 
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started a new social form, capitalism, based on the specialisation of economies according to 
the world-market mechanism. The core states backed up this process of exploitation of the 
peripheral regions, firstly in Eastern Europe and then the New World. Europe’s unique path 
results from this resolution of the crisis of feudalism through spatial domination in the 
absence of the threat of a return to a world-empire. 
 
From its original emergence around the 16th Century (Wallerstein, 1974), the modern 
capitalist world-economy has been traced back to an earlier point in the East by others, 
among them Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) and Andre G. Frank (1998).25 Another trend 
following more closely the WST framework backdates the origins of the modern world-
economy to the inter-city-state system of ‘commercial capitalism’. According to Mielants 
(2007), a reorganisation of the economy began the 12th Century. The growing influence of 
the city-state system and its monetarisation and specialisation of the economy made the 
capitalist logic gradually erode the feudal mode, throwing it into crisis. This process was 
first started by European merchants using the city-state infrastructure and resources to 
peripheralise the countryside in this early division of labour, as a prelude to the later world-
economy operating through the state-system. Such early correlation of weak rural nobility 
and strong bourgeoisie (in autonomous cities) forms the ‘backbone’ of the latter’s 
integration into representative assemblies, which enabled them to use this political power 
for the establishment of a spatially deployed division of labour (Mielants, 2002). Mielants’ 
(2000, 2007) interest in China resides in the fact of its failure to ‘take-off’ despite its greater 
commercialisation and urbanisation than Europe. He concludes that city-states imposed a 
very different ‘path dependence’ on Europe (whose revenues were drawn from merchants, 
bargaining in return for political power) than did the world-empire in China (an agrarian 
empire of taxation).  
 
WST forces us to think about the implications of the rise and decline of geopolitical orders, 
as they were obviously plural and not only a property of the West. Contrary to previous 
                                                 
 
25
 Frank’s work will be discussed at length in Chapter Six, alongside that of the California School, a labelling 
that Frank has been given (Goldstone, 2000) and has accepted (Frank, 2001). Abu-Lughod and Frank depart 
from Wallerstein's work by discarding the notion of transition from a mode of production and favouring 
instead a narrative of the shift in hegemony. 
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approaches, WST views Europe as less of a homogeneous entity, for hierarchy divides it 
into a core, semi-pheripheries and peripheries, according to their labour-regimes. However, 
the theory has no historical explanation for the emergence of either the state-system or 
capitalism - its two core concepts and conditions of possibility for the world-economy -, let 
alone of their concatenation (Teschke, 2006). On the one hand, WST resorts to the 
commercialisation model’s explanation of the origins of capitalism as a result of the 
cumulative accumulation of riches. The ‘Rise of the West’ is still a pan-European process in 
which capitalism naturally emerges at the interstices of the previous social organisation 
whenever market exchange relations are allowed to mature (Wood, 2002). However, it is far 
from evident whether there was an inherent link between the decline of feudalism and the 
emergence of capitalism (Dobb, 1950: 33-82), and whether the former was a homogenous 
and temporally coincidental process within Europe (Brenner, 1991, 1995). As for Liberal 
and neo-Weberian narratives, the WST perspective on the emergence of Western modernity 
is about what did not prevent it from arising, such as imperial integration (e.g. in China). 
This transforms capitalism into the destiny of the whole world, thereby reiterating the 
Eurocentrism of naturalising the EuroAmerican trajectory (Dirlik, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, WST contends that state forms and economic models are conferred 
according to their location within the global system of exchange. This functionalism 
prevents us from conceptualising the constitution and transformation of types of regimes 
and socio-spatial orders as politicised processes. On this epistemological level, since it is 
the system (and not its units) which is capitalist, this blurs enquiries into the source of 
social change. The conflation of the ontological and empirical categories of the world-
system renders its existence presupposed (McMichael, 1990), preventing the 
problematisation of Europe’s allegedly exceptional sustained geopolitical pluriverse.  
 
2.4 The ‘Rise of the West’ legacy 
This literature review has evaluated overlooked facets of Eurocentrism in the three main 
‘Rise of the West’ narratives. I argue that there is a common legacy in their diverse 
methodologies: that the transhistorical ascription of economic/political and inside/outside 
differentiations results in narratives of historical continuity and Eurocentric conceptual 
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anachronisms. These scholars indeed elevate the socio-historical processes they attribute to 
European modernity to the rank of analytical a prioris. These two features of the ‘Rise of 
the West’ are not only naturalised, but extrapolated as universal strategies of investigation. 
More broadly, the legacy of the ‘Rise of the West’ narrative ends in an inconclusive relation 
between theory of history, an insufficiently agential conception of social transformation, 
and a deficient understanding of the socio-spatial dimension.  
 
Put simply, these narratives assume an (at least Western) European homogeneity that stems 
from its fragmented character or insertion into the state-system. Universal responses to such 
stimuli in turn foster trade, growth, or capitalism and a unique state form, defined by its 
representative character. This European exceptionality is then contrasted with China, which 
is conceptualised as ridden by rent-seeking and despotic tendencies, in the absence of their 
inhibition by (European-like) competition within and between states or among classes 
propelling the merchants to the front of the stage. What characterises these narratives is the 
absence of a theorisation of the international and of capitalism as social practices and 
relations put in place by struggles around power. I have critiqued in turn: (1) the Liberal 
blurring of power relations; (2) the neo-Weberians’ arbitrary ascription of power to 
disconnected spheres; and (3) WST’s spatial deployment of power in a social vacuum. Each 
of these theories ignores the multifaceted deployment of socio-spatial relations and the 
articulation of the ‘international’ by variegated social institutions and dynamics. This 
dramatises the East/West divide, radically backdates the rationality of European states, and 
conflates very diverse social trajectories into one (medieval-to-modern) Europe-wide logic. 
Their non-provision of a social definition of capitalism is symptomatic of its being taken 
for granted, as something occurring naturally alongside the increase of commerce. 
Presupposing rather than explaining these crucial features in their narratives does not allow 
them to go beyond a mere checklist of absent forms when it comes to understanding the 
‘non-rise’ of China.  
 
The theorisation of these phenomena as socio-historical processes in contrast allows for the 
comprehension of the impact of the politicisation of the economy and trade and of the 
grounding of the ‘international’ in pre-capitalist dynamics. This has two consequences. 
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Firstly, it reveals as a methodological dead-end the analysis of world history based on 
dissociated dimensions of social life, prior to the socio-historical conditions of possibility 
of their constitution as such, and its corollary elevation to a cognitive device. Secondly, it 
stresses the need for a reassessment of the East/West dichotomy and the presupposition of a 
European homogeneity. The appreciation of international dynamics as inherently social 
reveals that there is no simple causality between the working of the ‘international’ logic and 
state-formation along homogenous and rational lines. Thinking along lines of the presence 
or absence of a state-system and the presupposition of outcomes thereof precludes an 
understanding of the socio-spatial dimension of political entities as a crucial instance of the 
reproduction of social relations. This needs to be recovered historically. Only historical 
investigation of conflicts around power, conceived as simultaneously social and spatial, can 
explain the specificities of these trajectories and counter the myth of any inherent long-term 
European superiority, by stressing non-teleological historical outcomes and demystifying 
European homogeneity. Thus, I argue that, on a general level, China and most European 
political entities partook of the same pre-capitalist dynamics far beyond the agreed-upon 
timeframe of the ‘Rise of the West’. Let us turn to this argument’s similarities and 
differences with the project of the California School. 
 
3. Overcoming the ‘Rise of the West’ Debate? The ‘California School’ 
The California School (also qualified as ‘revisionist’ or ‘neo-Smithian’) is part of a wider 
anti-Eurocentric perspective also associated with the works of Jack Goldstone, John M. 
Hobson, and Frank. These anti-Eurocentric scholars challenge the idea of European long-
term superiority and argue for a ‘Eurasian similarity’ until the 19th Century ‘Great 
Divergence’. Pomeranz and Wong are prominent figures of this approach, drawing on the 
empirical works of Li Bozhong (1985) and James Lee (Lee and Campbell, 1997; Lee and 
Wang, 1997). Their comparison between China and Europe seeks to show that neither part 
of Eurasia was on its way to becoming modern and to being able to sustain economic 
growth before 1800.  
 
The California School has done extraordinary work putting Chinese history on the IR 
agenda whilst demystifying its perceived stagnation. A long overdue comparison of the 
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European and Asian trajectories has been renewed beyond the traditional mobilisation of 
the latter as a mere counter-example of European exceptionalism, which has indeed often 
been ‘nothing but a measure of the existing ignorance with regard to the history of the rest 
of the world’ (de Vries, 2010: 8). Wong (1997) introduced the method of ‘reciprocal 
comparison’, which aims to switch from comparing world history and the abstract model of 
European development taken as the norm to a ‘two-ways’ comparison of historical models. 
This is more an insight and warning than an innovative method per se. It stresses the 
necessity to compare the ‘West’ to the ‘East’ by the developmental criteria of the latter, 
without assuming the superiority of the former. If we push forward this insight, this opens 
the door to historical enquiry into the ways pre-19th Century Europe resembled Imperial 
China, turning the tables on both classical enquiries into ‘Eastern’ deviations from an 
idealised Western path (e.g. Landes, 1998), and the anti-Eurocentric strategy of searching 
for proto-forms of Western development earlier in the ‘East’ (e.g. Hobson, 2004). 
 
Overall, the California School is right in stressing that no pan-European uniqueness 
rendered it on the verge of a breakthrough during the early modern period, and that China 
had found equally innovative ways to cope with the systematic resource crises 
characteristic of pre-modern economies. However, the approach faces similar pitfalls to the 
‘Rise of the West’ legacy: it assumes as an analytical a priori the working of international 
and economic logics, and therefore puts forward an ontology in which European historical 
processes are universalised. I shall argue that the California School ultimately fails for this 
reason to explain why China and England (or Europe) ‘accidently’ diverged. In contrast, 
investigating power relations and the historical outcomes of these never-ending contentions 
around the definition of the form power took allows for both explaining the specificities of 
Chinese and European trajectories as well as preserving some explanatory power for the 
emergence of capitalist modernity - as one of these resolutions of social conflicts. Such 
outcomes are neither accidental nor contingent, but ‘unpredictable and only retrospectively 
intelligible’ through enquiries into agents’ struggles to maintain their social power 
(Teschke, 2003: 79). I will first review the debate in economic history sparked by 
Pomeranz’s ‘Great Divergence’ before turning to Wong’s theses, which widened the debate 
on Chinese and European political trajectories. 
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3.1 Pomeranz’s ‘Great Divergence’ 
In emphasising the sudden and late character of the ‘Rise of the West’, Pomeranz wishes to 
reverse the traditional mode of enquiry by demonstrating that Europe was on the Chinese 
path until contingent elements intervened. He contends that a series of socio-economic 
indicators were more or less the same until 1800 at those two ends of Eurasia (life 
expectancy, calorie intake, wage levels, standard of living, household income and 
production and consumption rates). Other similarities include techniques of birth control, 
free land and labour markets, science and technologies, property rights, and proto-
industrialisation. Such indices of ‘Smithian growth’ followed demographic growth which 
promoted the expansion of commerce, specialisation, and division of labour. However, 
Europe and China were both approaching a ‘proto-industrial cul-de-sac’, as they faced the 
inevitable environmental constraints of pre-modern development, highlighted by the classic 
political economists. ‘Luck’ then favoured Britain as it was able to overcome this 
increasingly limited pool of resources and land by switching to an ‘inorganic economy’ 
(due to its easily extractable coal located near the metropolis), and by importing resources 
and land-intensive products from the New World (Pomeranz, 2000: 66, 185). 
 
Pomeranz has been criticised for his misguided use of data in support of his argument 
(Allen et al, 2011; Broadberry and Gupta, 2005; Brenner and Isett, 2002; Bryant, 2006; 
Huang, 2002). Most notable is his predilection for comparing land productivity rather than 
labour productivity, despite the widespread acceptance of the latter as indicator of sustained 
growth. Pomeranz’ argument assumes a universal economic rationality to agents naturally 
investing in productive endeavours. Due to his neglect of the reasons why and the manners 
by which people use techniques or manufacture products, Pomeranz misses the ‘already 
existing divergence’ (Brenner and Isett, 2002: 613) between Britain and the rest of the 
world, be it the European continent or China. What distinguished Britain was indeed its 
systematic implementation of techniques and technologies to increase labour productivity 
(instead of requiring labour intensification, as in China).26 Chinese proto-industrialisation 
                                                 
 
26
 Chinese agricultural techniques, such as weeding, the use of a second fertilizer made of soybeans, and 
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was powered by an increase of labour input per unit of land to obtain subsistence 
requirements, and thus part of a wider ‘involution’ (the decrease of marginal return per unit 
of labour).27 An opposite factor, labour productivity, was rising in Britain well before the 
Industrial Revolution28, and its economic development was following a distinct pattern that 
did not necessitate traditional land expansion, labour intensification, or demographic checks 
to keep it going.  
 
The overall problem with Pomeranz’s study is that he looks for an arguably incalculable 
quantitative level at which a capital-intensive and technological-oriented economy becomes 
more advantageous than a land- and labour-intensive economy, instead of searching for the 
social relations that favour this path. To be sure, ‘How important coal and the New World 
will seem depends partly on how convinced readers are of the similarities I [Pomeranz] 
have suggested in other areas’ (Pomeranz, 2002b: 445). The answer to which is: not at all if 
we understand the important similarities not in terms of standards of living and similar 
quantitative measures, but in terms of the social relations conducive to labour productivity 
and thus increase in productivity per capita (i.e. rendering specialisation and innovation 
inevitable for agents subject to the imperatives of the market). The use of coal and new 
techniques, and the extension of new areas for cultivation, do not naturally follow a logic 
that favours the rise of GDP per capita. The question Pomeranz fails to ask is: what social 
relations were needed so that coal and resources from the colonies made the difference they 
did in the British economy? In the end, under Pomeranz’ impetus, the California School 
shares with neo-institutionalism their conception of growth (as the natural evolution of a 
commercial society, when it was not facing shortages of land and resources to transform) 
and a de-socialised conception of agents. To these similarities, Wong will add the re-
introduction of the ‘double competition’ thesis. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
double-cropping (winter wheat), all required more labour-power and were used to maintain the previous level 
of production when the subdivided lands were not able to yield enough grain to feed the inhabitants (Huang, 
1985, 1990). 
27
 Once again due to the subdivision of holdings among children, peasants resorted to rural manufacture, such 
as weaving, to buy grains when they were not able to produce sufficient food on their land. 
28
 According to Brenner and Isett (2002: 627), ‘Between 1500 and 1750, agricultural labor productivity grew 
by between 52 and 67 percent (Allen 2000, 20, table 8; Wrigley 1985, 720, table 10). Its trajectory thus 
diverged sharply and decisively from that of virtually all of the rest of Europe in this period, reaching, for 
example, a level that was double that of France by 1750 (see below, Table 5).’  
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3.2 Wong and Rosenthal’s return to European uniqueness 
While Pomeranz (2000: 12, 66) contends with the European exceptionalism argument by 
highlighting Britain’s ‘geographic good luck’, Wong in his latest work introduces political 
analysis, alongside Pomeranz’s resource-based comparison, and looks beyond 19th Century 
contingencies to explain the divergent paths of Europe and China. However, as in 
Pomeranz’ work, industrial capitalism is the crucial ‘fundamental transformation of society 
and economy’ (Wong, 1997: 17). It shares a ‘casual rather than causal’ and ‘historical’ 
rather than ‘logical’ connection with the economic pattern it was born in, since such 
Smithian growth was not exclusive to the pioneer zone of the Industrial Revolution (Wong, 
1997: 52; Wong, 1999: 220). In China Transformed, the necessary precondition for the 
Industrial Revolution’s eventual overcoming of Malthusian constraints was technology (or 
forces of production). This is understood as an ‘exogenous variable’, unrelated to ‘relations 
of production’, since the Chinese Smithian growth did not lead to such a cluster of 
technologies (Wong, 1997: 53-58). Despite this causal role of technology associated with 
industrialism, Wong does not enquire into the social origins of technological innovation, his 
analysis consequently relying ultimately on a version of techno-determinism. 
 
In his later work, Wong (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012) draws on another underlying part of 
his previous argument on the uniqueness of European state-formation to explain this 
European proneness to technological innovation. Ruling out a series of conventional 
explanations for the European take-off,29 Rosenthal and Wong fall back upon what amounts 
to the most decisive dissimilarity between Europe and China: their socio-spatial 
constitution, i.e. as a state-system or an empire. Neither political geography was better 
suited for development in general. On the one hand, the Chinese empire encountered an 
early Smithian development, due to its exceptionally large domestic market. In such a 
peaceful environment, its rulers were free to concentrate on social welfare, which resulted 
in light taxation, little interference in the economy, and the provision of a large number of 
                                                 
 
29
 Rosenthal and Wong claim a difference in degree rather than in kind between Chinese and European 
population dynamics and households, economic institutions, manufacturing, financing of production and 
trade, and public finance. 
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public goods (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012: 167-207). On the other hand, the European state-
system constrained its political units to be constantly prepared for and to wage wars, 
therefore raising the tax burden on their citizens and rendering concessions to them almost 
inevitable. An ‘unintended consequence’ arose from this overall unfavourable context for 
economic growth. Economic activity had to move into fortified towns in order to avoid 
destruction from war. In this environment, investment in capital was more rewarding than 
in labour (due to the scarcity thereof), hence catalysing an economy oriented toward 
technological innovation and the adoption of machinery (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012: 99-
128). 
 
On the empirical level, Rosenthal and Wong raise more questions than they can answer. For 
example, although they recognise British exceptionality in its rural location of industry 
(compared to the typical European urban location of manufacturing), they offer no 
explanation for this, despite this coinciding with the locus of the Industrial Revolution. 
They maintain the argument of the continent’s fortified cities’ innovative spirit, despite 
locating the European technological leap in Britain (and thus its move to the countryside) in 
the middle of the 17th Century. Consequently, it is difficult to agree with them that the 
technologies associated with the Industrial Revolution (such as the spinning jenny and the 
steam engine) ‘were developed in ways that were very similar to the development of older, 
less economically-rewarding technologies’ (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012: 124). Their 
argument focusing more on the inventions themselves, than on their implementation and 
their relation to production and its social organisation, renders them unable to fit within 
their theoretical model their own empirical conclusions30, i.e. that the relation of techniques 
and technologies to the economy in Britain simply does not fit the Continental pattern, even 
before industrial capitalism.  
 
Similarly, Rosenthal and Wong (2012: 126, 200) assert that geopolitical competition was 
not the exclusive privilege of Europe,31 but they also admit that they cannot explain why 
                                                 
 
30
 A further example of this is their affirmation that that the unique British success was a matter of demand for 
such improvements. 
31
 They cite Africa, Mesoamerica, southern and central Europe, and Southeast Asia as similar areas witnessing 
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only there did it lead to an advantage in ‘capital-using technological change’. Given their 
causal chain establishing a direct relation between political fragmentation, warfare, 
urbanisation, and the likelihood of technological change, one would expect that the 
assumptions on which they base their core arguments would cohere with their own 
empirical data, and that they would suggest explanations for the non-recurrent character in 
world history of the causal links proposed.  
 
3.3 Space, power and politics 
It is paradoxical that Rosenthal and Wong’s thesis, which deliberately asks us to interrogate 
the relation between space and politics, promulgates such a simple conception of it, 
reminding us of the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives’ ‘state-system vs. empire’ dichotomy. Like 
Pomeranz (2000: 37), Rosenthal and Wong (2012: 4) take the size of the territory and 
population as a justification for the China/Europe comparison. When they discuss the 
relation between space and politics, which features as the crucial impetus of their divergent 
paths, they claim to be speaking literally about the spatial scale: their definition of empire is 
consciously minimalist, a ‘practical appellation for spatially large polities in contrast to far 
smaller ones’ (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012: 13)32.  It becomes rapidly clear, however, that 
what they really mean by this is large spaces exempt from war. This one-dimensional logic 
pertaining to ‘space’ needs to be scrutinised. In the end, their explicit commitments to 
political geography, and to inquiring critically into the selection of units to compare is 
inconsistent and dissolves rapidly, because the former is not socially understood.  
 
A comparison according to size and population presupposes that, like the Yangzi Delta 
within the Chinese empire, Britain was part of a whole called Europe. On a superficial 
level, this obviously does not hold, if only because British social relations were not affected 
by European politics in a manner similar to how the Yangzi Delta was affected by the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
political fragmentation. Rosenthal and Wong (2012: 126) leave it to ‘further researches’ to establish ‘just what 
kind of political competition is tolerable if one seeks to produce economic change’. 
32
 Empires are ‘polities […] where a central ruler exercised effective authority over a large fraction of a 
contiguous region’ (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012: 13). It is in this light, i.e. given that spatial scale is 
understood in its more restricted sense, that we can understand such sibylline affirmations as ‘much of what 
passes for international relations in Europe is domestic politics in China’ (Rosenthal and Wong, 2012: 4).  
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Chinese empire33. But Pomeranz and Wong have different implicit reasons for such 
comparisons. Pomeranz’s strategy is to illustrate similar economic performance in core 
regions, first dissociating politics from economic performance and then trying to recover 
wider patterns and factors which might have influenced these regions. While I have 
previously criticised his use of data and conclusions, it is the incompleteness of his strategy 
with respect to what counts as social context, more than his method itself, which is 
questionable.34 For Rosenthal and Wong, the China/Europe comparison is grounded in the 
assumption of similarity among European states (to the extent that we can see a single 
European ideal-type of state formation), due to an isomorphising international logic. Such 
non-problematisation of political geography is striking for an approach that criticised as 
Eurocentric the taking of pre-modern units as given according to their later nation-state 
form. 
 
In Before and Beyond the Great Divergence, war in Europe is taken as a given derived 
simply from territorial fragmentation; it is a factual rather than a social phenomenon which 
imposes a particular logic on states. This logic of the anarchical system is the only way the 
‘international’ enters into Rosenthal and Wong’s narrative on state-building. In China, the 
absence of a state-system freed rulers from this logic. In the absence of such international 
dynamics, the meaning of territoriality in China is assumed as unproblematic; its disputed 
and unstable character, as well as its enmeshing in intra-elite relations, is ignored. This is 
why Wong can backdate arbitrarily the fixation of the territoriality both in Europe and in 
China by anachronistically already attributing to them the ‘modern’ consolidation of social 
relations. According to Rosenthal and Wong (2012: 10), ‘as early as A.D. 1000’, (socially 
unexplained) ‘self-reinforcing patterns’ were set for the diverging ‘political equilibriums’ 
(spatial fragmentation vs. spatial integration), and the difference in the spatial scale of 
                                                 
 
33
 See for example Pomeranz’s (2002b, 2008) recognition of this point on the difficulties of intra-European 
migrations and the Chinese state’s support of certain property relations and socio-institutional arrangements. 
34
 However, Pomeranz is particularly inconsistent in The Great Divergence about the weight of European 
internal diversity, switching between the Annales’ emphasis on geo-climatic units (see the Preface to the 
French edition, 2010) and an opposition to the European character of the ‘miracle’, whichever serves best his 
argument of demonstrating parallels between both ends of Eurasia.  
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policies in Europe and China35. For scholars concerned with territory, Rosenthal and Wong 
(2012: 23) do not pay much attention to the varying size of this ‘long apprenticeship in the 
strategy of internal rule’, resulting from geopolitical challenges they under-estimated; they 
enquire even less into the manner in which these territories were ‘centrally’ administered; 
and they dismiss the social origins and impact of the expansion of the empire. Yet, 
territoriality was never settled as it was embedded in pre-modern dynamics of domination 
and exploitation; it was the relative capacity to enforce dynastic politics which delimitated 
what was part of ‘China’ from what was not. 
 
For Rosenthal and Wong, Chinese empire formation and European state formation seem to 
be only a rationalisation of governance on different scales. They dismiss the political 
constitution of territoriality and hinder themselves therefore from reaching their objective 
of explaining the geopolitical origins of breakthrough in Europe and their absence in China. 
To recall, the different international environments, conceived as defined only by the 
presence or absence of a war logic, yielded to two processes of state/empire formation. On 
the one hand, we have the traditional narrative of the isomorphising impact of being a part 
of a state-system, delineated primarily by the mere presence of multiple states with more or 
less equal power facing war-induced fiscal challenges and negotiating popular sovereignty 
for the financing of war (Wong, 1997: 127-151). On the other hand, Rosenthal and Wong 
produce a very benevolent and very static image of the Chinese empire. This involves the 
absence of political competition engulfing state revenues, which establishes the conditions 
of possibility for a ‘benevolent’ ruler, guided by Confucianism, to unite local and central, 
as well as elites’ and peasants’, interests in an ideal domestic order, characterised by low 
taxes and investment in infrastructure (especially through granaries; see Will and Wong, 
1991).   
                                                 
 
35
 In their historical discussion, they cannot but keep postponing the stabilisation of these forms of 
territoriality to 1279 (i.e. to the Mongol invasion of China) and then arbitrarily to 1500. The Mongol reign 
appears as a fundamental instance of the consolidation of the spatial scale of China, without consideration of 
its relation to the wider early Mongol empire or its later complex relation with other khanates. For them, the 
reunification of the North and the South under the Qing constitutes another instance of the stabilisation of the 
imagined frontiers of the empire – as they appear to contemporaries. This is already an improvement on 
Wong’s (1997: 76) previous assumption that ‘China never really experienced permanent fragmentation after 
its period of intense interstate competition ending in the third century B.C.E.’. I leave the historical contention 
with these affirmations to the empirical chapters. 
  
52
 
As I shall demonstrate in the empirical part of the thesis, this perspective on the Chinese 
state relies on passive acceptance of the imperial ideology of Confucian collaboration and 
promotion of welfare and growth, presuppositions which do not hold against historical 
interrogation. There is more to the history of China than the succession of dynasties 
recapturing the idea of the Chinese empire and building on the work of previous rulers, as 
argued by the ‘dynastic cycles’ paradigm. The Sinocentric myth of China’s regional 
superiority throughout its history has been importantly challenged as well. The impact of 
consequent ‘international’ pressures also often led to the re-privatisation of political power, 
as in Europe. The office-system praised by Wong for its efficiency and integration of 
dominant classes was rather characterised by the politically-constituted access to peasants’ 
surpluses, whilst the ‘low tax consensus’ was circumvented by the consequent use of this 
system to raise additional fees and surcharges. Wong’s intra-elite peace based on the 
continuity of governance ignores the many changes in relations to property; in sources of 
social status and economic wealth, through and parallel to the state; in the status of the 
peasants; in elites’ relations to the state; and in the forms of the state. Another key problem 
in Rosenthal and Wong’s work is that it is highly misleading to assume that since China 
was an ‘empire’, there was no war and therefore no important military expenditures36. 
Furthermore, the re-mapping of East Asia was constant, as expansion meant the opening of 
new sources of income and the possibility to relax tensions with the elite.  
 
Contrary to Wong’s thesis on the Chinese moral order, both land and people were coveted 
by diverse factions of the elite, and their access to these was politically-constituted and 
often militarily contested, never fixed and always depending on the local and ‘national’ 
balance of power between peasants, landlords, merchants, ruling houses, and their 
entourages. Rosenthal and Wong’s neutral view of the Chinese state derives from their 
alleged absence of pressures toward war waging. There are, however, strong empirical 
grounds for arguing that such pressures existed also in China, were equally enmeshed in the 
                                                 
 
36
 For example, in one of Wong and Rosenthal’s starting points for China’s ‘spatial integration’, the Song 
period, 75% of the state revenues went to military expenditures (Mote, 1999: 115; Twitchett and Smith, 2009: 
399). 
  
53
personalisation of the state and the struggles to gain political access to revenue, and, 
consequently, that until very late in the ‘pre-modern’ period continental Europe resembled 
closely the traditional Chinese ‘despot’. 
 
Rosenthal and Wong’s flattened history of an integrated and unchanging imperial rule has 
its roots in the under-problematisation and contradictory mobilisation of agency. On the 
one hand, the European trajectory is over-determined by geographical contingencies. In 
other words, the structural constraints fostered by the state-system led in themselves to 
modern economic growth. On the other hand, the Chinese path is explained by a highly 
voluntarist conception of agency. In minimising the social contradictions of the regime and 
in setting aside the traditional enquiry of HS into relations of domination and exploitation, 
Rosenthal and Wong are left with no means to explain China’s alleged preference in terms 
of fiscal policy, except by reference to the pursuit and refinement of the typically Chinese 
imperial form of rule that existed ab initio. The Chinese empire’s disintegration and 
reconstitution (always in accordance with the idea of the continuity of a Chinese empire) 
are analysed through the prism of the degree of fulfilment of the allegedly traditional tasks 
of the empire: maintaining the integrity of the territory whilst preserving a good 
tax/services ratio founded on the idea of Confucian good governance. Every step of this 
tautological study is ridden with anachronistic categories and agents evolving in a power 
vacuum.  
 
Conclusion  
Despite the recent de-Europeanising of enquiry into the origins of the ‘Rise of the West’, 
the debates on the ‘Great Divergence’ still suffer from Eurocentrism. Wong’s method of 
reciprocal comparison has much to recommend it, but it cannot bear fruit so long as the 
California School faces the pitfalls of the ‘Rise of the West’ legacy. His objective of 
understanding core European transformations as historical processes to be compared, rather 
than constructed as abstract theoretical models, cannot be achieved whilst universalising the 
very results of these social changes, namely the economic/political and inside/outside 
differentiation. Wong indeed assumes as analytical transhistorical assumptions the logics 
these spheres acquired only through these processes of dissociation. These overlooked 
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Eurocentric pitfalls preclude enquiring into the social origins of modern economic growth 
and incorporating a social conception of political geography. This results, more generally, 
in the impossibility of identifying agency, because its workings are lost in the assumption 
that it follows the imperatives of anachronistically defined spheres (or sources of social 
power). Reciprocal comparison would be put to better anti-Eurocentric use in ruling out 
that Europe possessed intrinsic and pan-continental characteristics inevitably leading it 
towards modernity. The best way to do this is to denaturalise its exceptional features 
supposed to have set it on a special path, and to politicise the different trajectories of its 
constituent units, which in turn must contextualise the motivation of agents in order to 
specify our categories of analysis in showing what they meant socio-historically for the 
agents themselves. 
 
The limitations of the ‘state-system vs. empire’ dichotomy, propagated by the ‘Rise of the 
West’ paradigm, thus remained unchallenged by their main detractor, the California School. 
It is however imperative to leave behind the fallacy of inscribing the ‘nation-state’ 
framework on pre-modern Europe. This eludes firstly the diversity of European units beside 
ones conforming to (incomplete) absolutist sovereignty, but also their ‘empire-like’ 
character. This ultimately reifies the East/West dichotomy. Contending with this 
dichotomised view on East Asian and European international environments is fundamental 
since the geopolitical vacuum in which the Chinese empire is deemed to have been is what 
is assumed to draw a line between modernising Europe and stagnating, or slowly growing, 
China. Problematising the pre-modern forms of territoriality, inside Europe as well as 
compared to China, is a crucial step for circumventing the retrospective ascription of 
modernising tendencies prior to their conditions of possibility. Long-term stories of the 
consolidation of fragmented sovereignty and of spatial integration as gradual processes - 
whether or not we ascribe a modernising virtue to the first - obscure their pre-modern 
similarities, through which their specificities have to be understood. Such narratives indeed 
present the imperfect and conflict-ridden centralisation and territorialisation - as space and 
state were sources of income - as more or less natural and un-contradictory processes. I 
argue that it is the balance of power and resolution of conflicts in highly contested 
processes of state-formation, all sharing a socio-spatial dimension, that reveals the 
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specificity of developmental trajectories more than the geopolitical environment per se. 
Challenging the myth of Chinese stagnation is not enough; this must be done 
simultaneously with a critical examination into the pan-European ‘success’ and the legacy it 
bears for analytical strategies. 
 
I therefore advocate an alternative theoretical framework for envisaging, in a non-
Eurocentric way, the history of Imperial China. To confront the Eurocentric analyses of its 
trajectory, we must however go beyond the timeframe set by the California School, a 
theoretical perspective that has been overly prevalent in the search for a way out of the 
‘Rise of the West’ paradigm. China has been recently brought back within the discipline of 
IR beyond its use as a tool to further specify the European take-off. From Realism (Kang, 
2010) to the English School (Zhang and Buzan, 2012), many scholars try to decipher 
Chinese allegedly unique international institutions, the roots of which are found in the Tang 
(618-907) and Song (969-1279) dynasties’ consolidation of the bureaucratic office-state and 
tribute-system. Such East Asian uniqueness in matters of hierarchy and hegemony was also 
a factor implicit in the explanation of the divergence of the Chinese ‘empire’ and the 
European ‘nation-states’ in the literature reviewed here. Investigating historically in 
specific socio-spatial configurations of Chinese and European polities up to the 19th 
Century will allow me to show the pre-modern continuum on which they rest, and to rule 
out as the origins of ‘rise’ and ‘non-rise’ such naturalised geopolitical or normative features. 
On a general level, this study is about understanding the conflicts around power that shaped 
the Chinese trajectory. ‘Rise’ and ‘non-rise’ alike are better conceived as the historical 
outcomes of such conflicts, and the socio-political contexts in which they occurred need to 
be understood through radically historicised categories that can recover the specificity of 
the phenomenology of power and socio-spatial practices. Prior to such an empirical 
demonstration for the case-study of Imperial China through a PM perspective, I shall first 
show that Eurocentrism is not congenial to Marxism, and further demonstrate that my 
historicist method circumvents the four facets of Eurocentrism I have highlighted above.  
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Chapter Two – Eurocentrism and Marxism 
 
During the 20th Century, the spread of revolutions in the ‘Third World’ confronted Marxism 
with one of its most important conundrums. The issue of the universality of the theory was 
posed with a new, political, acuteness. New questions have been introduced, from thinking 
about the impact of revolutions occurring in peasant societies (e.g. Lenin, Trotsky, and 
Mao) to a growing recognition of the structural impact of the unequal relation between the 
West and the ‘rest of the world’ (e.g. anti-colonialist local Marxisms, WST, and 
Dependency Theory). The application of Marx’s work outside of his original area of 
historical investigation opens up a new series of problematiques also on the theoretical 
front. The categorisation of the non-Western world entails debates pertaining to the 
Eurocentric nature of Marxism: the linearity or non-linearity of development and its motor; 
the ontological dichotomy of East and West; and the theorisation of the ‘superstructural’ 
forms. Following further debates on the nature of pre-capitalist and non-Western societies 
and revisions of Marxist periodisation, does Marxism still fall prey to the understanding of 
world history through the prism of European modernity, and more specifically to the ‘Rise 
of the West’ Eurocentric legacy I identified? Must the ‘East’ be an imperfect form of the 
West; or, put simply, must the former follow the path of the latter, and if so, why? Asking 
whether the addition of a mode upsets the theoretical model, and whether historical 
development is universal, two-fold, or completely open, brings us back to the question of 
what drives history.  
 
It is here, I shall argue, that we find the illustration of the core differences between 
Historical Materialisms (HM) trends, and the differences in their capacity to overcome 
Eurocentrism. What we encounter in the Marxist literature are multiple HM, reflecting 
differential readings of Marx and Marxism. Section One will examine the evolution of 
Marx’s thinking on historical development and the place of the non-West in it. This has 
important bearings for the accusation of ‘historicism’ often levelled against Marxism 
(Chakrabarty, 2000). Historicism here refers to a teleological and stadial theory of history.37 
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 It is not to be confused with my later use of the term as referring to a perspective informed by social history. 
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I will show that Marx was however not always consistent in believing that the non-West 
recapitulates the previous historical stages of Europe. Marx’s writings on the non-West 
indeed contain two contending theories of history and definitions of what constitutes a 
‘mode of production’.38 The possibility of a non-Eurocentric Marxism necessitates 
emphasising his multi-linear conception of historical development. 
 
Section Two will address how Marxist categories have been produced in subsequent 
theorisations of the AMP and the tributary mode. The second, correlated, problem deemed 
as congenital to Marxism by its anti-Eurocentric critiques is indeed its categorisation of the 
world in a way that does not fit the non-West (Saïd, 1978; Hobson, 2012: 52-58). I will 
argue that these mode-of-production analyses cannot overcome such Eurocentrism due to 
their formalism and adherence to Marx’s problematic early theory of history, anchored in a 
Liberal narrative. Overall, I shall demonstrate that, in order to overcome Eurocentrism, the 
emphasis must be put on Marx’s conceptualisation of class relations and class struggles, 
both as theory of history and as understanding of ‘modes’. This chapter therefore also 
serves to establish the basis to distinguish my own approach’s (PM) specificities within this 
tradition. 
 
1. Marx’ writings 
Several Eurocentric passages from Marx, related to the ‘unchangeableness’ of Asia which 
‘has no history at all’39, have haunted any Marxist studying world history. Marx’s 
perspective on the non-Western world nonetheless dramatically changed over the course of 
his works, including regarding political events40. The discovery and translation of 
                                                 
 
38
 I shall use here the widely employed term ‘mode of production’, although I will depart from this concept in 
my own analysis. 
39
 This comes from an article in the New York Daily Tribune of 1853: ‘India has no history in general […]: 
what we call the history of that country is external history, the succession of foreign conquerors who set up 
their kingdoms on the passive foundation of their societies, who offered no resistance to them, and underwent 
no change.’ 
40
 Marx’s articles on India and China celebrate the ‘progressive’ impact of British imperialism on such a 
‘backward’ societies characterised by ‘Oriental despotism’. This parallels Marx’s perspective in the 
Communist Manifesto. These societies’ agency and resistance to British rule was underlined in later works. 
See Ahmad (1994: 221-242), Anderson (2010), Brook (1989:11), Jani (2002), and Young (2001: 101-112) on 
this growing anti-colonalist stance. Others study the complex relation of Marx’s works to Asia (Bartolovich 
and Lazarus, 2002; Lindner, 2010). 
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previously unpublished manuscripts41 has moreover recently upset the notion that Marx 
was a thoroughgoing Eurocentrist. I will argue that the evolution of Marx’s view on the 
AMP parallels the increasing sophistication of his theory of history.  
 
Some words have to be said about the state of knowledge in Marx’s time and the general 
objective of his study of non-Western societies. Despite that ‘the theory of the Asiatic mode 
of production makes excessive demands on the sources’ (Krader, 1975: 304), Marx’s 
historical knowledge on the ‘Orient’ was tenuous (Anderson, 1974b; Hobsbawm, 1964: 20-
26), in the absence of an archaeology of ancient societies, which would later revolutionise 
anthropology and the study of primitive societies (Godelier, 1978b: 106-142). Furthermore, 
it is important to bear in mind that Marx’s prime goal in mobilising this knowledge on non-
Western societies was to reveal the specificity of capitalism against alternative social 
organisations, rather than to understand those social systems as such.  
 
1.1 The concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production  
The concept of the AMP appears for the first time in the Grundrisse (written in 1857-1858) 
and in the Preface to a Critique of Political Economy in 1859. This can already be viewed 
as a progressive move, from the term ‘Oriental society’ (a remnant of the Enlightenment’s 
contempt for Asia) to the study of the East through the same analytical tools as are used for 
understanding historical change in the West (Krader, 1975). This mode was originally 
intended to show an original, more or less ‘natural’, stage from which Western societies 
evolved, a stage based on Marx’s contemporary India, which had remained, according to 
him, relatively unchanged since that time. In this sense, Marx was still a product of his era 
in preserving the idea that Asia was ‘closer to the origin of human society than European 
societies were’ (Brook, 1989: 7). To a certain extent, India was not only the ‘cradle’ but also 
the ‘museum’ of primitive forms of social organisation (Godelier, 1978a: 65 – my 
translation). This is so because the ‘despotic’ state grafts itself onto the independent 
communities previously established, without altering their self-sustaining character and the 
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 Krader (1972) first translated and published ‘Marx’s Ethnological Notebooks’. Thereafter, the Marx-Engels 
Gesamtausgabe project revealed unpublished works, notebooks, and letters, among other texts dealing with 
non-Western societies (see Anderson, 2010).  
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unity of agriculture and manufacture that prevailed within those villages.  
 
However, moving towards his more thorough analysis of the AMP in the Formen (a section 
of the Grundrisse), Marx seems to have abandoned the geo-determinist insistence of his 
early writings42 on the ‘despotic’ character of the state, arising out of the necessity of public 
works due to the aridity of the climate and thereby implying the monopolisation of the land 
by the sovereign. Indeed, after readings which covered a larger range of non-Western 
societies,43 Marx defines the AMP mainly through the notion of self-sufficient villages 
embodying a collective labour process, and he acknowledges a variety of state forms (from 
despotic to democratic, from centralised to decentralised) that can arise from such 
communal forms of property. History is brought back to India in Marx’s Ethnological 
Notebooks, alongside the recognition of social antagonisms in examples of the AMP 
(Anderson, 2010: 209-210).  Asia – or the non-Western world – is less and less viewed as a 
monolithic, unchanging, and pre-conceived bloc.  
 
1.2 Conflicting theories of world history 
Marx’s work on the AMP reveals an important issue: the question of the categorisation of 
Asia is one about its place in historical development, and thus about the nature of the latter. 
The evolution within Marx’s conception of Asia parallels the evolution of his theory of 
world history from the German Ideology and the Manifesto to the Grundrisse and Capital. 
In the former, Marx’s thought is still embedded in the evolutionist perspective of his era by 
making stages in the social division of labour correspond to forms of property. Such a 
succession of modes of production driven by a transhistorical, techno-determinist law or the 
growing of capitalism ‘in the interstices’ of feudalism is reminiscent of the commercial 
model of classical political economy (Brenner, 1989; Hobsbawn, 1964; Wood, 2002). This 
culmination of progress furthermore follows a geographical itinerary (as the parallels 
between Hegel’s and the ‘young’ Marx’s conceptions of historical development exemplify), 
                                                 
 
42
 Marx took the idea of the absence of private property in land, a fashionable notion in his time, from 
François Bernier, and thereafter linked it, on Engels’ suggestion, with geographical determinants. See 
Anderson (1974b) for a genealogy of thinkers who influenced Marx in the creation of the AMP concept. 
43
 The Ethnological Notebooks shows Marx’s critique of many anthropological writings of his era. In Marx’s 
later writings, parts of the AMP conceptual apparatus are applied to India, Java, and China, pre-Columbian 
America, Russia, and Spain. 
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from Asia (either by its absence or by its association with primitive societies) to the Ancient 
World and then to Northern Europe (Brooks, 1989: 5-6; Thorner, 1969: 341-342). 
 
However, this conception is nuanced in Marx’s later works, in which we find an innovative 
thesis on historical development. Already in the Formen, Marx’s concerns with a universal 
rule, ‘some external historical necessity’, switched to an awareness of the specificities of 
different modes governing the behaviours of agents (Wood, 2008b: 88). In these later 
works, Marx shows how abstract and general categories (such as labour, property, or 
surplus extraction) appear historically, thus providing the internal principles guiding human 
activity in particular modes, rather than seeing these categories as evolving forms marking 
the ‘forward march of the bourgeoisie’. He is therefore interested in breaks in the allegedly 
progressive evolution of these forms through history, the ‘Asiatic’, ‘Ancient’, and ‘German’ 
modes having much more in common among themselves than does any of the Western 
ones, including feudalism, with capitalism. No criteria such as the levels of division of 
labour or productive forces can stand either as an explanation of the transition or as a 
gradation of modes. For Marx, all three modes (Ancient, Germanic, and Asiatic) are now 
alternatives roads out of primitive society, i.e. belonging to the ‘same stage of development’ 
rather than having to abide to a formal pre-conceived sequential perspective (Hobsbawm, 
1964). Communal property no longer embodies a homogenous stage; it had undergone 
different forms, within Asia and within Europe, and different modes arose from them 
(Anderson, 2010: 160-162). This growing alternative conception of historical development 
allows for its theorisation as multilinear, in which the non-Western world is no longer 
necessarily trapped at the remote end of a universal evolutionary list. 
 
Other materials illustrate Marx’s later opposition to a reading of his work as a 
universalising history of mankind. In 1877, Marx wrote that his analysis must not be read 
as ‘a historico-philosophic theory of the general path that every people is fated to tread, 
whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves placed’ (in Shanin, 
1983: 136). This emphasises the historically specific character of his account of the 
transition between modes. As additionally shown through Marx’s editing changes to the 
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French edition of Capital (Anderson, 2010: 176-180; Wada, 1983)44, he does not see the 
European trajectory as the one that was logically determined to happen, but one based on 
his contingent historical conclusions. Marx adopted through this a multilinear perspective45. 
The simplistic diffusionism and teleology of the Manifesto has softened. 
 
2. Conceptualising the ‘non-West’ in Marxist debates 
Vigorous debates among Marxists have arisen out of this quote: ‘In broad outlines Asiatic, 
ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as 
progressive epochs in the economic formation of society’ (Marx, 1979). This section 
discusses different Marxist categorisations of the non-West, from the politicised debates 
around the AMP to the more recent thesis on the tributary mode. I will demonstrate that the 
different extents to which they each abide by Marx’s early theory of history impede their 
objective to overcome Eurocentrism. Their correlated neglect of social conflict and 
‘superstructure’ offers contrast with these PM strengths, to be demonstrated, in the next 
chapter, as enabling its anti-Eurocentric understanding of non-Western history. 
 
2.1 The debate around the Asiatic mode  
The intellectual history of the AMP in the regions allegedly encompassed by this model is 
linked with their political history and the history of the Internationals in complex ways 
which can only be browsed over here. In a nutshell, the AMP debates were formally put 
aside in the USSR46 with Stalin’s official proclamation in 1938 of the five-step model of his 
Dialectical and Historical Materialism. The traditional model sticks to the universal history 
in five steps (primitive society/ancient society/feudalism/bourgeois society/socialism) 
                                                 
 
44
 Anderson (2010: 171-176) explains how Marx intended this version to be the one on which other editions 
should have been based.  
45
 Marx’s late writings on Russia moreover suggest the possibility of skipping stages of development: 
‘Precisely because it is contemporaneous with capitalist production, the rural commune may appropriate all its 
positive achievements without undergoing its frightful vicissitudes’ (draft of a reply to Vera Zassoulich in 
Shanin, 1983: 102). Trotsky took up this challenge of the multilinearity of development set out by Marx. I 
shall return, in the next chapter, to the vast literature on UCD arising out of Trotsky’s insights. It should 
already be noted that there are major differences between Marx’ ‘negative’ multilinearity, revolving around 
the possibility of different paths of development, and Trotsky’s ’positive’ multilinearity implying the 
interactivity of paths of development.  
46
 The concept of the AMP was previously disregarded by Lenin, but for very different reasons from Stalin’s 
strategic ones, i.e. mainly because it denies the existence of social classes and their effect in non-Western 
countries (Bloch, 1983: 108-113).  
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presented by Marx in his early works. This ‘single ladder’ model generally has as its 
corollary a search for ‘fundamental laws’ at each stage which would explain mechanically 
the passage from one stage to the next (Hobsbawm, 1964: 60-61). The Comintern stated 
that the communists in the ‘Third World’ were to ally themselves with their national 
bourgeoisie, emulating the Western strategy of the ‘bourgeois revolution’. Opposition to 
Stalin’s dictum in China and the USSR took mainly two forms. Some scholars concluded 
that China differed only ‘in the rate, not in the nature’ of development, and that China 
followed Marx’s universal model, albeit in Oriental variants of Ancient and feudal 
societies.47 Others proposed a bilinear model, as an alternative path in which the AMP have 
arisen out of the primitive society in China and Russia, explaining their despotisms or 
stagnation (Melotti, 1977; Wittfogel, 1957; Wu, 1989)48. 
 
From the sixties onwards, the Centre d’études et de recherches marxistes49 rekindled along 
multilinear lines the debate on the AMP in Soviet anthropology (Bloch, 1983: 116-123; 
Sawer, 1977: 333-372). Godelier (1978b) refuted the ‘Asiatic’ setting of the AMP and its 
association with despotism, locating it instead on a ‘developmental’ scale as a transitional, 
but dynamic, mode between classless and class societies. Circumventing unilinearity, the 
AMP is now seen as giving way either to the slave mode (in the West) or to differentiated 
forms of feudalism.  
 
Even in Godelier’s more sophisticated model, the non-Western world is ultimately confined 
to limbo, in a transitional form problematically ‘lasting for one or two millennia’ (Le Than 
Koi, 1981: 288) which ‘end[s] with the same reductio ad absurdum produced by an 
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 Being written in ignorance of Marx’s later works - the Grundrisse became available in China only in 1963 
(Zhang, 2008) -, those works thus extended the category of feudalism, providing for an alternative, albeit still 
unilinear, model (Hobsbawm, 1964: 61-63). See Dirlik (1978, 1985) on Chinese interpretations of feudalism. 
For a similar inflation of this category, applied to India, see Mukhia (1981, 2008). This confuses a small 
period of European world history with a criterion by which all pre-capitalist world history should be 
evaluated. The slave-owning society as alternative to the Ancient society was promoted by Struve in the 
USSR in 1933.  
48
 Magyar and Plekhanov figure as the early Aziatchiki (Soviet proponents of the AMP). See also McFarlane 
et al. (2005) for an overview of the national debates. For a translation of important Chinese works on the 
AMP, see Brook (1989). 
49
 Alongside Godelier, Jean Suret-Canale (working on Africa), Alfred Métraux (working on the pre-Incan 
states) and Jean Chesneaux are prominent figures of this school. From the thirties onwards, Japanese thinkers 
already foresaw many of their conclusions (Fogel, 1988). 
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indefinite extension of feudalism’ (Anderson, 1974b: 487). The extent to which the AMP ‘s 
stagnation or ‘half-classless’ character draws on Marx’s early theory of history is 
overlooked in the literature. This is demonstrated by what the AMP precludes: the 
emergence of a money economy, of commodity relations, of an open labour market, and of 
an urban bourgeoisie. This results from the self-sustaining character of the community that 
unites manufacture and agriculture, ‘[containing] all the conditions for reproduction and 
surplus production within itself’ (Marx, 1964, quoted in Hobsbawm: 33). All these features, 
rather than social conflicts, are what is supposed to drive historical change in Marx’s early 
theory of history. 
 
Yet, stagnation, or ‘non-development’, fusion of manufacture and agriculture, and the 
individual’s ability to ensure its own subsistence or to appropriate surplus through 
organisation in communities in order to preserve current conditions, are the characteristics 
of all pre-capitalist societies (Anderson, 1974b: 489; Brenner, 1977). However, non-
development does not mean the absence of social antagonisms and social conflicts: there is 
always a ‘political moment’, i.e. a contested character, to any ‘stagnant’ mode insofar as it 
is understood as an institutional arrangement of exploitative social relations, and not as 
instances of an otherwise determined transhistorical mechanism.50  
 
2.2 The thesis of the tributary mode 
This Marxist tradition conceptualises the variegated sub-modes of both Western and non-
Western worlds under the broader notion of the tributary mode, to be distinguished from 
kin-ordered/primitive and capitalist societies. I will first critically review the main initial 
propositions made by Samir Amin, Chris Wickham, and John Haldon, before turning to 
Jairus Banaji’s more recent attempt.  
 
Amin, Wickham, and Haldon propose Althusserian analyses of any social formation 
                                                 
 
50
 The definition of a mode as the relationship between the productive forces and the relations of production – 
the contradiction between them furthering social development – pertains to Marx’s early theory of history, 
This is to be opposed to his statement in Capital to the effect that ‘The specific economic form, in which 
unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, […] the direct relationship of the owners of the 
conditions of production to the direct producers, […] reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure’ (Marx, 1998: 777-778). 
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classically understood as a ‘concrete combination of different modes of production, 
organised under the dominance of one of them’ (Anderson, 1974a: 22). Extending the 
unequal development thesis to pre-capitalist formations, Amin (1976, 2010) differentiates, 
by the strength of the superstructure, between European weak/peripheral (decentralised) 
societies and Chinese, Indian and Egyptian strong/central (centralised) social formations. In 
contrast, Wickham seeks ‘to exclude political and legal definitions’ of modes (1985: 90) 
and thus locates the differences between the modes in their ‘economy’, i.e. between tax- or 
rent-based exploitation. For him, the fundamental difference between these two types is the 
locus of class struggle: over the amount of product peasants must give to the exploiting 
class (for the tributary mode), or over the control of the production process (for the feudal 
variant). Haldon (1993) also dismisses superstructures in his definition of ‘modes of surplus 
appropriation’, but disagrees with Wickham by arguing that rent-takers and tax-collectors 
are ‘two factions of a single ruling class’.51 For Haldon, it is the political relationship and 
the contention within groups of the ruling class over the surplus distribution which 
differentiates tributary societies from one another and propels the change from one mode to 
another. For all these authors, these two modes are more or less well articulated historically 
in given social formations, and this is what gives rise to contradictions. 
 
The problem with such Althusserian analyses is their difficulty in making their theoretical 
position fit with their historical enquiries52. They seek to infer analytically contradictions 
between these modes, whereas they are forced to recognise, in their empirical studies, that 
such ‘contradictions’ arise rather between classes, thereby undermining the explanatory 
force of their model. Despite their different positions on superstructures, these authors all 
fail to reconcile their analysis of superstructural forms to their theories of social changes. 
They rely heavily on the Althusserian notion of articulation of modes of production, which 
inclines them to privilege productive forces above relations of production as the level of 
explanation, contrary to what they claim. They thus partake in Marx’s problematic theory 
of history criticised above. 
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 This view fits more closely with Wolf’s (1997:81) definition of variants within the tributary mode as 
‘variable outcomes of the competition between classes of non-producers for power at the top’. 
52
 This argument will be further developed in Chapter Three. 
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In his attempt to build an anti-Eurocentric, anti-teleological, and anti-formalist Marxism, 
Banaji revises the conceptual apparatus in terms of modes of production as more than the 
mere form of exploitation they imply. He is interested in ‘historical capitalisms’, as varied 
configurations of the logic of accumulation of capital (for example, in commercial, money-
lending, or slave-holding capitalisms), thereby favouring the reading of Marx’s 
comprehension of the cumulative rise of capitalism (Banaji, 2010: 4). He however adds 
more exotic locations to instances of sprouts of capitalist-oriented merchants, amongst 
others Song China (960-1279) through its capitalist industries adjusted to international 
markets (Banaji, 2010: 28-30). China, notably during the Song dynasty, is however also 
viewed as belonging to the tributary mode (Banaji, 2010: 27-33)53. Such a mode is 
characterised by the tributary state control of the means of production, the ruling class, and 
peasant labour.  
 
As for the previous proponents of this mode, when Banaji tests empirically his hypotheses 
across Eurasia, he allows for a whole spectrum of state/elite relationships and variations in 
forms of domination of the peasantry in terms of place and time, through the notion of 
‘historical configurations’. The Chinese state certainly did not ‘own’ the elites throughout 
its history (even Banaji recognises such fluctuations); forms of domination varied, 
especially when we add the variable of peasants’ struggles and differentiated statuses 
through history. Intra-elite relations are best seen as an arena to investigate in order to 
understand how power is negotiated, rather than as a prerogative of a mode (since these are 
‘contingent’ variables, outside of the ‘essential form’, in the concurrent feudal mode 
(Banaji, 2010: 91). This is part of a wider problem of such analyses in terms of mode: 
political geography and authority relations are not critically integrated as social forms 
which are decisive dimensions of the struggle for power, institutionalising the ways to gain 
access to means of production and to products. 
 
The formalist framework of modes-of-production analyses thus leads to a problematic 
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 Song China also belongs to the feudal mode (Banaji, 2010: 85-86). 
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understanding of agency and superstructures. Marx’s very materialism (as opposed to 
idealism) relies on a refusal to think of ‘superstructures’ as inhabiting a realm independent 
of the production and reproduction of material life; their ‘causal’ properties arise from their 
being understood as aspects of productive activity (Sayer, 1987: 88-89). Any dimension can 
‘function as relations of production’, i.e. possess the roles of ‘determining access to and 
control over means of production and social product […] and organizing the process of 
production as well as the process of distribution of products’ (Godelier, 1986: 28). Thus, 
one must not assume theoretically which ‘instances’ or ‘institutions’ belong to the 
infrastructure, but uncover it historically; there cannot be any transhistorical or universal 
aspect that determines a priori the social character ‘the material’ adopts. Rather than being 
derived from a model, the particular ‘contradictions’ have to be specified for each regime at 
a level of concretisation that implies a disclosure of how social agents play and contest 
rules not easily grasped at the level of ‘economy’: the explanatory level of ‘economic’ 
changes has to be located in the political struggles. 
 
Conclusion 
Contrarily to what is often assumed, several Marxist trends took the issue of Eurocentrism 
seriously and proposed a panoply of theories to overcome it in their revisiting of Marx’s 
periodisation and categorisation. I have however shown the limits of the modes-of-
production analyses due to their reliance on problematic versions of Marx’s thought. 
During the debate on the transition to capitalism, Brenner (1989) demonstrated that there is 
more than one theory of history in Marx’s work. I have further developed this point 
concerning different theories of world history in Marx’s writings, illustrating the uneven 
presence of a ‘waiting room of history’ for the non-European world (Chakrabarty, 2000: 8). 
In the tradition of PM, Wood made her own the project of countering the naturalisation of 
capitalism in the traditional narratives of its emergence. However, it is not only capitalism 
which is essentialised in these studies, but also the West and its trajectory, and thus they 
contain many assumptions on what historical development on a world scale is, and who can 
be part of it. 
 
In contrast to modes-of-production analyses, PM’s emphasis on ‘superstructure’, historicity, 
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specificity, and the role of social struggles leads to the conclusion that the emergence of 
capitalism is not a logical (and thus universal) outcome of either the ‘West’ or of one of its 
exclusive modes of production. It was instead a historical outcome of class struggles that 
occurred in one of the atypical forms of Western feudalism. From this standpoint, this 
chapter has criticised the Eurocentric formalism and teleologism of some Marxist 
conceptions. Althusserianism further petrified the vocabulary of ‘modes’ by its ambiguous 
relation between theory and history (the so-called ‘social formations’). PM’s alternative 
understanding of regimes of social appropriation, based on a distrust of the teleological 
prefiguration of a given social form in a preceding one, overcomes such discrepancies. 
Whilst further exploring PM’s distinction within the Marxist tradition, the next chapter 
builds on this critique in arguing for a wider critical use of generic concepts, including 
many on which the IR discipline has been built. PM’s historicisation of praxes is meant to 
avoid reification of non-Western experiences and Eurocentric conceptual anachronisms. 
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Chapter Three – Political Marxism  
 
In the background of two central debates in IR and in social thought, the relations between 
history and theory and between agency and structure, this chapter highlights the originality 
of PM within the wider HS tradition. Clarifying how PM can overcome the charge of 
Eurocentrism and be applied to the analysis of a key non-Western case, China, is 
demonstrated in five steps. In continuity with the preceding chapter, and further 
substantiating the claim that that the criticisms of Eurocentrism cannot be addressed to a 
homogeneous Marxism, Section One develops on the first generation of PM scholars’ 
works on Marx’s theories of history. This shows how Brenner and Wood discarded Marx’s 
early stadial, techno-determinist, and teleological Smithian narrative of the emergence of 
capitalism in favour of a re-reading of social change through historically specific open-
ended social conflicts.  
 
In Section Two, the developing of such historicist method54, contrasting with Capital’s 
logicist perspective, is set in the light of the debate within British Marxism occurring from 
the sixties onwards. The debate opposed a structuralist strand, illustrated by Perry 
Anderson’s importation of Althusserianism, to a historicist strand, put forward by E. P. 
Thompson’s reliance on the British tradition of social history. Section Three evaluates to 
which extent each of these influences are at work in PM. I will demonstrate that there are 
tensions between, on the one hand, Brenner’s structuralist understanding of rationality, 
partially informed by Rational Choice Marxism (RCM) and illustrated in the ‘rules’ of 
reproduction generated by social-property relations, and, on the other hand, his historicist 
account of the transition to capitalism, stressing the agential, contested, and open-ended 
nature of historical outcomes. A similar tension is visible in Wood’s work, between her 
Thompsionian approach to class and history and her structural, reifying reliance on 
imperatives rendering difficult to agentially understand historical specificity. 
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 Historicism refers here to the historical grounding of analytical categories. On the misinterpretation of 
historicism by Althusser (1970) and for an overview of what historicism means to social historians, see 
Thompson (1978). The alternative meaning of historicism is discussed in Chapter Two. 
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Section Four reveals how a second generation of PM scholars (Samuel Knafo, Hannes 
Lacher, and Benno Teschke) has developed the historicist legacy of PM whilst responding 
to the need of a proper articulation of Marxism vis-à-vis IR (Halliday, 1994; Rosenberg, 
2006; Skocpol, 1979; Teschke, 2005). This has been done through further re-
conceptualisation of the relations between history and theory and between agency and 
structure, epitomised in the engagement with the UCD approach. The key claim is that 
PM’s contribution to IR is to provide a method through which understanding the 
historically contested construction of political geographies and strategies of spatialisation, 
in opposition to a formalised and universal theory of ‘the international’. Section Five 
engages with the charge of Eurocentrism as addressed more specifically to PM, and 
counter-argues that its anti-formalism enables the productive transfer of PM’s method to the 
analysis of non-Western trajectories. Its historicist method overcomes the super-imposition 
of preconceived categories of analysis to the non-Western world, whilst providing means 
for understanding their socio-political conflicts on their own terms. 
 
The chapter’s conclusion thus stresses the necessity of strategies of concrete historicisation 
of generic concepts as praxes in order to reconstruct China’s trajectory in its geopolitical 
context. ‘Western’ IR concepts, such as war, international, and hierarchy/anarchy, and 
sociology and political theory’s concepts, such as state, empire, territory, economy, and 
rationality, must be radically historicised and specified on a case-by-case basis in order to 
recover the sui generis and contested character of their socio-political construction. This is 
what informs the historical reconstruction of China’s trajectory from Chapter Four to 
Seven. 
 
1. Political Marxism’s theory of history 
The term ‘Political Marxist’ was coined by Guy Bois (1978) during the ‘Brenner Debate’ to 
criticise the ‘voluntaristic’ tendency in the works of Brenner on the transition to 
capitalism55. Through this debate, PM stimulates the renewal of anti-teleological, anti-
determinist, and anti-functionalist Marxism. PM’s historical method seeks to overcome the 
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 This label is endorsed by Wood (1981) and her followers, who welcome the emphasis on the explanatory 
power of political struggles. 
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traditional labelling of Marxism as privileging theory over history and reproducing the 
base-superstructure model. The core concept of the approach, social property relations, is 
defined as:  
the relationships among the direct producers, among the members of the class of 
exploiters (if any exists), and between the exploiters and producers, which specify and 
determine the access of individual economic actors (or families) to the means of 
production and to the economic product (Brenner, 1986: 26).  
This concept includes, as constitutive of a 'mode of production' and at the level of the 
reproduction of material life, many ‘extra-economic’ dimensions, such as culture, religion, 
law, ideology and politics, i.e. social factors and institutional mediation. In studying the 
contestations of these social relations institutionalising inequality, PM places an 
explanatory emphasis upon the outcomes of concrete social struggles even at the risk of 
upsetting a theoretical model, in opposition to the assertion of universal laws to which 
empirical cases are bound to conform.  
 
In this way, Brenner (1989) and Wood (1995) stress that two theories of history can be 
derived from Marx’s work. As stated in Chapter Two, Marx’s earlier works understand 
capitalism as the apogee of the development of productive forces taking place through an 
increasing division of labour56. This idea ultimately led to the theses of the ‘bourgeois 
revolution’, the ‘commercial model’, and the successive historical stages. A starkly 
different theory of transition is at work in the later texts, in which Marx recognises that the 
drive to revolutionise the forces of production is characteristic of capitalism, and of 
capitalism only. The sources of social transformation are then to be found in the distinctive 
dynamics of the mode of production from which class conflicts arise, as can be better seen 
in Capital, in the Grundisse, and in his later historical writings. This less unilinear and 
teleological perspective was however never fully achieved, as Capital is not a history of 
capitalism conceived of as a social relation, but a history of capital whose effects produce 
capitalism (Thompson, 1978: 74-94). This fundamental tension within Marx’s work forms 
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 This can be set in the sociohistorical context of the salience of the ideas of the Enlightenment, in which 
capitalism is seen as coeval with ongoing historical progress in a teleological fashion (Wood, 1995: 146-149). 
The ‘social history of political theory’, developed by Wood in collaboration with Neal Wood (1978; Wood and 
Wood, 1977), has been tentatively applied to ‘Marx’s context’ in Comninel (2000b). 
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the theoretical anchor of the divergence of structuralist, functionalist, rationalist, and 
historicist trends within Marxism.  
 
2. The debate within British Marxism 
The debate within British Marxism opposed two different schools of thought: what have 
been called the ‘British Marxist Historians’, foremost Thompson,57 and the structuralists, 
deriving from Anderson’s introduction of Althusserianism into Britain.58 Both interventions 
were designed to re-conceptualise the relations between the ‘base’ and the ‘superstructure’ 
and between history and theory, as well as the role of agency, but in highly distinct ways. 
 
Louis Althusser’s prime objective is to elevate Marxism to the status of science, involving, 
as a ‘preliminary task’, epistemological critical readings of Marx, inspired by Western 
Marxism59 (Anderson, 1976: 52). Briefly, Althusserian structuralism aims to relieve 
Marxism of its economism by epistemologically separating the social world, conceived as a 
‘totality’, into three realms: ‘ideology’; the ‘economic’ (determinant in the ‘last instance’); 
and the ‘political’ (which is given a ‘relative autonomy’). In these theoretically determined 
structures (since ‘history’ can never be properly grasped), the subjects are ‘träger of 
structures’ and history is presented as a ‘process without subject’. Albeit combining 
Althusserianism with the British tradition of social history, Anderson’s HS (1974a, 1974b, 
1976) has structuralist influences in the conceptualisation of pre-capitalist modes of 
production as distinguished by their superstructures (as a somehow distinct realm), the 
‘articulation’ vocabulary of his theory of transition60, and the more classic ‘history from 
above’ required by his emphasis on a theory of the state. 
 
Thompson’s historicism strongly departs from this kind of structuralism. Against 
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 Kaye (1984) unites under this label also Maurice Dobb, Rodney Hilton, Christopher Hill, and Eric 
Hobsbawm, for their common ‘bottom up’ enquiries into the emergence and development of capitalism 
through a ‘class-struggle analysis’.    
58
 See for example Hirst and Hindness (1975). 
59
 Under this term, Anderson brings together, among others, Georg Lukàcs, Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt 
School, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Althusser. 
60
 It is notably informed by an Analytical Marxist that I will mention in the next section: Gerald Cohen 
(1978). 
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misinterpretations of its theory as voluntarist (Anderson, 1980), a rehabilitation of the 
‘materialist’ Thompson has been defended (Trimberger, 1984; Wood, 1995; Kaye, 1984). 
Thompson objects to the ‘self-generating conceptual universe’ of Althusserianism (1978: 
17) and emphasises instead the importance of the empirical mode of investigation. 
Thompson stresses the historical experience of social groups over theoretically inferred, 
fixed, and de-historicised ‘categories of statis’, of which history is but a manifestation. He 
constructed his relational definition of class by a historical logic (building the Marxist 
categories out of regularities observed over time). A class is therefore not a location within 
a structure, but a common experience—as a mediation between ‘social being’ and ‘social 
consciousness’ translated onto cultural grounds—of divergent interests from another social 
group. The concept of ‘experience’ illustrates that individuals are simultaneously ‘part-
objects’ (of society ‘organised in class ways’) and ‘part-subjects’ (proper agents shaping 
history). This contrasts with Althusserianism’s irresolvable dualism between the 
deterministic realm of structure and the contingent historical plane (Wood, 1995: 59). This 
concept is particularly important in Thompson’s corollary emphasis on struggle because the 
impact of the division of society into classes—felt at the ‘level’ of social relations, 
institutions, customs, values, and daily life as a common experience—is the source of the 
generation of antagonisms and conflicts and, ultimately, social change.  
 
3. Tensions with Political Marxism 
Where does PM fit in this Marxist philosophical divide? Despite its Thompsonian heritage, 
PM works sometimes exhibit a strictly defined conception of agency (Brenner, 1986, 1997) 
and a formalistically conceived structure (Wood, 2002, 2003). PM’s tensions in this regard 
will be revealed through RCM’s influence on Brenner, before turning, in the next section, to 
the historicist response of the second generation.  
 
Originating in neoclassical economics, Rational Choice Theory has been extended to 
Marxism through RCM (Elster, 1985; Roemer, 1982), as a special branch of Analytical 
Marxism.61 The central characteristic of RCM is its unravelling of the conscious, strategic, 
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 Analytical Marxism also encompasses functionalism (Cohen, 1978). These approaches diverge notably on 
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intentional and rational ways agents act in given social relations, an enterprise necessitating 
a micro level of analysis and only critically incorporating methodological individualism 
(Wright, 1995). Many critiques have been aimed at RCM: agents are no more than 
‘embodied structures’, their motivation automatically being derived from them; its non-
relational concepts of class and exploitation render the model unable to explain the 
background distribution; the model is based on a generalisation of capitalist 
rationality/transition/’freedom’, assuming what needs to be explained; it is compatible with 
no theory of history (Chibber, 2011; Goldfield and Gilbert, 1995; Wood, 1989; Wright, 
1995).  
 
In some of Brenner’s works, there is a RCM tendency to derive ’strategic’, ‘maximising’ 
behaviours not from historical analyses, but analytically, from the constraints imposed by 
social-property relations, thereby confining the possible behaviours along strict lines62. A 
structuralist tendency is present also in some of Wood’s ‘ideal-type of capitalist rationality’, 
which totalises all social reality under its deployment (Knafo, 2007: 102).63 Her sometimes 
rigid reading of the separation of the economic and the political in capitalism could lead to 
a return to a simple theoretical derivation of capitalism from the logic of capital.64 
 
Yet, Brenner’s works differs from RCM in its relational definition of class and exploitation, 
leading to a thicker, more socialised and historicised conception of rationality (Wood, 1989, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
the adequacy of a ‘methodological collectivism’ and on the primacy of either functional or intentional and 
causal explanations.  
62
 See, for example, Brenner’s four ideal types of combination of collective or individual organisation of 
property and surplus-extraction in pre-capitalist societies. Brenner (1986: 51-53) inferred theoretically the 
likeness of the intentional and unintentional outcomes of these ideal-types to lead to the dispossession of 
peasants of their means of subsistence. The explanatory power is not put on varying and contested strategies 
actually implemented, and conceptualised as ‘historically open’ (Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 571), but on 
structures more or less favourable to the transition to capitalism. This even allowed Carling’s (1991), a RCM 
scholar, combining of Brenner’s ‘special theory’ (as an ideal-type of interactions among intentional actors 
within a mode of production) with the ‘general’ (functionalist) theory of Cohen. 
63
 For example, Wood’s thesis on capitalist imperialism (as the culmination of capitalist inner logic) or her 
anthropomorphising affirmation that capitalism ‘needs’ a multiple-state system and a hegemon. See also 
Chibber (2005) and Allison and Anievas (2010). 
64
 ‘For the separation-argument is not conceived as an absolute, once-and-for-all insulation of spheres, but as 
an internal relation between states and markets whose degrees of de-politicization and re-politicization depend 
on historically concrete praxes’ (Teschke, 2011: 89). 
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1990).65 Even in Analytical Marxism, Brenner (1986) maintains an important emphasis on 
class struggle and political organisation, institutions, and communities, and challenges the 
transhistorical rationality of Rational Choice Theory by grounding sociohistorically what he 
had identified earlier as ‘Smithian economic rationality’ (1977). Merchants and Revolution 
is a masterpiece in terms of theorisation of a social process, in which social relations, 
cultural forms, class strategies, interests and alliances, and state forms and policies are 
conceptualised as conflictual and always contested, and whose outcome is historically 
open. Crucially, these social forms are not to be deduced analytically, but to be recovered 
historically in a Thompsonian ‘logic of process’, as emphasised by Wood (1982).  
 
4. Political Marxism’s renewal: agency and geopolitics 
The Thompsonian legacy in PM was later re-activated. Knafo (2010) argues for a stronger 
PM’s conceptualisation of agency, as a methodological principle instead of as an 
ontological issue.66 This entails that we cannot predict how agents would react to 
‘imperatives’ upon their sole description, e.g. before historical research revealing the 
multiple variables that ‘conditioned’ agency.67 Social regimes of appropriation primarily 
gives form to ‘regularities, shaping and directive pressures, indicative articulations of 
human practices’ (Thompson, 1978: 116), rather than being explanatory in themselves of 
the agents’ behaviours and of social change. Preferring ‘ways’ over ‘rules’ of reproduction 
(Teschke and Lacher, 2007) and ‘appropriation’ over ‘property’ (Dufour and Rioux, 2008: 
129) emphasises that there is no one-way straight line between social-property relations 
(‘structure’) and agency, the latter then sometimes, intentionally or not, giving way to a 
different set of limitations.  
 
Yet, PM’s theory of history does not dissolve into an un-theorisable, empirical series of 
contingent events. It is the manner in which the ‘structure’ is mobilised by agents that 
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 Teschke’s (2003) ‘bounded rationality’ would also fall into this category. Such a historicised rationality 
strengthens the ‘classic’ rationality by putting the preferences and the ends in social context (Teschke, 1998: 
340-341). 
66
 This does not lead to a ‘voluntaristic’ theory of history, which would imply that agency matters historically 
by virtue of its (exceptional) escape from structures. 
67
 As ‘balance of class forces, degree of self-organization, setting of hegemonic discourse, mobilization of 
institutions and so on’ (Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 570). 
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defines the form it takes (Knafo, 2010)68. So long as we conceive a society as organised in 
class ways, this definition of agency is relational and presupposes the ‘structure’ as socially 
contested and dynamic, because the ‘imperatives’ becomes effective only when wielded by 
social agents whose interests are in conflict with those of others. Social-property relations 
are what agents act from and what agents act on in an institutionally, politically, and 
culturally mediated way, and this, not only in times of transition, but in the ongoing 
modulation of ‘imperatives’.  
 
This re-conceptualisation of agency was crucial in PM’s historicisation of geopolitics and 
can be opposed to the UCD approach’s structuralist stance (Teschke, 2014)69. Both theories 
undertake the challenge of conceptualising geopolitics as constitutive of social development 
(rather than as an external factor) and endeavour to explain the divergence, rather than the 
convergence, of social trajectories. In aiming to produce an International Historical 
Sociology (Rosenberg, 2006), the UCD approach studies the structural effects of political 
multiplicity though a universal theory of the ‘international’.70  
 
However, the ‘international’ and its unevenness are only superficially transhistorical; as a 
‘socio-historical practice’ (Teschke, 2008: 180), eminently specific through space and time, 
it cannot easily universalised. UCD as a general abstraction has to function with an 
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 In fact, taking the behaviours of agents for granted is what leads some authors to infer such an inner logic 
of the structure, thus reifying it.  
69
 PM however flirted for a time with this concept, albeit understood differently than in Rosenberg’s thesis 
(Dufour, 2007; Matin, 2007; Teschke, 2003, 2005, 2006; Teschke and Lacher, 2007). 
70
 The ‘international’ is conceptualised as the ‘dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the 
coexistence within it of more than one society’ (Rosenberg, 2006: 308). Rosenberg's interpretation of 
Trotsky’s (1980) concept of UCD intends to make sense, at the theoretical level, of the perennial fact that 
discrete societies, each on a particular trajectory of social development, also interact with each others and find 
themselves inserted into a specific geopolitical context, making completely endogenous (or ‘pre-
combination’) development impossible (the second level of UCD as ‘intrinsic’ and transhistoric). The 
empirical consequence of conceptualising UCD as a general abstraction is a first level of understanding UCD 
as an overdetermination of development. Social and institutional developmental trajectories must be seen in 
the context of a geopolitical environment offering constraints and opportunities for the conflictual process of 
preservation of social power of the elites in specific forms of adaptation. Thus the unevenness of development 
and the inevitable interaction of societies imply a need for a social theory that is able to account for the fact 
that the international constantly produces more unevenness and differentiation. On UCD and IR theory, see 
the CRoIA debate (2009) Callinicos and Rosenberg (2008), Rosenberg (1996, 2006, 2010), Matin (2007, 
2013), and Hobson (2011). UCD is alternatively conceived as a ‘methodological fix’ (Alison and Anievas, 
2010) or as ‘an inescapable context’ (Halliday, 1999). 
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‘international’ that is analytically given. Yet, sociological explanations do not arise from 
‘the fact of inter-societal coexistence and interaction’, but from their nature, so its 
integration ‘into [a] theoretical conception of social causality’ can only be indirect, better 
thought of as a methodological premise. The ‘international’ (as variegated territorial 
relations or socio-spatial orders) is a ‘structure’ only in the sense that it is modified and 
used by social groups for their social reproduction. ‘Interactive (inter-societal)’ as well as 
‘reproductive (internal social-structural)’ structures or necessities cannot have an inner 
logic or causal effects (the ‘whip of external necessity’ or ‘the law of a mode of 
production’) abstracted from history (and agency). In the UCD approach, the ‘international’ 
has replaced class conflicts as causal determinants.71  
 
By contrast, the 'social history of geopolitical relations' (Teschke, 2011) starts from the 
specificity of class conflicts, their outcomes, and the social reproduction of agents they 
relate to, as enacted dialogically at the internal and external levels. For Teschke (2008, 
2011), historicisation prevents the reification of phenomena (e.g. ‘the international’, 
‘society’, ‘development’, and the ‘state’) which can be socio-historically traced back to—
but not theoretically derived from—72 a specific (modern) European context. The impact of 
the international (and, above all, its nature) has to be deciphered for each social 
transformation studied: geopolitics is as 'social' as economics, which the UCD approach 
arguably recognises but cannot substantiate. The canonical features of the ‘international 
system’ are historical products of concrete struggles over the form and implementation of 
surplus extraction, arising from the diverging interests between and among classes over 
their social reproduction and the varying corresponding strategies implemented. Geopolitics 
is intervening at every moment (and not as a distinct realm) as it is constitutive of the ways 
of reproduction of classes. PM contends that the social rationality of agents cannot be 
fathomed outside a geo- and socio-historically specific and always contested 
‘international’. 
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 The level of generality to which the notions of ‘development’ and society are defined allowed the former to 
be interpreted in a number of divergent ways as inflexions of social-property regimes (Matin, 2007) or as 
levels of productive forces (Allinson and Anievas, 2010). Hobson (2011) has also used the concept to explain 
British late industrialisation. 
72
 See Teschke (2003) and Lacher (2006) on the non-coeval emergence of the multiple states system 
(inside/outside differentiation) and capitalism (economic/political differentiation).  
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Geopolitical orders are ‘what social agents make of them’ by mobilising their ‘imperatives’ 
in ways that are historically open, even if they are grounded in prevailing social-property 
regimes73. In pre-capitalist eras, geopolitics is eminently singular as it is based on 
hierarchically overlapping authority relations in the absence of a settled inside/outside 
differentiation (Teschke, 2003), and whose set of changing and often conflicting social 
relations are fundamental to understanding how conflicts between social forces are 
structured simultaneously at the ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ levels.  
 
5. Eurocentrism and Political Marxism 
For the anti-Eurocentric literature, PM’s methodological nationalism turning into normative 
Eurocentrism and Eurocentred categorisation of the world leads to its belief in the historical 
superiority of Europe. In respectively countering and furthering these critiques, I will argue 
that the full extent of PM’s historicist premises for the anti-Eurocentric analysis of world 
history has yet to be grasped, thereby developing the argument made in Chapter One. 
 
Firstly, PM’s account of the transition to capitalism is deemed Eurocentric. By looking only 
through the ‘European tunnel of time’ (Blaut, 1993), PM disregards the contributions of 
non-Western civilisations as a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism (the 
fourth meaning of Eurocentrism identified in the Thesis Introduction). Colonialism is then 
perceived as ‘secondary’, as a consequence of Western capitalism, rather than as having 
causal significance in its rise (Bhambra, 2011: 7). Brenner’s downgrading of the importance 
of trade and towns during the Middle Ages and his restrictive conception of capitalism 
precludes him from seeing that its emergence was happening world-wide (Blaut, 1994). 
From the standpoint of the UCD approach, Matin (2013) crucially argues for emphasising 
‘the geopolitical and geocultural fault-lines and fractures within modern(izing) Europe 
itself’, in order to counter the ‘internalist’ perspective that views this process as self-
contained. According to Matin, Brenner fails to acknowledge that ‘historical processes that 
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 Geopolitical orders are then deciphered ‘by a historical account of the interplay between the constraining 
structures of property and authority and their consequences for the goal-oriented yet bounded and antagonistic 
practices which animate and change these social relations’ (Teschke, 2003: 47). 
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culminated in the crystallization of capitalism in North Western Europe were international 
in dynamics and sources’74. Everything depends upon what is to be explained, what this 
notion of ‘crystallization’ means, and what spatial reach must necessarily be taken into 
account in the light of the process being explained75. Contentions about other necessary 
conditions for the transition are fair, but does it mean that PM is a Eurocentric theory?  
 
For Hobson (2004, 2007), previous ‘Eastern’ achievements and interrupted processes are 
discarded on the basis of geographical location and remain outside the focus of mainstream 
analysis, whereas PM’s decision to place the explanatory power on internal variables in the 
account of the emergence of capitalism is seen as exogenous to the theoretical weight of 
one factor against another.76 In short, the fact that PM privileges internal class struggles as 
the principal explanatory factor of the transition is viewed as normatively problematic in 
itself. These are however better viewed as contending causal explanations. These critiques 
become unfairly organised around normative Eurocentrism, rather than seriously engaging 
with PM on empirical and theoretical disagreements, notably about the sources of social 
causation, the definition of social processes, and the significance of the differentiation 
within European trajectories.  
 
Secondly, anti-Eurocentric scholars critique the absence of a systematic PM comparative 
analysis using non-European cases (the third meaning of Eurocentrism). What is at stake 
here is the ‘Euro-Marxist’ denial of the ‘non-West’ as ‘the site of historically efficacious 
change in its own right’ (Blaut, 1993: 45). Later analyses of non-European cases (Brenner 
and Isett, 2002; Wood, 2003) were indeed more focused on proving their ‘non-
development’ compared to post-1688 England, than on genuinely recovering the specificity 
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 For a similar argument, see Anievas and Nisancioglu (2013). 
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 PM does not rule out the impact of interconnections, but conceptualises differently the ‘heterogeneity of the 
social’. For example, PM has discussed the role of the demise of the Carolingian Empire and the Norman 
Conquest in the settings of the transition to capitalism, whose ‘diffusion’ was a long, variegated, and 
conflictual process (Brenner, 1995; Comninel, 2000; Teschke, 2003). 
76
 Hobson (2007: 93) explains that ‘what makes it Eurocentric is the assumption that the West lies at the 
centre of all things in the world and that the West self-generates through its own endogenous “logic of 
immanence”’. However, it is unclear why Hobson (mobilising Abu-Loghod, 1989: 12) supposes that all 
Marxists believe in the inevitability of the emergence of capitalism and have to ‘rationalize why this 
supremacy had to be’. 
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of their social trajectories, which this thesis endeavours. This critique needs to be further 
developed, as there is a tendency in Wood’s works to stress a ‘European’ specificity against 
an all-encompassing non-Western background negatively defined.  
 
Regarding Europe, in certain studies (e.g. Wood, 1995: 19-48, 2008a), there is a tension 
between, on the one hand, a description of an ideal-typical, exclusive, and evolutionary 
pan-Western particularity woven around the autonomy of private property (enabling 
capitalism and political theory77) and, on the other hand, a commitment to reconstruct the 
variegated and (relatively) open-ended nature of European social developments. Wood 
sometimes seems to follow the famous argument (popularised by Anderson, 1974a) 
according to which Roman private property opened the path to feudalism, which is 
conceived in turn as a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism. In trying to 
show the specificity of capitalism as a ‘privatisation of political power’, Wood sketches out 
schematically the singularity of Western feudalism.  
 
The PM analysis of the transition is however organised against such a thesis that Western 
feudalism as a whole gave rise to capitalism. PM contends with the assumption that the end 
of feudalism and the rise of capitalism were a singular social process (Dufour, 2008), in 
emphasising the singularity of English feudalism amongst highly differentiated institutions 
of lordship and the divergent social trajectories in early modern Europe which arose out of 
open-ended social conflicts (Brenner, 1991; Comninel, 2000; Teschke, 2003). This is 
crucial to PM’s anti-Eurocentric de-reification of Europe as a homogenous category and as 
a unique site of social change. 
 
When it comes to theorising the ‘non-West’, Wood (2008b) accepts implicitly Godelier’s 
transitional understanding of the AMP (as defined in Chapter Two), broadening it so as to 
encompass much of the non-Western world until the colonial period.78 There is a real 
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 I have strong doubts about the manner in which Wood confines ‘political theory’ (as a specific form of 
political thought) to the West, due to its ‘three way relation’ between producers, propertied and state classes. 
There are indeed historical grounds to disagree that, on the one hand, this feature was unique to Europe and, 
on the other hand, that we could generalise this way about the history of all Europe since Ancient Greece.  
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 AMP defines ‘bureaucratic states in which the central monarchical power was the principal appropriating 
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danger here to conflate the diversity of non-Western history into one category, valid across 
space and time, ‘left over after the canons of European evolution have been established’ 
(Anderson, 1974b: 549). The earlier Marxist vocabulary of ‘modes of production’ is loaded 
with such Eurocentric assumptions and postulates based on inadequate historical research. 
PM’s historical method however challenges the conceptualisation of ‘deviant’ cases from 
ideal-typical trajectories as ‘incomplete’, within Europe or at the global level. Neither 
‘Asia’, the ‘non-West’, nor early modern Europe is to be taken as homogeneous and united 
entities or categories. To none of them can exceptionalism be attributed, and none of them 
witnessed a pan-regional simultaneous ‘rise’.  
 
Furthermore, Thompson’s method must be applied to evaluate the adequacy of historical 
categories. The attention that PM gives to the specificity of social development leads it to 
historicise the differentiations of the economic and the political, and of the inside and 
outside. They pertain to a specific European development (capitalist modernity) and as such 
cannot figure as unproblematically transhistorical analytical assumptions: this is something 
which is overlooked by most anti-Eurocentric scholars. Analytical categories—from 
different ‘modes of production’ to the international itself—arose from historiography and 
are to be conceptualised as contested and historically specific social forms. PM’s historical 
method enables us to determine historically what belongs, in social theorisations, to the 
European experience of modernity (or to its interpretations), and what can be generalised as 
analytical tools to investigate world history. Historical categories are universal insofar as 
they are built on and correspond to social practices (be they ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’), and not 
merely assumed to exist. This historicist insight is necessary to set aside the epistemologies 
blurred by the European experiences of modernity, whose reification transforms specific 
European historical features into a method of dividing the world into spheres, thereby 
implying the universality of capitalist/European categories. Besides being an arguably 
imprudent theoretical behaviour, dissociating structure from agency or theory from history 
is a Eurocentric move in itself. This risks to take as ontological givens analytical 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
force, extracting surpluses from surrounding villages of peasant producers, where the division between 
appropriators and producers was a direct relation between state and subjects, and where private property and 
class were undeveloped’ (Wood, 2008a: 81-82). She discusses in the same terms Minoan and Mycenaean 
Greece and Imperial China (Wood, 1981, 2003).  
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derivations from the European experience, and to congeal them into permanent, self-
confirmed features of social reality prior to their confrontation with history. 
 
In short, historicising and socialising the establishment of new social forms or regimes 
precludes a teleology that would lead to Eurocentrism. Relocating the explanatory power to 
the concrete strategies implemented through an agential reconstruction of specific social 
trajectories avoids the universalisation of European experience(s) and gives back (their) 
history to ‘people who were without one’. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with an enquiry into the philosophical premises of PM in order to 
illustrate, from a historicist standpoint, the shortcomings of some works undertaken under 
the PM umbrella. I then showed that its renewal makes it a legitimate interlocutor in the 
debate on Eurocentrism. This is due to its powerful historical method, which deconstructs 
the myth of the uniqueness of the West (and its inverse Eastern image) and understands 
social trajectories and constructions of the world as sui generis and contested, as products 
of open-ended social conflicts. This, in turn, challenges the widespread 
‘transhistoricalisation’ and hence naturalisation of European socio-historical phenomena 
transformed into analytical tools to study world history.  
 
These crucial contributions of PM regarding specificity, historicity, and agency will be 
applied to the Chinese trajectory in the subsequent four chapters. A crucial notion inspired 
by these PM distinctive characteristics will be introduced: the phenomenology of power. By 
this notion I seek to draw attention to the fact that agents experienced the world differently, 
in time and space. This implies that the notions of ‘state’, ‘war’, and ‘international system’, 
among others, must necessarily be historicised in order to understand what agents act from 
and upon, through a socialised conception of rationality. Social meanings are to be 
deciphered on a case-by-case basis rather than assumed. Emphasising and borrowing the 
sui generis conceptions of power in time and space is imperative to understand the socio-
historical context allowing agents to conceptualise this way their relations to power. In 
mainstream IR, the concepts relative to the internal and external orderings of power are 
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taken for granted as being transhistoric and universal, not only over time in Europe (see 
Teschke, 2003) but also across space. Such a phenomenological conception of power is 
imperative to counter Eurocentrism, because it enquires into the socio-historical conditions 
of possibility of the internal/external and economic/political differentiations, thereby 
precluding the imposition of the vocabulary of European modernity on very different 
possible conceptions of the world. More generally, PM-informed interrogations of the 
validity of the categories of analysis used in different accounts of China’s history in 
Sinology and IR will drive these empirical chapters. 
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Chapter Four – Transcending the Ontology of Empire in Chinese Imperial History 
 
 
‘The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been.’ 
The Romance of Three Kingdoms 
 
The assumption of a unified and stable Chinese Empire, presiding over a Sino-centred 
wider geopolitical environment and stretching from 200 CE to the early 20th Century, is a 
pervading organising idea in the historiographical and sociological literature. The properties 
that enable scholars to maintain the coherence of the Chinese Empire as a meaningful 
concept refer to its centralised office-system, based on examination and a high degree of 
literacy, a succession of Chinese dynasties, a particular discourse of Heavenly Mandate, its 
civil rather than military culture based on Confucianism, and its supreme and hegemonic 
position within East Asia. These features are regarded to have imparted not only an 
extraordinary degree of internal stability, cohesion, and duration, but are also widely held to 
explain the absence of a Chinese ‘take-off’ when compared to the ‘Rise of the West’ – a 
divergence that manifested itself from the beginning of the early modern period onwards. 
The ‘case of China’ has thus become a central comparator in the proliferating controversy 
on the historical geographies of development and non-development, closely tied to the 
question of the regions’ respective international environments as enabling or disabling 
conditions for take-off. In other words, controversies in the disciplines of HS and economic 
history are closely linked to controversies in the field of IR over the spatial ordering 
principles in hierarchical and anarchical geopolitical ‘systems’. 
 
This chapter subjects the ‘Unified Empire Thesis’ to a historical and theoretical critique and 
argues that the developmental trajectory of Imperial China is more similar to pre-modern 
Europe than much of the literature assumes. This argument rests on two sub-arguments: 1) 
that the dynamics of early modern Europe as a whole are over-stated and problematically 
theorised and historicised in the mainstream ‘Rise of the West’ literature, and 2) that the 
history of Imperial China, blinded by the ‘Unified Empire Thesis’, is often ideal-typically 
constructed against an ideal-typically constructed dynamic Europe. To demonstrate the 
plausibility of this argument, this chapter critically interrogates the ontologised categories 
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of the Chinese World Order and the ‘Confucian/office-state’, conceived as antithetical to 
the ideal-types of the pre-modern European state and its state-system. It is argued that these 
notions stem from a lack of interrogation of what the ‘international’, ‘empire’, and ‘state’ 
socio-historically meant for agents in Imperial China. This in turn hides the similarity of 
authority relations and geopolitical relations of Europe and East Asia in their pre-modern 
anchoring in conflicts around property and power. 
 
This argument is theoretically grounded in the tradition of PM, which critiques the 
persistent tendency within IR to proceed with unproblematised political and spatial 
categories based on the universalisation, in the analysis, of the inside/outside and 
economic/political differentiations. For Imperial China, this means that concepts based on 
late European (and above all incomplete and often radically backdated) developments are 
mobilised, without enquiring into their socio-historical conditions of possibility, to prove 
the uniqueness of behaviours of East Asian actors within such ‘international systems’ or 
‘societies’. I shall argue that only a sociological enquiry into the origins of Chinese 
‘international’ institutions and into the social agency (re)producing them allows for an 
explanation of their transformations without having to resort to the myth of Chinese 
Confucian singularity. 
  
In this, IR scholars, such as David Kang, and Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, passively 
echo commonplace assumptions in Sinology. Debates around the ‘blockage’ of China rest 
upon postulates about the organisation of the Confucian bureaucratic state and its scholar-
gentry on which is built the very static image of Imperial China. This static image is 
translated to East Asian IR, in a narrative in which the unitary and enduring Chinese 
Empire presided over a pacified geopolitical environment. The Chinese tribute-system and 
office-system are deemed to operate, at least in incipient forms, since the beginning of the 
‘universal empire’, as it is held that there was a single Chinese Empire (Fairbank, 1981; 
Weber, 1951). However, their consolidations are usually attributed to the Tang (618-907) 
and Song (960-1279) dynasties, from which this chapter, as a methodological prelude to the 
historical reconstruction of this period, will borrow empirical examples. I shall demonstrate 
that retracing the political economy around shares of state power and grounding 
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geopolitical endeavours in contestations over land and people permits us to consider the 
Chinese bureaucracy and the tribute-system as elements to be explained, rather than 
perennial features whose existence is taken for granted. Most crucially, their sociological 
characterisations as being at the core of pre-modern social conflicts enables us to view 
Chinese development on par with European pre-modern polities, which were similarly not 
on the verge of ‘modernity’.  
 
The chapter proceeds in three steps. Section One critically discusses the extant IR literature 
on the medieval and early modern East Asian international system, centered around the 
Chinese Empire. Here, the main contention is that Neorealist and English School 
interpretations remain defective. The former prioritise systemic ordering principles – 
hierarchy/anarchy – in the abstract, without providing socially-grounded explanations of 
the specific nature and generating dynamics of East Asian political geography and 
geopolitical relations. The latter relies primarily on the normative discourse (the Confucian 
ideology) inherent in the imperial Chinese self-understandings of an alleged ‘Chinese 
international society’, without disclosing the socio-political power struggles over land and 
people this ‘society’ was based on. Because they divorce Chinese IR from its domestic 
politics or are unable to account for this relation, and because they furthermore rely on the 
‘Unified Empire Thesis’, they reify their own unit of analysis, whose interactions they aim 
to explain. 
 
Section Two returns to central interpretations within the more specialised traditional 
historiography on Imperial China. Those literatures known under the label of ‘gentry 
studies’ in Sinology organise their interpretation around a status-analysis (often derived 
from a Weberian sociology of types of domination) of the imperial bureaucracy. The 
argument is that much of the IR discourse relies passively on these literatures, which tend 
to restrict their analyses to the centrality of the imperial bureaucracy, often informed by 
Weberian categories, in abstraction from conflicts analyses. Here, the notions of status and 
elites tend to be detached from the analysis of wider social relations. This includes the 
fiscal (tax) and lordly (rent) relations between the state and landlords and the mass of direct 
producers – the peasantry. In conceiving of the ‘gentry’ as a stratum of their own, they hide 
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the class relations and the transfer of surplus from the direct producers to the dominant and 
ruling classes, including the imperial state.  
 
And it is here, at the level of contested vertical class relations that the issue of a HS of the 
Chinese Empire, informed by PM, provides crucial insights into the ‘internal’ political 
structure and dynamics of the empire and its ‘external’ relations. For the vertical class 
conflicts implicated the horizontal conflicts among the various members of the Chinese 
polity, which translated, amongst others, into the ‘tribute-system’. This demonstrates the sui 
generis nature of Chinese international order. Understanding this requires not only an 
analysis based on conflicting social relations, but also a terminological specification of the 
self-definition of Chinese political geography, which clarifies this unique vision of the 
‘world’ – how the world appears to them. Section Three demonstrates how this process of 
social and idiomatic specification serves also as a warning that the import of specifically 
Western IR concepts – state, the international, hierarchy, anarchy, balance-of-power – leads 
to serious Eurocentric distortions and terminological anachronisms. 
 
1. International Relations Theory and the Chinese Empire 
In this section, I will first introduce the proponents of the concept of Chinese World Order 
in IR, which has gained popularity both in Realist and English School agendas, through the 
respective works of Kang, and Zhang and Buzan. I will demonstrate how this notion, 
supposed to capture the specificity of East Asian interactions, takes for granted agential 
motivation rather than explaining it, leading them to be unable to account for the 
transformations of their object of analysis. I will subsequently argue that their 
conceptualisations of war and of East Asian units are fundamentally unsound. De-
ontologising them from their derivation of European model, itself historically flawed, is 
essential to go beyond merely positing the World Order’s existence and immutability. This 
demonstrates the necessity of problematising hierarchy and sovereignty by understanding 
them as historically varying socio-spatial relations. 
 
1.1 Hierarchical order in Chinese history 
The tribute-system traditionally refers to the bestowals of titles by the Chinese Empire to 
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'vassal' units who would then kowtow before the emperor and pay him tribute. Prominent 
Western sinologist Fairbank's (1981) theory of the Chinese World Order, based on its 
tribute system, has become the springboard for debates in IR among Realists and English 
School authors during the last decade79. The relative peacefulness of the East Asian system, 
compared to its Westphalian counterpart, is explained through a gradient of positions, 
ranging from ideational emphasis on the Confucian uniqueness (Kelly, 2012) to power 
analysis underlying the rationality of strategic interactions (Zhou, 2011).   
 
Kang seeks to provide for a neo-Realist explanation of the ‘anomaly’ of East Asia’s 
peaceful hierarchical system by introducing the importance of states’ preferences. He 
contests the Neorealist Eurocentrism of transforming particular security relations of the 
European state-system into transhistorical and universal assumptions about the conflictual 
nature of hierarchy and the application of the principle of balance of power. Kang 
characterises China's peaceful 1368-1841 period as stemming from the acceptance of the 
Confucian rules of the game and China’s wider hegemony, complementing the theorisation 
of polarity. The international society of the four Sinic states (China, Korea, Japan, and 
Vietnam80) compelled them to behave peacefully among themselves (i.e. differently than in 
the larger unipolar system in which fighting with the nomads occurred). Furthermore, Kang 
argues that participation in the Chinese World Order was motivated by an implicit 
agreement on the sovereignty of the units. According to Kang’s criteria81, only two wars 
occurred in this period between the core Sinicised states within this system of formal 
hierarchy and informal equality. The assumption is that states sharing common Chinese 
culture and institutions (willingly emulated through time by the three others) will have had 
                                                 
 
79
 Bozeman (1960) had, however, already introduced this puzzle about the distinctiveness of the Chinese 
World Order in IR. Despite their utilisation of a Chinese historical concept and institution (the tribute system), 
such theses on East Asia have to be distinguished from the call for an ‘IR with Chinese characteristics’, or the 
Tianxia approach, reviving Chinese classical thought (Wang and Buzan, 2014).  
80
 I will follow Kang’s use of such modern-day terminology here, whilst I will adopt the proper names of the 
polities in my own historical reconstruction.  
81
 For Kang (following Swope), a major war must imply an ‘intent for conquest’ and involve at least 1000 
deaths; anything below this would otherwise be termed as a ‘border skirmish’. Kang focuses on such wars 
between the four Sinic states, de facto excluding conflicts with ‘nomads’, raids, or territorial expansion 
against other political units. Kang does not consider ‘internal conflicts’ and wars of ‘regime consolidation’ 
(i.e. conflicts between contending dynasties outside the accepted dates of regime transitions). The two 
recognised wars were the Chinese invasion of Vietnam (1407-1428) and the Imjin wars, the Japanese attempt 
to invade China through Korea (1592-1598).  
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no need for war as long as the tribute-system worked as a tool which regulated trade and 
diplomatic activities. As norms based on equality lessen the worries about state survival in 
the Westphalian system and enforce mechanisms (e.g. balance of power) to put those norms 
into effect, so did the acceptance of the set of rules on inter-state relations within Chinese 
hegemony. The relations between these Confucian states and what are broadly qualified as 
‘nomads’ did not partake of the Chinese World Order, as the ‘nomads’ contested China’s 
normative order. Within this, it is posited that only when the dominance of the Chinese 
World Order was shattered, did conflicts occur.  
 
Buzan and Zhang (2014) go further in investigating the reasons of the peacefulness of the 
East Asian system, as an instance of ‘regional international society’ worth inquiring into for 
its anti-Eurocentric deconstruction of the uncontested hegemony and uniformity of the 
global Western one. They underline the emergence of this international society immediately 
following the fall of the multi-state system of Ancient China, retracing its long evolution 
since the Han era until its institutionalisation under the Tang dynasty. Zhang and Buzan’s 
(2012) specific contention is that the East Asian order reflected the features of a distinctive 
international society powered by the Confucian promotion of cosmic and social harmony 
maintained by the intersubjective construction and re-affirmation of the normative order in 
which the respective states had been socialised. It is precisely this agreed-on and never 
challenged Confucian ‘moral purpose of the state’ which gave this order its uniqueness and 
resilience despite its ups and downs, whereas the contestation of this order is argued to have 
merely reinforced its legitimacy in the long run. 
 
1.2 Historical and logical shortcomings 
Does Kang succeed in demonstrating, within his own definition of states and wars, why the 
East Asian international society was so peaceful? For Kang (2010b: 602), 'The simple 
explanation for why this system was stable is that China was a status quo hegemon, and the 
other states in the region knew and accepted this’. The argument seems tautological: the 
acceptance of Chinese dominance (even without formal tributary relations, as was the case 
for Vietnam and Japan for long periods) guaranteed peace and stability, and the signs of this 
acceptance are that surrounding states did not contest this by waging war. We are left with 
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no means to test that assumption within Kang's framework. Kang mentions other signs of 
acceptance of China’s hegemony, such as the use of Confucian institutions and discourses. 
However, these emulations occurred centuries before the actual working of the international 
society, so other reasons must have motivated the adoptions of such Chinese practices. 
Thus, can these really figure as signs of recognition of the Chinese World Order? Why did 
peacefulness not occur in preceding periods in which Kang’s own criteria were met?82 
Moreover, the positing of China's hegemon status rests on a mix of material and cultural 
considerations, requiring in theory both83, but Kang's historical enquiries implicitly 
demonstrate that this was the case only for Korea and only for short periods, thereby 
illustrating the shakiness of the grounds on which his core theoretical assumption rests. 
Since what provides peace is the recognition of the normative hierarchical order, wars 
would naturally have to occur as contestation of postulated shared norms or ‘When the 
Hierarchy Broke down' (Kang, 2005: 71). When engaging with the empirics of the only 
wars (according to his definition) that occurred in his period of review, however, Kang is at 
pains to explain the causes of these wars in their relation to his alleged theoretical sources 
of war (opposition to, or weakness of, the Chinese World Order), let alone the absence of 
additional occurrences of war in cases where Kang's supposed war catalysts were present.84  
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 According to Kang, the three other participants in the international society (Korea, Japan, and Vietnam) 
indeed acquired state-like characteristics respectively from the 7th, 8th, and 10th Centuries onward. Under the 
early Tang and Yuan dynasties, China could be said to be a hegemon. The Yuan dynasty however attempted to 
invade Vietnam and Japan, and succeeded in Korea. The Tang Empire was not less war-like with Korea and 
Japan, having in addition Vietnam under its rule. Kang (2010a: 15) tests more thoroughly his concepts in 
Ming and early Qing eras ‘because [these] represent[…] the culmination of centuries of state-building in East 
Asia and at that point the East Asian international system was at its most complete and developed’. This weak 
justification of the circumscription of the period points out to his evading of the question of the social origins 
of, and variations within, the order.  
83
 Kang (2010: 148) excludes the 'nomads' from his thesis because for these, the tribute system was a 'means 
toward an economic end rather than a full-blown embrace of [its] full meaning, legitimacy and authority.' 
Consequently, the adequacy of Kang’s thesis relies on whether we can prove that Korea, Vietnam, and Japan 
saw the tribute system according to a non-strategic logic.  
84
 Regarding the Imjin wars, can we prove that the Japanese invasion was related to a lack of Chinese 
leadership? If so, why did it occur at that time, and why was it the only case? Why did Japan fail in this if the 
Ming was in hegemonic disarray? Or was it the case that Japan was contesting China's hegemony? Why then? 
Kang resorts to saying that Japan's motivations remain 'unclear' (2010a: 94, 106), listing historians' conflicting 
views on the causes of the war without selecting one, or consistently linking these to his thesis on Chinese 
instability or Japan’s contestation of hegemony. According to Kang, a key factor for the other instance of war 
was the Vietnamese reluctance toward accepting Chinese legitimacy in the World Order (Kang, 2010a: 70, 
99). Since Japan, however, had the greatest difficulty in accepting Chinese supremacy and in much more overt 
ways than Vietnam, why did we not witness Chinese retaliation as in the case of Vietnam? Similar questions 
likewise remain unanswered regarding the Ming’s invasion of Vietnam. Why did the Ming engage in war for 
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In Kang’s work, the constant shifting between material and cultural motivations happens in 
an ad hoc manner, preventing clear causal mechanisms from emerging. Furthermore, what 
little of Kang's theses that can be said to abide by such mechanisms does not resist their 
testing against history. Even while preserving its very disputable criteria for what counts as 
war and state, the historical situations which do not comply with his theory have then to be 
understood as anomalies, with Kang resorting to contingent historical explanations outside 
his theoretical framework.  
 
Whilst digging further in the 'deep constitutional structure' of this international society, 
Zhang and Buzan do not pretend that the actors of the Chinese World Order abided by its 
rules or that tributary relations mattered. Their point is rather that it worked as an 'organised 
hypocrisy'. Zhang and Buzan’s model thus accommodates the recurrence of anomalies to 
the working of the World Order by emphasising its flexibility, which figures at the same 
time as its ‘virtue’85. Variations in the configurations of the system, even its episodic 
disappearance, are understood as instances of intersubjective re-adjustment, which cannot 
be conceived otherwise since no other ‘moral purpose’ than the Chinese Confucian 
discourse was put forward at this time. It is argued that even when such rules were violated, 
their legitimacy endured.  With this, Zhang and Buzan's model thus clearly shares the flaws 
of Kraser's notion in 'dissolv[ing] IR theory into history' (Teschke, 2003: 26). To reconcile 
the persistence of the discourse with its episodic concreteness, Zhang and Buzan (2012: 26) 
are forced to say that the behaviours of the actors within the order are 'inspired and 
constrained' as much by 'these states’ rational strategic, political and economic calculations' 
as by the system’s norms. How are we to decide? The Chinese World Order as organised 
hypocrisy appears to be an elegant way to evade the conceptualisation of its causal effect 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
this particular Chinese dissatisfaction in its involvements in wars of succession, which were many (such as the 
Ming-Korea 'incident' in 1389, and the Qing-Vietnam conflict in 1788-1802)? How could Kang say that this 
was an anomaly, as 'the four preceding centuries had seen a stable relationship between the two' (Kang, 
2010a: 98), whilst Vietnam experienced many decades of repeated invasions by the Yuan dynasty? How could 
Kang claim that there were never debates within the court about potential invasions of other Confucian states 
(see Lorge, 2013 on this)?  
85
 It is posited that the tribute-system was culturally open, but not always so, and sometimes also involved 
force. The Chinese World Order is understood here has having had core principles, but its design varied 
according to geopolitical and economic motives. 
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on actors. Recognising that the Chinese World Order was firstly a discursive practice has 
the merit of being closer to the reality than Kang's belief in its historical continuity, but it 
looses all explanatory power. 
 
For Kang, the mere existence of the system explains the behaviours of the units, and the 
mere idea of it, for Zhang and Buzan, implies that even behaviours running contrary to the 
system have to be understood in relation to it. It has to presuppose, without means to test it, 
that the Confucian prism was the prime motive for rulers. Furthermore, it either assumes an 
unproblematic continuity in the use and adhesion to the tribute-system on the parts of China 
and on the part of the different states - notwithstanding the dynasty and its domestic and 
international objectives -, or it leaves no means for understanding these changes.  
 
1.3 Beyond the World Order model. A re-assessment of the significance of empire 
Kang, Zhang, and Buzan focus on the World Order in the objective of finding an equivalent 
to the Westphalian treaties and international society in Europe. This might well be the case, 
if we consider these as myths (Teschke, 2003), or at least as a set of institutions to be 
explained in terms of broader and, crucially, socialised practices put forth by agents to 
advance their power, and not as an explanans for it. I shall contend with Kang and Zhang 
and Buzan's theses on their selection of relevant units, on their definition of wars, and more 
generally on the types of interactions to take into account towards understanding the East 
Asian geopolitical system, in order to emphasise what should be considered into an 
alternative framework.  
 
1.3.1 Units in East Asia 
Kang’s category of 'state', as a central administration monopolising violence on a defined 
territory, is inaccurate for the pre-modern period, in Europe as in East Asia. Kang’s grounds 
for dismissing ‘non-state actors’ – i.e. because these are not taken into account for the 
European state-system – is therefore misleading. Firstly, he severely underestimates the 
instability of polities and frontiers by claiming that ‘In East Asia, the number of countries 
and boundaries composing the hierarchy has remained essentially the same since AD 200.’ 
(Kang, 2005: 72). This affirmation clashes with the facts of the Chinese, Korean, and 
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Vietnamese Empires’ overly changing frontiers, their recurrent internal divisions into 
multiple kingdoms, as well as the multiple instances of incorporations of parts of or 
complete territories of Vietnam and Korea into the Chinese Empire. His model cannot 
accommodate the implications of the very high number of conflicts belonging to his 
category of 'border skirmishes'. This is the case as his definition fails to grasp the pre-
modern constitution of territory and direct producers as sources of revenues, which explains 
why they were thus sought after prizes of foreign policy. 
 
Secondly, Kang’s dichotomisation of polities reveals deep misunderstandings of East Asian 
historical context. It is highly questionable that the actors that Kang qualifies as 'nomads' 
(the Mongols, Uighurs, Khitans, Jurchens, and Tibetans) were all indeed nomads, and that 
they belonged to a different category than 'state actors'.86 Nomad/sedentary or 
Confucian/non-Confucian dichotomies do not hold against East Asia’s history, and merely 
begs the question of diffusion of norms and institutions.87 The sociopolitical diversity of 
East Asia (as of Europe) is to be explained rather than dismissed, if only because it holds 
fundamental keys to understanding the nature of pre-modern geopolitics. Understanding the 
social origins of war illustrates why no unique or twice naturalised models of state-
formation can adequately describe East Asia’s history. 
 
1.3.2 Conceptualising Chinese wars 
Kang's method (not questioned by Zhang and Buzan) to delineate wars is based on criteria 
of understanding post-1816 Western conflicts (the Correlates Of War project) and hence is 
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 Kang's criteria for selecting the countries are not consistent or clearly demarcated. It is not self-evident that 
Japan, Korea, and Vietnam can be understood as the 'more powerful' or the 'biggest and strongest' states, 
considering that the Manchus managed to invade Korea and China, to say nothing of the previous 'alien' rule’ 
of 'Chinese territories' by the Khitans, Mongols, and Jurchens. Kang’s choice of his four ‘state-like units’ 
furthermore relies on them being ‘more institutionalized', ‘more sinicized', 'more Confucianized', or 'more 
consolidated'. It excludes for this reason the kingdoms of Siam, Burma, and Java, as well as ‘nomads’ with 
state structures or other 'civilizational' marks (Kang, 2010a: 144). Many of Kang’s 'nomads' without ‘settled 
agriculture’ (2010a: 140), such as the Jurchens and the Khitans, were indeed in fact mostly sedentary and built 
polities contending, on equal terms (Rossabi, 1983), with the Song dynasty. The 'nomad' polities also 
borrowed Chinese practices. See for example Schneider (2011) on the issue of the Sinicisation of the Jin. 
87
 Zhang and Buzan (2012: 25) affirm, as does Kang, that 'shared values generated highly similar government 
forms'. This conception of the diffusion of Chinese state forms, as causally stemming from Confucian values 
embraced by Korea, Japan, and Vietnam due to the Chinese normative influence is highly problematic when 
pitched against the history of their state-formations. 
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problematic in itself. Kang’s own data nonetheless show that territorial expansion, outside 
China’s coveted territories, continued and that alliances against other units were part of the 
arrangement. This is the case as the tribute-system in a broad sense, including in addition 
all its participants ('nomads' and non-Confucian states), was rather at least partially aimed 
towards the settlement of territory claims. Such conflicts were struggles towards the 
negotiation of sources of revenues, as in the form of direct producers from which to extract 
and redistribute surplus. Bringing the 'nomads' and non-Confucian states back in also 
stresses the importance of monopoly over trade routes, negotiated partition of other 
political entities, and tributary payment in exchange for non-contestation of sovereignty 
claims88. We must understand the Chinese World Order in the complexity of its hierarchical 
or equal relations between the units, in its infringement of the internal/external delimitation, 
and ultimately in its impact on the Chinese social property regimes.  ‘In all cases of strong 
rivals [of China], the particular forms of the relationships – equal adversaries, fictive kin, or 
lord-vassal – were negotiated through diplomacy and military attacks or threats’ (Skraff, 
2012: 108).  
 
‘Nomads’ impacted Chinese socio-spatial relations beyond the commonly encountered 
delineation of the ‘nomads’ position as one of subordination in the early Tang (after the 
conquests), then more or less as equal bargaining partners in mid-Tang (as with the Tibetan 
empire in 783), and finally Song inferiority to these (and the tribute given to the Khitans 
and then the Jurchens). Tang China relied on nomads’ for its defence against ‘internal’ as 
well as ‘external’ enemies, and their changing allegiance, even to other Chinese parties, 
weighed heavily on the outcomes of conflicts, as the mid-Tang rebellions demonstrate. 
Impact in internecine and succession wars was a two-sided coin and the postulate of an 
outside/inside distinction confuses more than it reveals.89 Sovereignty was always relative 
and had to be won and maintained; the ‘multipolar competition’ over the powerful ‘nomad’ 
                                                 
 
88
 Respective examples of this can be seen in the Tang's intermittent control over the much coveted Central 
Asian territories, the Song/Jin pact against the Khitan Liao, and Song treaties with the Jurchens and Tanguts. 
89
 Even during ‘peaceful’ times, ‘nomads’ did not always prefer bargains with the emperor rather than with 
local/regional commanders. The same Chinese tactics to bind internal factions were used towards the 
‘nomads’: marriages, bestowal of fictitious kinship, or relative independence in exchange for tribute. 
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units was a crucial part of this.90 This rested on a delicate power struggle involving intra-
ruling class contending strategies within each polity, which thus cannot be explained at the 
'international' level only, or even primarily at this level. Conceptualising war in pre-Yuan 
China necessitates showing that the way it was able to negotiate its ‘external’ relationships 
rested upon its resolution of internal conflicts and varying patterns of extraction and 
redistribution of revenues. These, in turn, were simultaneously shaped by its spatial 
configuration, and the ‘nomads’ occupied an important place in this.91  
 
By circumventing the origins, variations, and groundings of the tribute-system, it shifts 
from a sociopolitical practice, an institution to be understood, to the rank of an ideal-type 
through which are reified East Asian ‘inter-state’ relations. After all, even if the initial 
proponent of the concept, Fairbank, provides for no means to understand this, he at least 
recognised that the tribute-system acquired different meanings for the Chinese dynasties, 
from defence during the Song, expansion for the Yuan, to stability for the Qing (Zhang, 
2009). Overall, relations both among Sinic polities and with their neighbours did not 
conform to any universal rule, thus needing an alternative model, a social history of 
geopolitical relations, able to make sense of changing socio-spatial practices by grounding 
them in social property regimes and conflicts. 
 
2. The Chinese Empire in Traditional Historiography  
The assumptions of these IR scholars about Imperial China rest on a passive importation of 
mainstream findings in Sinology. The notion of Chinese World Order indeed relies on the 
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 This was epitomised during the ‘turbulent transition’ of the 10th Century (Worthy, 1983) but this was also an 
underlying feature of all pre-Yuan China. 
91
 Examples of this include the changes of the balance of power in late 7th Century Tang China. A new 
military system on the borders was implemented to face ‘nomadic’ threats, whilst coping with the halt of 
geopolitical accumulation. It gave rise not only to regional military governors, internecine wars, unrest, 
further heterogeneity, and an increase of peasant surplus extraction, but also to the informal partition of China. 
In turn, these autonomous governors struck alliances with diverse nomads, notably the regional Shato Turk 
warlords. One of them ruled the Shanxi region during the late Tang and reunited North China during the ‘Five 
Dynasties’ period. Another example of the impact of changing socio-spatial configurations of the Chinese 
Empire derived from the massive settling of nomads on early Tang borders and their integration in its military 
system. The Tangut Xi Xia emerged this way, and proved later to be instrumental in the Northern Song 
debacle, leading to its confinement in the South. The combined territorial losses, increasing military 
expenditures, and obligations of tribute were important facts in the struggle for power among landlords and 
the imperial polity, which was then also increasingly faced with peasants’ uprisings upon whom the fiscal 
burden had shifted. 
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postulate of a Confucian bureaucratic office-state. In this section, I will firstly show that 
important pitfalls pervade this literature, with the significant consequence of leaving the 
Weberian framework unable to account for social change in Imperial China. Secondly, I 
will propose an alternative method through which we can conceptualise the Chinese 
bureaucracy, imperial ideology, and political geography, as embedded in a political 
economy of shares of political power. 
 
2.1 Pitfalls in Chinese history 
In Sinology, the notion of the bureaucratic state rests on the even more long lasting myths 
of the ‘universal empire’ undergoing ‘dynastic cycles’. According to this last paradigm, 
dynasties are seen as declining more or less naturally, the last emperors losing their might 
or morality until an unsullied dynasty was understood as regaining the task of rule.92 The 
specific reliance on the latter has fallen out of fashion. Nonetheless, it has left an enduring 
legacy on the study of China within the wider literature. The fact that few historians have 
contested the Chinese imperial ideology has de-militarised its history, naturalised the idea 
of a single Chinese Empire, and presented its division as a deviance from the norm (Lorge, 
2005). In this section, after having revealed how IR studies of Imperial China subscribe to 
these broad paradigms in Sinology, I will further investigate the Weberian conception of the 
state inherited from these paradigms. 
 
The IR proponents of the Chinese World Order are perfect examples of passive reliance on 
these two interlinked paradigms, as they take for granted the Confucian peaceful inclination 
and the continuity of the empire over time. Kang, Buzan, and Zhang thus fall prey to a 
longer tradition within IR, avoiding any serious engagement with historiographical debates. 
The same is true of mainstream and critical accounts of the ‘Rise of the West’ and the 
‘Great Divergence’, which similarly abide to those two paradigms on Imperial China. As I 
showed in Chapter One, the narratives of the ‘Rise of the West’, from neo-institutionalist, 
Marxist, and neo-Weberian perspectives alike, generally view Imperial China as a 
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 Dynastic cycles had also been widely claimed to have followed population decline (Usher, 1989; Chu and 
Lee, 1994), climate change (Zhang et al., 2005) or the development of nomad empires surrounding China 
(Barfield, 1989; Lattimore, 1962). The advocates of the AMP and of the thesis on parasitic regimes (Fairbank 
and Goldman, 2006) also partake of such explanations.  
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stagnating and enduring empire, its rent-seeking behaviours unchecked by geopolitical 
competition and/or a noble or enterprising merchant class (i.e. as the mere mirror image of 
Europe). Even Hui (2007), who starts by contesting this premise of an enduring universal 
empire implicitly fall back on the idea that Imperial China remained more or less the same 
in its social organisation, pointing toward a naturalised and transhistorical factor, war, to 
explain the waxing and waning of dynasties. Such a Neo-Weberian stance on the perennial 
tasks of the rulers in charge of maintaining order within and without accommodates very 
well the wide-spread postulate of the conflict-free Chinese tax-office state. The California 
School, like Hui, also presumes the unchanging nature of the Chinese bureaucratic state. 
Wong (1997; and Rosenthal, 2011) additionally grounds this autonomy of the ruling class 
as an outcome of the Confucian tradition. In short, Realist, English School, neo-
institutionalist, Marxist, neo-Weberian, and California School authors all fail in bringing IR 
beyond orthodox Sinology. 
 
Sinology is however a lively field. The historiographical debates on Imperial China were 
traditionally framed by the divide between the orthodox Marxist emphasis on economic 
relations between landlords and peasants93 and the Weberian account of the office-holding 
status group. A move away from this false dilemma where the methodological choice is 
confined between the analyses of ‘economic’ or ‘political’ relations was long overdue. In 
fact, none of these relations could successfully be studied in abstraction from the other, 
especially in pre-capitalist societies, without leaving the analysis vulnerable to the fiction of 
liberal modern terminology. Significant attempts to go beyond this false dilemma - in 
Japanese scholarship and in Western local history - are, however, still found wanting, 
 
The ‘gentry studies’ were pioneered by Wolfram Eberhard (1952), Chang Chung-Li (1962), 
and Ho Ping ti (1962) and posit, throughout Imperial China’s history, the gentry acting on 
the behalf of the state through cultural benevolence. In the footsteps of Weber, this 
approach focuses on the complementarities of the elite, defined by its degree- and/or office-
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 The debates within Chinese Marxism have often remained at the level of attributing pre-conceived modes 
of production to specific periods of history. See for example Dirlik (1985), Kamashi (1990), and Schwartz 
(1954).  
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holding, in its relationship with the state to form an enduring and meritocratic bureaucratic 
system. This proceeds from the alleged uniqueness of China’s most important social group, 
the literati, compared to the West’s landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie The central focus of 
much of the literature on China is mainly placed on establishing the degree of social 
mobility within the office-state, a debate put forward by Kracke (1947)94, or on creating a 
typology of social stratification within the gentry. These theses are strongly associated with 
the ‘dynastic cycles’ paradigm, as the closeness of interests between the gentry and the state 
are deemed to follow, and be indicators of, the strength of the latter.  
 
The ‘gentry studies’ avoids the anchoring of this 'elite' in broader power relations, which is 
only partially overcome in subsequent trends in Chinese historiography, because of their 
understanding of the gentry as a status, i.e. defined by its monopoly over social prestige. 
The existence of the ‘gentry society’ relies on its meritocratic recruitment in the 
bureaucratic system. For these ‘gentry studies’, the very nature of the status of official, 
conferred by the state through examination selection, entails that this group shall pursue the 
same interest as the state. The prevalence of this status in the ordering of Chinese society is 
thus posited as pre-empting ‘feudal’ tendencies and the impetus to build estates. The 
categorisation of officialdom as a status group blurs its potentially conflictual interest with 
other landlords, as well as with the ruling house. Officials are not conceived also as 
contenders in the distribution of revenues. This conundrum arises from the fact that the 
Weberian approach does not allow for conceptualising how exploitation and domination are 
intrinsically linked, in variegated and conflictual ways, in pre-capitalist societies. It 
becomes difficult for these authors to appreciate the variations in the social power of the 
ruling class, especially during periods of social changes or of ‘divided China’. This is so, 
notably, as this is not straightforwardly a ‘political’ (understood in a strict sense) power, but 
a power that can be expressed in multiple extra-economic forms - the forms it took 
furthermore being at the core of struggles determining the access to labour surplus. The 
pitfalls brought by this focus on status have thus important implications for the very 
objective of ‘gentry studies’, that is the understanding of the uniqueness of Imperial China’s 
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state. By contrast, I argue that the state was foremost the location of the institutionalisation 
of, and contestation over, the manner through which property was politically constituted, 
and the fruits of exploitation were extracted and redistributed. Focussing on political power 
pursued for its own sake, in abstraction of these dynamics, gives a very partial, if not reified 
and static, portrayal of the Chinese state.  
 
The branch of Western Sinology most influenced by Japanese scholarship has moved 
beyond the exclusive focus on degree-holding, and contested the postulate of harmony 
between the state’s and the gentry’s interests. These scholars instead highlight the tensions 
and the changes over time in these relations, uncover important aspects of geographical and 
temporal variations in elite domination, and enquire into routes leading to official positions 
alternative to examinations95. Their historicisation of the relation between the gentry and 
the state allows for anchoring shifting strategies of the elite in the broader social context, 
rather than taking for granted their resulting from dynastic healthiness. Despite this, these 
scholars mainly broaden the ‘gentry studies’ paradigm, by still defining the elite through the 
prism of its participation in state activities, without asking why these families were seeking 
such ‘political’ power, beyond vague references to the preservation of their status or 
dominance. Such works suffer from a nebulous definition of 'elite', especially in terms of 
property relations: 'local prominence' or 'wealthy' are the closest by which these come to 
approximate such relations, without enquiring into social power properly. Overall, these 
works fall short of revealing the simultaneous ‘political’ and ‘economic’ base of power. 
 
In opposition to the Weberian status conceptual framework in which class stands uneasily, I 
will instead advocate for the historicisation, in space as well as in time, of the class 
relations terminology. The landlords were in a class relation with the peasants. Those who 
also acted as officials (outside of the imperial house) or were degree-holders did not 
however belong to a status group: their prevalence rather signals contingent strategies of 
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landlords, which have to be deciphered in specific contexts. As originating from a relational 
concept, classes should be defined historically in their changing opposed interests, allowing 
for the conceptualisation of social conflicts within the ruling class as well as with the 
producers, on the basis of varying socio-institutional environments. 
 
This issue of conceptualising the Chinese polity in a broader agential sociology of power, 
therefore, needs to be tackled before turning to its consequences for Chinese political 
geography. For all its incomparably sophisticated state structure, court etiquette, literary 
culture, and bureaucratic procedures having spread over an immense territory, Imperial 
China still subscribed to pre-modern patterns; these impressive features were thus governed 
by conflicts over social power deployed in intrinsically imbricated spheres. 
 
2.2 Myth vs. history of the office-state 
The civil service office-system and its concomitant system of written examination is 
certainly one of the chief pillars of nearly all historical study of China96. In this section, I 
shall contend with the pervasive idea that ‘For twelve centuries social rank in China has 
been determined more by qualification for office than by wealth’ (Weber, 1951: 107). The 
Chinese state was both a source of power and the object of contention.  
 
Firstly, acquiring 'gentry' status through examination was a means of reproducing social 
power. This was the case both for those who did not fill a position in the state (focussing 
mainly on gaining tax exemption, legal privileges97, and access to official hearings that this 
status conferred) and for actual officials, who were given 'official lands' from which to 
derive additional incomes98 and who used every means available, legal and borderline legal, 
to keep revenues. Social power was reproduced, on the one hand, since some kind of tax 
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exemption was bestowed to families with ties to officials. Officially, this exemption was 
restricted to labour tax during late Tang and Song, but meant that such official families had 
means to also partially evade the land tax. On the other hand, official tenure was also itself 
very lucrative. The prefecture and country official appropriation of a personal share from 
the surpluses of collected state-set annual tax quotas, for instance, was to be expected. In 
this, officials had immense latitude and relied on a complex system whereby they levied 
additional fees through clerks, a practice towards which the ruling houses had to 
accommodate99.  
 
Secondly, the ideal-type of the meritocratic system does not conform to its historical 
deployment. In general, the impersonal character of the state apparatus recruitment is 
overrated: positions in court were always immune to the widely postulated meritocratic 
selection process and the examination system was not the most defining pathway towards 
official positions as it is generally postulated to have been. Degree-holding was only one 
route to office-holding, and not the more important.100. Throughout the examination 
system's history, 'special facilitated degrees for licentiates, hereditary privileges for some 
officials, purchase of degrees by merchants' were more than 'shortcomings in fairness' 
(Elman, 1991: 23). It exemplifies the fact that a share of state power was not only a highly 
valued commodity, but also to be ‘purchased’ through political means101. The ‘rule of 
avoidance’ (the impossibility for an official to serve either with kin or within his native 
district), by which scholars generally posit a rational character of the state bureaucracy, 
must also be socialised and historicised: it was not implemented to the same extent in every 
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period, nor was it towards every stratum of officials102. Furthermore, when it was, this only 
meant that systematic corruption, via status, tended to be resumed after the usual three year 
service upon the return of given officials to their county of origin (Wakeman, 1975: 4), or 
upon the migration of family member of officials from their native region to the county of 
official tenure after the termination of the official’s state services (Tackett, 2008: 150). 
 
The enormous body of literature on the office-system systematically shies away from any 
assessment of the wider political economy of political titles and positions, restricting the 
analysis to the examination system proper. The governing principle of the ‘recruitment’ and 
state service abided to the same principle which explains the existence of offices in the first 
place: not meritocratic rationality, but social power deployed in negotiations within the 
ruling class around the distribution of revenues extracted by extra-economic means from 
producers. Overall, even in periods in which the examination route was important, 
recommendations were the key to securing and holding of office positions, and these did 
not come cheaply. This crucial feature, when mentioned at all, tends to be noted as a 
peripheral issue not deserving of further attention. Alternatively, 'court patronage' is 
invoked without explaining what this implies103. This however places the debate on social 
mobility dear to ‘gentry studies’ in another light; the rise of ‘new’ families was based on 
this political economy of titles. 
 
Moreover, counties and prefectures were ‘fiscally autarkic’ (Mostern, 2003) and ranked 
according to their uneven population104, the lucrativeness of each being determined by the 
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surplus local agents were able to capture beyond the tax quotas set by the emperor. 
Consequently, the diverse political economy of sponsorship and recommendations for 
specific positions must have been very important105. Furthermore, there was throughout 
Imperial China a great number of ‘stipendiary’, ‘titular’, or ‘honorary’ offices, sometimes 
‘concurrent’ titles to actual office-holdings, to which many authors only allude without 
explaining their crucial importance as an important cooptation tool for many emperors106. 
 
Finally, and as a result of positions in the state apparatus being a means towards enhancing 
the share of extraction kept from the center, the office-state did not remain the same since 
its inception. Its configuration, the redefinitions of the routes leading to high positions, and 
shifting hands in which was put the power of appointment were at the heart of struggles 
within the ruling class. The role of the office-system in tax collection varied according to 
social property regimes.  
 
To summarise the working of the office-system, in the ‘Six Dynasties’ period, it was used 
intermittently as an acknowledgment of local power by the nine ranks and as an award for 
the military support of the lucky horse in the unstable and shifting alliance game. It was 
also used as a ‘welfare’ policy in the migration of the northern elite establishing its dynasty 
in the South; offices were created to feed their needs at any given time. The Tang’s 
establishment of a relatively centralised appointment system through the ‘selection 
examination’ must be put in perspective in order to explain how it affected only 5-6% of 
office-holders. The early Tang, as every dynasty, conferred nobility and office positions to 
both defeated opponents and followers alike. The fiscal and geopolitical context and the 
struggles within the ruling class directly impacted the workings of the office-system. In the 
late 7th Century, the sale of ranks began, followed by the sale of appointments in the 
usurping, within the high court, of the selection process. Combined with the loss of 
territories to the Tibetan empire and to regional governors, this meant that the number of 
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positions for the court to bestow drastically decreased107. From the mid-Tang, office 
positions such as regional governorships were literally won by war, when they were not 
bought, and were renewed by personal tribute to the emperor. The imperial selection 
process was thus outstripped by a parallel system in the provinces, as well as in the diverse 
commissions.  
 
The Song attempted to further hierarchise relations within the ruling class, notably through 
the establishment of an additional layer of officials at the ‘provincial’ level, the circuit 
intendants. Imperial promotions and demotions of prefectures and counties also played a 
role in the curtailing of the power of former governors (Mostern, 2003). What the Song 
expansion of the ‘bureaucratic elite’ meant was the increase of the landlords’ power in the 
competition for surplus extraction, both through this generalisation of tax exemption and 
the further opportunities provided for personal appropriation of revenues, especially from 
the ‘localist turn’ of the elite (Hartwell, 1982). Furthermore, the office structure was 
paralleled by the maipu system, put in place in certain sectors of the economy108, and the 
bestowal of offices to local magnates on the frontier during the phase of expansion. The 
office-system was thus not only far from temporally unchanging, but also far from spatially 
uniform.  
 
Among proponents of the Chinese rational and meritocratic office-system, exogenous 
factors are put forward to explain 'anomalies' to the overall meritocratic and rational 
system109. This is best illustrated during the time of Tang in relation to the villain empress 
Wu and her 'favourites' and the rise of maleficent eunuchs accepting bribes110. This 
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ascribing of the status of anomaly to such processes, nonetheless, clashes with the 
widespread occurrences of sale of office in times of distress, as during mid-Tang111, or of 
the creation of virtual posts with no duties attached, as a solution to the increasing number 
of degree-holders due to the yin privilege during the Song (Ebrey, 1988). This bias is 
fundamentally based on the divorcing of political history from class relations and 
geopolitics. This has resulted in the obfuscation of crucial conflicts around power which 
shaped the wider historical trajectory of China. 
 
The socioeconomic basis of power of the ‘gentry’ emphasises the conflicting interests 
between the ‘state’ and the ‘elite’, which remain hidden by the Weberian conceptualisation 
of this group as exclusively beholden to the office-state. The very idea that ‘office lands’ 
should provide for undistinguished private and public needs goes against any notion of 
bureaucratic rationality. The 'rationalisation' of the tax administration describes, at best, the 
historical reconfiguration of surplus distribution among the ruling class in a more 
hierarchical fashion. In no way did this signal a de-personalisation of the process of tax 
collection through a disinterested meritocracy funnelling revenues to the state. All of this 
speaks against the belief that the center imposed an unchanged meritocratic and efficient 
system through the empires’ lifespan, and that the state would respond to geopolitical 
imperatives in a disinterested manner. Qualifying the state as bureaucratic does not exhaust 
the subject. The Chinese bureaucracy is an explanandum rather than an explanans. 
 
2.3 Beyond ‘unified China’ vs. ‘divided China’ 
It would be highly problematic to presume not only that each ruling dynasty governed like 
its predecessors, but also that two ideal-types (division or unification) could encompass the 
variety of socio-spatial deployment of power in ‘China’. As stated in Chapter One, it is 
misleading to assume the neo-Weberian postulate that ‘pressures for war compelled similar 
causal mechanisms across time and space’ (Hui, 2005: 8). No law can be said to govern 
Chinese history: as the property of the ruler, the ‘state’ was at his whim and constant 
struggles around the relative shares and distribution of this object of power and its spatial 
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mobilisation re-wrote the state’s and China's history time and time again.  
 
There was no ‘unified China’ vs. ‘divided China’, even allowing for brief durations of 
disorder between dynastic shifts. The common narrative of the Chinese Empire constantly 
being re-built, and the smaller countries into which it had crumbled re-united, cannot 
explain the complex processes of state-formations and changes within China’s political 
geography. Each of these processes involved a renegotiation of the relations between social 
groups, among the elites, and between them and the producers. For example, the early Tang 
and early Song Empires are perceived as heydays of Chinese history because these were 
able to pursue strategies of ‘geopolitical accumulation’112, winning politically or militarily 
new bases of producers from whom to extract social surpluses, channelling it into means of 
coercion while rewarding the elites taking part in this through land grants or positions at 
court. When these strategies could no longer be pursued, as during the mid-Tang, elites 
transformed their state-vested power into private power, ‘dividing’ the empire first by 
accumulating fiscal and military power and then by a fierce intra-elite competition. By 
Song times, this exit option was less accessible to the elite, who instead engaged in ‘local’, 
rather than (geo)political, land grabbing, so as to shield this from state reach.  
 
To be sure, uniting China (as uniting Europe) was an ideal shared by all rulers, as the goal 
of universal empire naturally entailed more social power to be wielded. Nevertheless, 
'Chinese empires did not reproduce the same institutional structure century after century, 
they reproduced the same language and abstract ideology' (Lorge, 2005: 9-10). Only 
historical investigations could reveal such varying socio-political practices and institutions, 
where these would all take different spatial dimensions. We have no grounds to suppose 
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that the Yuan dynasty was a natural heir of the Han and Sui Empires, no more than we 
could explain Napoleon’s conquests solely by Charlemagne’s empire and the Capetian 
monarchy. Rather than this, it would be better to speak of distinct Chinese Empires in the 
plural and to historicise their distinct trajectories. This applies also, I shall further 
demonstrate, for their geopolitical relations.  
 
3. Phenomenology of ‘All Under Heaven’ 
Overall, the fundamental contribution of this chapter is to propose a phenomenology of 
power of ‘All Under Heaven’, i.e. the changing perception of the extended world which the 
‘central kingdom’ could claim to (loosely) govern. For the case of China, such a 
phenomenology of power is particularly useful to counter narratives, such as those 
reviewed above113, which put forward a fixed conception of Confucianism and the 
constraints it allegedly put on agents’ behaviours. I contend that if Confucian ideas 
influenced the way agents experienced the world, we should nonetheless critically 
interrogate the imperial rhetoric. Confucian imperial discourse must be deconstructed to 
shed light on the conflictual claims on state power it implied. On the one hand, we cannot 
uncritically adopt the imperial ordering of the world in lieu of historical inquiry and 
reflexive thinking on what agents conveyed through their specific conceptions of the 
political world. On the other hand, this imperial rhetoric gives us access to and reveals the 
particular way in which social conflicts around power were organised. My study therefore 
takes up the works which have sought to see Confucianism less as a rigid dogma imposing 
a certain type of rationality than as a conception of the world amenable to a panoply of 
meanings and uses over time and amongst agents. The imperial ideology prominent at a 
given time was only one of them, although a crucial one for a phenomenology of power.  
 
To fully de-ontologise the Chinese Empire’s developmental path necessitates critically 
interrogating the vocabulary used, in order to avoid imposing a modern conception on 
fundamentally different entities. The language used by Imperial China’s official historians 
was connoted by political motives, but it can also be deciphered as revealing the broader 
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social context. As developed by the Confucian philosopher Mencius (372 – 289 BC) and 
perpetuated afterwards, the imperial ideology suggested that the Heaven bestowed a 
Mandate (tianming) upon a ruler demonstrating both the ability to control the realm (tong) 
and to govern in harmony (zheng). This gave way to a coherent and uninterrupted 
succession of dynasties (chao). However, this ideology also recognised at least implicitly 
that each reign is temporary and subject to the actual deployment of zheng and tong (rather 
than stemming from a divine right). Those principles governed the succession of dynasts 
(rather than royal blood). This vocabulary was used by official historians and emperors to 
legitimise the myth of a unified empire even when this notion was blatantly inaccurate from 
any point of view (for example during the ‘Six Dynasties’ and ‘Five Dynasties and Ten 
Kingdoms’ periods). However, it also points out to the notion of one’s rule resting on the 
capacity to implement a ‘Mandate’.  
 
Governing China was always a contested and incomplete process and, as such, it cannot be 
encapsulated by one timeless notion, unless it is conceived in very broad terms. Control and 
harmony vastly differed in time, notably depending on whether this was the tendency 
towards ‘parcellised sovereignty’ (Anderson, 1974) or towards ‘generalised personal 
domination’ (Gerstenberger, 2007) which were the strongest. More crucially, control and 
harmony could not be achieved under pre-modern social relations: the concrete extent of 
zheng and tong was always re-negotiated, as parts of the conflicts around the redistribution 
of surplus deployed on ‘political’, ‘military’ and ‘judicial’ levels. It rested on a delicate 
balance of power which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. ‘State’ (guo) is a 
misleading term if we see in it an actual embodiment of political power as uncontested, 
absolute and not pervaded by the logic of exploitation, and for this reason constantly re-
alienated and ‘privatised’. ‘Civil war’ was consequently a threat lurking behind the façade 
of guo; the use of this notion however bears the risk of misinterpreting that such conflicts 
around shares of political power could never be tamed because politically constituted 
entitlement to revenues is what fundamentally constitutes the pre-modern ‘state’. 
 
The imperial rhetoric on geopolitics also casts light on the complex relation between the 
‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ in pre-modern China, indeed their non-existence in such distinct 
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conceptions. Within Imperial China’s terminology, the central Chinese ‘state’ (Zhongguo / 
Middle Kingdom) existed in relation to the extended Chinese world (tianxia / All Under 
Heaven). However, Zhongguo itself was by no means a fixed territorial concept, but an 
enforcement of dynastic politics. The claim to the Heavenly Mandate gave the right to 
impose the enlargement of Zhongguo, which was often resisted by other would-be Sons of 
Heaven. There was no clear-cut distinctions between internal and external contenders: the 
Mandate was historically claimed as much by ‘barbarians’ (e.g. the Khitan Liao and 
Jurchen Jin during the Song era), former regional officials (e.g. the mid-Tang military 
governors), and distinct ‘Chinese’ mini-‘states’ (e.g. during the ‘Six Dynasties’ and ‘Five 
Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms’ periods). Such contention around the holding of the Mandate 
therefore occurred beyond the obvious periods of ‘dynastic transitions’. Moreover, those 
are better understood as instances where Zhongguo was reconstructed by recognising its 
piecemeal privatised status in delicate intra-ruling class arrangements rather than by re-
establishing a natural unity.  
 
Another illustration of the enmeshing of the inside/outside in Imperial China is the tribute-
system (chao gong ti xi). Here again the perception of what tianxia encompassed was not 
fixed, but instead dictated by the implementation of dynastic politics. The language used to 
order the world and treat with other polities varied - from brother to brother, father/son to 
uncle/nephew relations -, expressing metaphorically the agreements achieved. But these 
allegorical relations were subject to change according to dynastic politics driving the rulers 
to geopolitically expand their tax bases. In the use of this vocabulary as in the proper 
bestowal of fictive kinship or marriage ties, the emperors made no internal/external 
distinction: these were tools to deal with ‘barbarians’, other Confucian polities, and 
rebellious ruling class groups alike. A similar argument can be made about another aspect 
of the tribute-system: the exchange of gifts which gave it its name. The importance of 
symbolic reproduction in pre-modern relations must indeed not be underestimated 
(Teschke, 2003: 64). In Imperial China, annual tributes were expected not only from parties 
to the tribute-system, but also from regional officials. Finally, in this system, ‘loose-rein’ 
regions (jimi) on the frontier were the perfect illustration of the blurriness of any idea of a 
finite and self-contained empire. 
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It is no coincidence that the Chinese vocabulary was so impervious to modern ideas of 
sovereignty and authority. As traditional accounts of Imperial China have incorporated the 
Confucian rhetoric of China being guided by wen (civil) rather than by wu (military)114, my 
reconstruction of the history of the Mandate of Heaven in its conflictual socio-spatial 
relations is of particular acuity. This is also a crucial anti-Eurocentric move against 
speaking in ‘European’ ways, rather than unveiling how the Chinese thought about 
themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has demonstrated the pitfalls faced by the reliance of IR accounts of China on 
the sociology of domination of Western Sinology. Realist and English School analyses are 
based on myths about Chinese domestic and international politics, from the perennial 
Chinese Empire and meritocratic office-state to the peaceful tribute-system. I have rather 
argued that these political and geopolitical forms have temporally varied and were 
incompletely institutionalised, as they were results of particular negotiation between social 
forces. I have enquired into the social origins of the processes which gave rise to these 
myths, to instead reveal the constant contention around power from which derived the non-
linear and contradictory pre-modern processes of Imperial China’s state-formation. I have 
argued that we cannot view those two crucial features around which are organised the 
narratives of the Confucian uniqueness of China – its polity and political geography – as 
fixed and uncontested. This is because these were at the heart of the social reproduction of 
classes and the conflicts around the redistribution of revenues extracted from the peasantry. 
It simultaneously explains why we cannot passively import the concepts of the ‘state’ and 
the ‘international’ from the conceptions of modern European geopolitics. This chapter has 
thus set the basis of my method through which to understand China’s authority relations 
and geopolitical relations. China’s office-state and tribute-system will be further 
historicised in their specific incarnations as results of socio-political conflicts in the next 
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refusing this crude antinomy (e.g. Graff, 2002; Johnston, 1995; Lorge, 2005; Wang, 2011), but most of these 
focus on China’s military history per se without systematically linking it to social history. 
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chapter’s investigations of trajectory of the Chinese Empires in the plural until the Song 
dynasty’s collapse.  
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Chapter Five – ' China' Before the 'Barbarian Invasion': Socialising Chinese Imperial 
Geopolitics (618-1279) 
 
This chapter provides a historical reconstruction of the Chinese trajectory until the Late 
Imperial period, through a theoretically-informed narrative of the changing authority 
relations and political geography of the empire. Within the wider literature, the Tang and 
the Song periods are alleged to comprise diverse processes at the origins of the divergence 
from the Western path. These empires are indeed generally understood as encompassing 
important developmental phases of Chinese singularities, namely the bureaucratic office-
system and tribute-system. More specifically, in traditional narratives, the Tang dynasty is 
deemed to have succeeded in empire consolidation and institutionalisation of the Chinese 
World Order, whilst the Song era is identified with the gentry’s ultimate overcoming of the 
medieval aristocracy though its perfection of the office-system. This historical investigation 
allows me to interrogate the relevance of grasping the Chinese Empire as an enduring 
entity, of which we should trace the gradual evolution towards centralisation through such 
concepts. I shall contend on historical grounds with the ontologising of categories of 
analysis at works with the notions of the Confucian state and Chinese World Order. 
Revealing their socio-historical variations, and thus the contextualised rationality they 
spring from, is the key to contest this. If, in the theoretical chapters, I challenged the 
postulate of a spatial homogeneity in Europe, here I challenge the idea of a temporal 
homogeneity of China. 
 
Until now, I have argued that the fundamental problems in IR works and traditional Chinese 
historiography are their incapacity to conceptualise, historicise, and unpack Imperial 
China’s international institutions and behaviours, forms of authority and sovereignty, and 
class relation constellations. These scholars dodge the issue of social changes and 
variations in the deployment of political power precisely because they divorce these 
‘international’, ‘political’, and ‘economic’ features from one another and occlude the social 
agency shaping them. I shall use the PM method against the understanding of China’s 
trajectory through static concepts and structural processes, in order to transcend the 
narrative of the steady bureaucratisation of the peaceful Chinese state. I shall instead reveal 
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how conflicts around power - always uniquely expressed - temporarily crystallised class 
arrangements in particular socio-spatial institutions, themselves sparking further social 
antagonisms whose outcomes rested on the balance of class power, organisation, and 
struggle. The crucial contribution of the PM method to the history of Imperial China is to 
show how conflictual and multifaceted ways of reproduction of social classes shaped its 
trajectory, which cannot be theoretically derived from China’s bureaucratic inclination, 
pacified geopolitical environment, or predilection to wen (civil rule). Far from being 
passively derived from Confucianism, through gentry domination and normative agreement 
among similarly inclined polities, socio-political forms were instead constantly re-
negotiated by social agents clashing over the extraction and distribution of surplus. Such a 
perspective provides for a much more dynamic conception of the trajectory of Imperial 
China. Moreover, instead of passively incorporating the imperial discourse into the 
analysis, I propose to anchor Chinese discursive categories and conceptions of the world 
into socio-political conflicts as they experienced them phenomenologically.  
 
When compared to European trajectories, such a historical reconstruction of Imperial China 
reveals not identical, but not dissimilar, dynamics of pre-capitalist socio-political conflicts 
around property and power, expressed in the specific institutional configurations of the 
Chinese polity within its geopolitical environment over time. In this way, transcending the 
ontology of empire resonates within the debates on Eurocentrism, notably through its 
contribution to the comparison between Eurasian entities. Both the ‘Rise of the West’ 
narrative and its critique, through the California School, assert that Europe was unique in its 
dynamic progress brought forth by its inclusion in the international system, in contrast with 
an enduring Chinese universal empire evolving in what amounts to a geopolitical vacuum. 
Grounding Chinese political and spatial categories in conflicts around power instead 
reveals the discontinuities in the constitution of the state and its political geography, leading 
me to question the very idea that we can talk of the same empire throughout China's history. 
On the one hand, this profoundly upsets the conventional narrative on China as static or as 
the mirror image of Europe, conceived as the exclusive source of development. On the 
other hand, such a comparison retracing the pre-modern parallels (whilst acknowledging 
their specificities) between Imperial China and early modern Continental Europe rules out 
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the widespread thesis that Europe possessed exclusive and pan-continental characteristics 
inevitably leading it towards modernity. 
 
The specific period covered by this chapter comprises the temporal span from the Tang 
dynasty (618-907) to the Song dynasty (960-1279), in addition to brief enquiries into the 
chaotic period between the building of the empire by the Qin dynasty and the end of the 
‘Six Dynasties’ period. This periodisation from the Tang to the Song is chosen, on the one 
hand, because this represents the more stable dynasties prior to the Late Imperial period. 
The challenge is thus greater in proving my argument that political geography and authority 
relations were not as settled as the dominant Sinology and IR paradigms suggest. On the 
other hand, these literatures understand the Tang and Song reigns as the culmination of 
processes started by the initial building of the universal empire. A detour through the 
‘divided’ medieval period is therefore also needed.  
 
Geographically, the empire waxed and waned during this long period: its scale varied 
enormously, as did the poroseness of its frontiers – and this, between and within dynastic 
reigns. The definition of its political boundaries also depends on how integration within the 
empire is defined, since loose administration of regions distant from the capitals 
characterised most reigns. What Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) referred to was eminently 
unstable, as the basis for this ‘geographic description, indicating the country or countries 
occupying the central portions of the known world’ (Holcombe, 2004: 749) drastically 
changed over time. At its nadir, the Qin dynasty was bordered by the Liao River, the Yellow 
River, the Sichuan basin, and the Guangdong and Guangxi regions.  At the moment of its 
furthest expansion under the Tang in the early 8th Century, the Chinese Empire’s reach was 
extended to Annam (Vietnam), Southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and modern-day 
Tadjikistan. This was however not a linear progression in geographical reach, as, for most 
of the time during the period studied, this territory was ruled by different political entities, 
to which are attributed anachronistically the characteristics of ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’, 
legitimising them, or not, as the holder of the Mandate of Heaven in the dynastic 
successions. Only from the North Song do we see half the population inhabiting what is 
often understood as the core of ‘China’ (Middle and Lower Yangzi and the Southeast) 
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(Hartwell, 1992: 385). Such variations in demographical patterns and nominal and actual 
(fiscal) territorial reach must be explained by conjoined enquiries in social history and 
political geography. 
 
Section One proceeds to provide a historical reconstruction of the trajectory of imperial 
China from the 7th to the 13th Century, informed by the tradition of PM. The purpose of this 
counter-narrative is to show the internally fractured and ever-changing constellation of the 
social and geopolitical relations of ‘Empire’, which the standard conceptual distinction 
between imperial unification and division cannot capture. Rendering this history as a 
contested process, in line with PM, enables us to trace the rich history of the Chinese 
trajectory without reducing it to pre-conceived models or theories. The second purpose is to 
secure our contention that the ’Chinese case’, in comparative perspective, does not 
constitute an anomaly or a divergence from the ‘European Case’, but one specific product 
of the agential construction of a ‘world’ – transcending the ontology of empire.  
 
Section Two draws out the implications of this historical analysis by returning to the 
comparative question – the similarity or difference between medieval/early modern Europe 
and Imperial China – that pervades the wider debate on the ‘Great Divergence’. This 
enquiry into Chinese history from the Sui to the South Song, paralleled by the analysis of 
the adequacy of the notions of office-state, empire, and tribute-system, builds up in 
comparing the long-term European and Chinese trajectories and by stressing their specific 
pre-modern characteristics. This is therefore also an occasion to test Wong’s ‘reciprocal 
comparison’ on the trajectories of Europe and China. I shall ultimately demonstrate that 
only a theorisation seeking to understand the complexity of Chinese domestic and foreign 
relations as variegated strategies grounded in changing social regimes can successfully 
achieve a non-Eurocentric comparison of pre-modern Eurasia’s diversity.  
 
1. Reconstructing Imperial China’s history 
This section provides an alternative narrative to the history of Imperial China’s major 
dynasties, and their respective traditional reputations as the period of medieval aristocracy 
(the ‘Six Dynasties’), of cultural reunification (the Tang), of an anarchic interlude (the ‘Five 
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Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms’), and of the literati dominance (the Song). Despite the 
richness of ‘sectorial’ histories on this period (whether in the forms of local, specific 
lineage’s, military, economic, or certain dynastic115 history), macro-analysis has mostly 
been driven by political history whose focus on leaders results in voluntaristic accounts 
(e.g. Cambridge History of China volumes; Mote, 1998) or by structuralist ideal-
typification, often driven by a Confucian uniqueness (e.g. Balazs, 1964; Fairbank and 
Goldman, 2006; Weber, 1951). In a nutshell, the traditional account of the Chinese 
trajectory during this period retraces the decline of the aristocracy to the benefit of the 
gradual rise of imperial power in the form of the office-state, this overall narrative albeit 
being punctuated by dynastic cycles. The critical interrogation of such an assumption of a 
linear and cumulative development (from the Qin to the Song) toward the realisation of the 
ideal of the centralised bureaucratic state will guide this section. Demonstrating how 
Chinese political authority relations and geography were as agentially-built and conflict-
ridden, and therefore whose trajectory was as open-ended as Europe’s, thus strongly departs 
from orthodox narratives’ enduring and single empire. It has tremendous consequences for 
avoiding blockage-like explanations of China’s long-term trajectory, anchored in its 
naturalised, allegedly intrinsic, immutable, and unique institutions. 
 
A note on sources is however needed before beginning this historical narrative. A fair 
charge could be levelled against the relative lack of engagement with peasant agency in this 
first part of my reconstruction of Imperial China’s history. PM has indeed been accused of 
excessively focussing on intra-ruling class relations, and insufficiently on the agency of the 
productive class (e.g Callinicos, 1999; Heller, 2011). This case study should also compel 
more representation of such struggles on empirical grounds, as Imperial China witnessed an 
impressive number of rebellions.  
 
The lack of dependable sources is the main reason for the absence of systematic assessment 
of the impact of peasant revolts on the course of the Chinese Empire during the 618-1279 
timeframe. Lists of uprisings are certainly available, but the extent to which these were 
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instances of peasant agency vs. banditry or contention for power by members of the ruling 
class is open to debate116. Because of the lack of primary material, no causal relation 
between peasant uprisings and the transformations of the Chinese polity and socio-
economic relations can be convincingly posited117. Much crucial data, as with land/man 
ratio, often result from controversial extrapolations from local or official data. No official 
records were kept during periods in which no ‘unified’ Chinese Empire existed (e.g. the 
‘Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms’ period). In turbulent periods, these records are 
particularly unreliable (e.g. the late Tang era). Variations between different extrapolations 
about population changes118 are enormous (Deng, 2004). To my knowledge, there is no 
equivalent, for the dynasties prior to the Ming, to the works of demographic historians on 
eco-demographical crises affecting Europe in the second millennium119. Furthermore, no 
tenancy contracts survived from the period covered here, except from one, moreover 
exceptional, region in Central Asia (Twitchett, 1966). It is thus impossible to ascertain 
changes in the security of tenure or other possible indicators of peasants’ victories. From 
what can be inferred from broader sources, it seems that there were important variations 
between regions in terms of landlord-peasant relations and that a diversity of practices 
endured (bondage to the land or the landlord, tenancy, fixed rent, sharecropping, etc.)120. 
The data begins to become clearer for the Song era, but suffices mostly during the Ming 
and Qing periods alone; so this is an issue specific to this chapter. 
 
Overall, peasant struggles and victories for this period seem to have been localised or 
regional in character, without parallels with the pan-European changes of the 13th Century 
or the 17th Century peasant victory in Ming China. Peasant resistance most probably 
impacted strongly within the areas in which these occurred, but the endeavour of retracing 
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 For example, see Deng (1999). His list confuses every kind of mass rebellion in one category according to 
the participation of peasants rather than taking into account the origins and objectives of revolts. 
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 Scholars asserting such causal relations, for example between war, dynastic collapse, land/man ratio, and 
peasant uprisings (Chu and Lee, 1994; Usher, 1989) rely on theoretical models alone. 
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 The leading works on population data are Chao (1986), Maddison (1998), McEvedy and Jones (1978), and 
foremost, in Chinese, Zhao and Xie (1984). 
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 Most of the literature on Imperial China’s demography is centered on either intra-regional migration (e.g. 
Hartwell, 1982; Skinner, 1977) or on the difference or similarity of Chinese family patterns to those of the 
West (e.g. Zhao, 1997). 
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 This issue shall be addressed in the historical reconstruction of the Song period.  
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their micro-politics is beyond the scope of the chapter. However, each time the sources are 
available, the impact of peasant struggles is portrayed, for example, at moments of turning 
points in the survival of the Chinese Empire (e.g. during the late Tang or Song periods) or 
as differentiating the situation of particular regions. Peasants’ historical imprint is 
nonetheless generally negatively assessed, for example through their flight or non-
registering strategies.  
 
1.1 From the dawn of the ‘universal empire’ to the ‘Six Dynasties’ period 
The history of the Chinese Empire conventionally has its starting point in the unification of 
the feudal principalities by what was later known as the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC). This 
marked the end of the Warring States period (453-221 BC) and, more generally, the first 
'multi-state system' (Hui, 2005) which also comprises the Spring and Autumn period (770-
453 BC). The Qin’s short-lived reign rapidly dissolved back into regional kingdoms, to be 
followed by the Han dynasty period (206 BC – 220 AD), perceived as the pursuit of a 
‘universal empire’. This is better understood as a period of political accumulation rather 
than a stable ‘state’ presiding over a pacified territory reaching even to Central Asia: the 
Han period was generally marked by internecine wars and constant shifting of political 
geography. This period was crucially marked by the division, then reunification of the 
empire under the Eastern, or Later Han (25-220) after seventeen years of war. Rebellions, 
endemic at least from 184 onward, finally ended in the breakdown of the empire, ushering 
in the Three Kingdoms period (220-265/280), comprised of the Wu, Wei, and Shu states. 
This era is followed by the ‘Six Dynasties’ period, including the Jin dynasty era and the 
Southern and Northern Dynasties period.  
 
The imperial ideology presents this period as an uninterrupted succession of dynasties in an 
undivided realm. It is however difficult to argue that there was a unified Chinese Empire 
from the Han to the Sui. In the literature, the debates on this ‘age of aristocracy’ revolve 
around whether clans controlled the state or whether it controlled them. The concept of 
‘aristocratic rule’, first argued for by an important Japanese scholar associated with the 
Tokyo school, presents the ruler as firstly ‘primus inter pares’. This ‘Naito’s hypothesis’ is 
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certainly far from convincing121, especially for accounting for the many variations 
occurring during this period. The subsequent literature on the great clans has been faced 
with the irresolvable nature of many historiographical issues of this period, notably the 
medieval origins and longevity of the ‘great clans’ until the Song122.  
 
As explained in Chapter Four, the problem with a large part of this later literature deriving 
from ‘gentry studies’ is that the notions of ‘aristocracy’, ‘great families of officials’, or 
‘oligarchy’ are not systematically linked within an enquiry into their bases of social power 
within specific social relations. Given the literature’s quasi exclusive focus on the imperial 
state, the idea of great clans or aristocracy is foremost associated with representation in 
official positions and with descent. I will rather more broadly ask whether there were 
important private powers challenging the ruling house, be there rising and falling (both in 
prestige and literally), as well as social relations favouring the persistence of a kind of 
‘parcellisation of sovereignty’. I will also ask why official positions were offered, beyond 
the fact that identified individuals detained aristocratic surnames. I argue that such 
positions were awarded for personal services, which included support of the dynasty in 
succession strife, and that such ‘offices’ did not carry important bureaucratic power. I 
propose that the rise and fall of great houses followed from the fact that dynasties quickly 
succeeded one another in a climate of enduring wars and shifting alliances. I suggest that 
this focus on the ranking apparatus obscures at times more important players and ways of 
cooptation (such as the princely powers in the Southern Dynasties or ‘nomadic’ distinctions 
in the north). Overall, I will show that the ‘Six Dynasties’ period was far from 
homogeneous or abiding to a linear narrative. This will also serve to subsequently 
demonstrate that these pre-modern characteristics of ‘divided China’, in terms of authority 
relations and political geography, were still operating in the ‘reunified’ and ‘imperial’ 
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was the ‘instrument of the aristocratic class’ has not survived in light of more recent research. There are, 
indeed, doubts about such a high degree of independent military and landed power, and thus also the 
possibility of long term reproduction of the ‘aristocracy’ (Dien, 1991; Grafflin, 1990). 
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China affiliation, arguing that only a few important Tang families can be traced back to the Han (Grafflin, 
1991). Clans are to be distinguished from Late Imperial China’s lineages, involving the ‘pooling of 
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period which followed.  
 
The notion of variants of ‘military dynasticism’ (Lewis, 2009a) is more attuned to the 
fluctuations of authority relations and political geography as sources of power for the 
period of the ‘Six Dynasties’. Ebrey (1979) demonstrates how many old families 
disappeared during this period, when the diversity of their resources was largely canalised 
in their collaboration with the court, with many of these families fading away with frequent 
coups. However, this does not mean a premature stable centralisation of power, as it was 
the names that changed rather than the processes by which emperors needed to be backed 
up by powerful groups to secure their rule and for this, re-privatising authority in diverse 
fashions. The ‘state’ was neither bureaucratic nor impersonal nor even that important an 
institution per se if devoid of the power the ruler brought with him. To summarise, the 
entire period was ridden by attempts (and at times and in different parts of the empire, 
successes) to establish independent polities by a number of social forces possessing private 
armies and dependents, from generals and leading local families to princes. These 
competed over the producing class composed of dependants (coming from either 
populations captured in war, bankrupted fugitives illegally escaping state tax and corvée, or 
‘bounded retainers’, i.e. dependants working the land of their master while not fighting for 
him) and of formally free peasants in registered households tilling state lands. Due to the 
high level of feuds, peasant rebellions occurred massively to fight conscription (Crowell, 
1983). Overall, violence was never centrally monopolised. Local and provincial powers 
always controlled more troops than the center, with ‘sub-national’ troops being composed 
mostly of ‘bounded retainers’. 
 
1.1.1 From the Three Kingdoms to the Western Jin dynasty 
The Three Kingdoms social regimes were based on ruling houses controlling hereditary 
military and agricultural colonies123. Over time, land and people were awarded to 
militarised followers as private property, whether through the Northern dismantling of 
colonies given as private properties to leading families or the Southern granting of lands as 
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fiefs to generals who had been opening new fields and recruiting native people in these 
colonies. Although these elites owed their titles to the ruling houses, they had an 
independent and hereditary economic and military basis. If high office positions were 
coveted, acquired through the court’s recommendation and monopolised by the ‘great 
families’ competing for this source of power, these were not at first the primary source of 
power. The ruling houses continuously tried to curb the local powers and increase their 
share of surplus by strengthening household registration, through which the states 
attempted to prevent the increase of the number of dependants of tax-exempted magnates, 
resisting the state’s arrogation of the right to expand. The awarding of ‘private clients’ was 
to remain the emperor’s prerogative, but this was not easily managed (Tang, 1991).  
 
Tensions between growing local powers and the ruling houses led to the landed family of 
the former Wei general, Cao Cao, establishing the short-lived (Western) Jin dynasty by 
conquering the Shu polity in 263, and thereafter the polity of Wu in 280. The imperial 
center however proved unable in the long run to provide sufficient occasions for the local 
elite to increase their social power. Since the Jin was wary of this elite, it managed to curb 
their independent powers by putting it in even more powerful hands, privatising the power 
at a provincial princely level. The Jin imperial power thus enfeoffed its relatives in fifty-
seven imperial princedoms according to the size of their armies. After the initial conquest, 
this situation led to war among the princes and against the emperor, notably during the War 
of Eight Princes (291-306; Dreyer, 2009). In 311, nomads conquered North China, and 
from that point onward, the history of the period is geographically divided between the 
rival Southern and Northern dynasties124.  
 
1.1.2 The Southern Dynasties 
The period began with the establishment of the (Eastern) Jin dynasty in the South from 317, 
following their flight from the nomads. The imperial center was still struggling for power 
with the great families, facing resistance over its policy of restricting the enlarging of 
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southern local estates125. The state apparatus at that time can be characterised as ‘a welfare 
system for the aristocratic refugees‘ (Graffin, 1991: 60): land and court positions were 
granted to the northern émigrés, a practice grafted to the more usual practice of conferring 
office as a recognition of local power126. From the 420s onward, the Jin were replaced by 
four succeeding different dynasties. A pattern of placing imperial princes into positions of 
power in provinces occurred (similar to such attempts in the late 3rd Century). This was 
aimed to reduce the threat of the local magnates’ participation in coups d’état and the 
clashes of local, provincial, and imperial forces characteristic of the Western and Eastern 
Jin eras127. The imperial power relatively succeeded in curbing the influence of the great 
local families at court, on whose armies the center did not depend anymore. The émigré 
families, whose position was insecure (as it was due mainly to their ties to the court), also 
disappeared with the coming to power of new military leaders. Other groups like regional 
warlords, however, joined the struggles among provincial and imperial forces during this 
period. Conflicts over jurisdictions were recurrent and imperial princes had the power to 
bind local forces through personal loyalty via patronage relations for, at most, a lifetime. 
Wars among princes, in competition for patronage networks and territories, cascaded 
through their militarised clients (Chittick, 2010). The very idea of a center declined over 
time: twenty-six rulers, mere puppets of the private forces detaining temporarily more 
power, succeeded one another from 420 to 589, of which thirteen were killed and four 
deposed (Dien, 1991: 18).  
 
1.1.3 The Northern Dynasties 
In the north, after the 311 war leading to the Western Jin's loss of its territories, power was 
much more dispersed, decentralised, and unstable. Nomads governed the divided North in 
Sixteen Kingdoms under a loose tribal confederation, forcibly moving the conquered 
population to their respective capitals and fighting or co-opting populations established 
within local forts. These Northern dynasties were characterised by a far less stable 
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 This even resulted in a short taking over of the dynasty by one such magnate from 322 to 324. 
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 The ruling house also had to provide high offices to local southern families in exchange for their military 
support, as the northern émigrés’ army was unable to repel the attack from the North (Dien, 1991: 17-18). 
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 There was a relative demilitarisation of the southern local families over the subsequent dynasties: 70-94% 
of this power was held locally during the Eastern Jin, whereas it declined rapidly after 420 during the post-Jin 
Southern Dynasties to a proportion as low as 17% (Mao, 1991: 94). 
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succession of rule than in the South. The Northern Wei (386-535) dynasty broke this pattern 
and proceeded to ‘Sinicise’ its rule, transforming its tribal leaders into a hereditary military 
class with attributed lands from which to derive income.128 The Wei pursued the conquest 
of the North whilst redistributing its fruits, which was an essential component of the 
securing of this regime (Eisenberg, 1997)129. Over time, it co-opted native magnates 
towards sharing state privileges while intermarriage also became frequent. At first, these 
preeminent families had retained their local bases (more important and militarised than in 
the south).130 Their independent power had, however, eroded over time under the combined 
pressure of the assault on private landholdings (through the equal-field system) and on their 
military power during their conquest by the Sui (Ebrey, 1979: 82-83; Lewis, 2009a: 127-
135). 
 
In 485, the Northern Wei promulgated the ‘equal-field system’ that the early Tang would 
also borrow. This northern practice served to relocate people and fill up the reservoir of 
taxation in areas that the dynasty could control. Under this policy, each household of one 
male could receive a given amount of land and tools on ‘state farms’ (in exchange of tax 
and corvée) and could thus be ‘free’ from any feudal protection. Large estates nonetheless 
persisted, despite the imperial ascribing of quotas of land allowed to be possessed131. This 
relative increase of state-lands allowed the new military system to be put in place. Such 
‘divisional militia’ of soldiers conscripted to work on military smallholdings later proved 
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 'Imperial retirement' was part of the process of 'Sinicisation' aimed at stabilising the line of succession in 
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crucial due to the subsequent loss of the military backbone of the dynasty during the early 
6th Century tribesmen revolts. Upon these frontier revolts led by the Mongolian nobility of 
the Northern Wei, this political regime was partitioned into two polities in the East and the 
West in 535. The latter was succeeded by the Northern Zhou (557-581), absorbing in 577 
the Eastern Wei/Northern Qi.  
  
1.2 The Sui-Tang period and its aftermaths  
In traditional narratives, the Sui era of rule is but a prelude to the Tang, the ‘Five Dynasties 
and Ten Kingdom’ period of rule, an interlude before the Song reunification. The Tang 
dynasty is often identified as the heyday of the Chinese empire (Adshead, 2004). If the 
concept of written imperial examination is dated as far as the Han dynasty, it has acquired a 
growing significance during the Sui, Tang, and Song eras and this system of granting 
degrees is seen as occupying an important place in the efficiency of the civil service 
system. The Sui-Tang period is thus perceived as characterising the end of the aristocratic 
rule which persisted throughout the ‘Six Dynasties’ era, which would now be replaced by a 
centralised bureaucratic administrative form of rule, to be further perfected by the Song.  
 
But did this ‘return to empire’ and ‘reunification’ signify that the presumptions of the 
inside/outside distinction and bureaucratic centralisation can be used to understand China’s 
history from the Tang Empire onwards? Overall, I argue that the characteristics which 
precluded this during the age of ‘military dynasticism’ were still present in the Sui-Tang 
era. My historical reconstruction of agential and relational conflicts over land and people 
indeed demonstrates that political geography and state power were still primary objects of 
contention in these struggles. More specifically, I will contend with the prevalent dynastic 
division of the period. To follow transformations in social relations rather than the 
‘unification vs. division’ narrative, the Tang era has to be separated into two periods which 
are divided by the changes catalysed by the halt in geopolitical accumulation, epitomised 
after the An Lushan Rebellion (755-763)132. The early Tang regime is reminiscent of the Sui 
reign. Following the mid-8th Century, the Tang had only nominally an empire. The division 
                                                 
 
132
 This military governor in a northern province expanded his power and even gained control over the capital 
before being defeated by the Tang dynasty with the help of Uighur troops. 
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of the empire under the rule of military governors formed a specific form of authority 
relations. Crucially, it is during the period of ‘Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms’ that we 
see the establishment of social relations enabling the Song office-state. Rather than being a 
conscious choice of the Song to consolidate a civil bureaucracy along the lines of preceding 
attempts dating back to the building of the ‘universal empire’, this instance of state 
formation originated in the period of ‘divided China’. This was a two century-long 
protracted process, based on the model of the military regional governors of the late Tang.  
 
However, I do not merely propose, through this, a re-periodisation of China history. This is 
rather a re-theorisation of elite power, of what this means to be able to ensure the ‘loyalty’ 
of followers and to build different forms of empires. These are understood here as 
conflictual processes built on diverse ways of redistributing revenues, rather than as 
projects of founders or a gradual process of centralisation, as the literature usually 
portrays133. This orthodox perspective on the Chinese ‘state’, as an intrinsic and 
cumulatively developing feature of the empire, enables simultaneously the un-
problematised use of the category of ‘China’ and the mobilisation of its enduring form of 
polity as the source of its ‘blockage’. Both the origins of the office-state and its nature 
under the Song rather further confirm that the ‘state’ was firstly a contested (and thus 
eminently changing) instance of institutionalisation of differentiated rights to gain access to 
surpluses. 
 
1.2.1 The Sui 
Emerging from a powerful family which had participated in the founding of the Northern 
Zhou, the Sui dynasty took over the relatively united North in 581, and then conquered the 
South, and later on Annam in 602, thereby resuming more glorious days for the empire 
until 618. During its short reign, the Sui dynasty rulers nonetheless attempted to centralise 
the system they inherited, whilst continuing with such northern policies as the equal-field 
system (Twitchett, 1979). The Sui tried to reverse the previous tendency of privatising and 
                                                 
 
133
 The range of such studies goes from Weber (159: 53-83) to Mote (1999: 92-118). On the Song as the 
beginning of ‘bureaucratic despotism’ characteristic of Late Imperial China’s history, see Naito (1983) and 
Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1965). The Cambridge History of China is a classic example of a founders-
centered perspective on the Song bureaucratic innovation (Twitchett and Smith, 2009).  
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subdividing proliferating offices, which was sustained by the surcharging of the local 
population and the bribing of the imperial government and had led to the loss of the ruling 
house’s tax base. The Sui therefore instituted the redistribution of land to officials for mixed 
private/public expenses and the new ‘rule of avoidance’134, whilst re-appropriating the right 
to appointment. 
 
All this rested on the Sui’s ability to redistribute the land they captured through their 
conquests. Yet, even lower officials (so with less means for this than high officials) pursued 
parallel strategies towards wealth and land accumulation. Moreover, the equal-field 
system’s application was limited. High quotas of land for the nobility ran parallel to this 
system. This system itself was a gold mine for the officials in charge. Peasants kept facing 
and fleeing enormous taxes and tax debts, as land allocation never reached the official 
quota. Land-grabbing also persisted under the right to open new lands. Later unsuccessful 
imperialist policies contributed to the dynasty’s fall: the Sui failed to conquer the Turks and 
Koguryo (northern Korea), while they were, furthermore, assailed by raids from the 
Khitans located in Manchuria. Upon the death of the emperor, combined with internal 
revolts and a depleted treasury strained by war, the Sui dynasty was rapidly followed by the 
Tang dynasty. A tri-partite internecine war divided along regional lines led to the victory of 
the North-Western contenders, who founded the Tang dynasty.  
 
The Tang dynasty originated as hereditary nobility controlling the Shanxi region, with 
conjoined military and civil official positions under the Sui ruling house. Such governors, 
who received sources of income and drafted pools of soldiers in addition to their private 
power, were in a position to ‘rebel’ if dissatisfied with the diminution of imperial largesse. 
This illustrates that the cooptation of the forces within the empire was congenitally unstable 
and relied on the ability of the center to pursue compensation for ‘loyalty’. Even if the Tang 
may have succeeded in maintaining such a balance for a longer period, they were not able 
to resolve the contradictions inherent to this mechanism of rule. 
 
                                                 
 
134
 This policy, not uniformly applied, referred to the short tenure of office outside the official’s native area, 
usually for three years. 
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1.2.2 The early Tang 
The Tang ruling house extended the Sui’s agricultural colonies under the equal-field 
system135, bringing more taxable land under cultivation and giving access to peasants’ 
corvée labour. As usual, the Tang began their rule by granting of titles, prefectures, and land 
to surrendered rebels or followers, a process which gave rise to a ‘swollen nobility’136. It 
also perpetuated ‘loyalty’ through its military system, based on the Northern Dynasties’ 
practice of an elite ‘regimental army’ leading imperial conscripted farmers-soldiers (Lewis, 
2009, 44-45). Elite families traditionally had a son as military officer, which granted him 
land and fiscal exemptions. Distinctions on the battlefield led to the coveted certificates of 
appointment, an opportunity to buy rank (Zhang, 2007). This system led the Tang to win 
Tolos and Uighur territories (in 646) and the former Korean kingdoms of Koguryo and 
Paekche, following the war fought in collaboration with Silla (645-668). A system of 
‘pacification colonies’ governed these territories, whilst the Tang’s administration of 
conquered tribes took various forms137. The ‘stability’ of the first century of the empire thus 
relied on the redistribution of the territory of the initial conquests and the capacity to make 
such a system endure. 
 
This overall arrangement did not last long; the Tang enjoyed a much shorter reign than is 
generally acknowledged. In this, they resembled mostly the Sui, but this is also reminiscent 
of the previous pattern of medieval China. As with previous dynasties, the Tang were 
successful as long as they could pursue expansion, as this was the primary means to 
redistribute surplus and reward the elite – in other words, the basis of the regime. However, 
this came to a halt from the late 7th Century. A shortage of land was increasingly felt: by 
730, the land allocated to peasants under the equal-field system was reduced by 50% in 
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 Here again, the actual reach of the equal-field system must not be overestimated: one decade after the 
conquest, one third of the total Sui population was still not registered. No sources confirmed that it had ever 
been implemented in the South even under the Tang (Twitchett, 1969: 39). See also Xiong (1999). 
136
 Prefectures and counties were created for this new nobility, to the extent that this doubled the number of 
such divisions as compared to the Sui era (Wechsler, 1979: 205).  
137
 Tribes were added to original prefectures or administered by the nearest military commanders. The 
administration could also be granted, in exchange of annual tribute, to tribal leaders with blood links to the 
emperor (many of which were fictitious due to marriage or bestowal of kinship). On the issue of bestowal of 
kinship, see von Glahn (1987) regarding the situation on the Sichuan’s frontiers, and Wang (2011), for its 
central importance during the Five Dynasties era. 
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80% of the districts (Chao, 1986: 91). The empire’s need of revenues led to sales of offices 
and noble titles becoming common practice again. A panoply of ‘extra-bureaucratic special 
commissioners’ were thus created, from regional military governors to head of monopolies 
– mainly salt and iron – and diverse ad hoc commissions on fiscal policy, infrastructure, 
and household registration. 
 
Military deployment patterns thus began to change, from rewarding expeditions to border 
defence. The ruling house was moreover less able to keep its commitment of awarding 
‘merit land’. This signalled the retreat of the ruling elite from those ‘state services’. The 
Tang would now come to face constant threats from diverse steppe ‘nomads’ and polities138, 
particularly by the Tibetan Empire139, but also by the Eastern and Western Turks, and 
Khitans. Such major raids on the borders led to the establishment of frontier military 
governors (Cohen, 2000: 77-78). This system of provincial governors, being concurrently 
responsible for the prefectures and the military colonies,140 came to replace the previous 
military system; this signalled the transfer of the formerly imperially-detained military 
might to commands on the frontiers.  
 
These regional military governors rose to power from the An Lushan Rebellions onward, 
achieving practical independence, gaining fiscal privileges, appointment power, and 
hereditary offices with long tenure. To face the rebellion, the imperial government 
institutionalised, within the entire empire, its frontier policies. The interior provinces were 
encouraged to establish agricultural and military colonies and to take over those colonies 
belonging to the state (Twitchett, 1959: 181-191). If this move proved successful in 
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 The adjective ‘nomad’ is used here in accordance with the terminology in the literature. This does not 
imply an absence of political organisation or settled population. There are nonetheless differences in socio-
political organisation between, on the one hand, loosely knit tribes on Chinese borders and, on the other hand, 
durable polities, such as the Jurchen Jin, the Tangut Xi Xia, the Khitan Liao, the Mongols, and diverse Turkic-
type state formations. Overviews of the trajectories of these polities and their relations with the Chinese 
Empires can be found in Franke and Twitchett (1994) and Mote (1999). 
139
 The Tang victories over the Western Turks gave them access to the lucrative trade routes in Central Asia, 
but these lands remained highly contested. The Chinese often had to make concessions to the Tibetan Empire, 
through inter-marriage and tribute. The Tibetans captured the Central Asian part of the Tang Empire from 670 
to 692. They always contested it afterwards, finally regaining it in 756. 
140
 Such colonies were based on the recruitment of poor and dispossessed peasants. They were given salaries, 
were exempted from tax and corvée duty, and were being granted land in frontier areas, in which they settled 
permanently (Twitchett, 1959). 
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retaking the capital from the Northern rebels, this, crucially, ‘gave institutional permanence 
to the rebellion’ (Lewis, 2009b). Following the imperial strategy to crush the rebellions, 
military power was held provincially and provincial loyalty could only be temporarily 
bought, as the governors succeeded in building private power, which led to intra-ruling 
class military competition 141. Provincial governors came into power through a variety of 
routes, from co-optation of former rebels to court governor appointments, and the relation 
between these and the center varied geographically and temporally throughout the second 
half of the dynasty (Wang, 1963). Large parts of the empire were re-privatised to whoever 
could afford to claim a piece of it, by force or by purchase of offices; in many cases, 
imperial appointees were turned down by provincial military display.  
 
From then on, the Tang had to mostly rely on foreign troops (Rossabi, 1983). By losing 
state lands, the Tang lost their source of soldiers, but also the source of revenues. The 
equal-field system was no longer workable, due to the provincial gain in autonomy and the 
destruction and obsolescence of tax records, all in a context of war-induced depopulation 
and southwards migration142. This signalled the end of the (relative) administrative 
uniformity in revenue collection and codes of law (Twitchett 1979: 18-19). In such a 
context, the two-tax system143 was instated in 780, as an acknowledgment of prevalent 
practices. Crucially, this system was to be implemented by negotiation of local tax quotas 
upon an initial assessment; the provinces then accepted to give this quota of tax to the 
center, but were autonomous on the issue of how to raise these. Changes in fiscal policy 
were unevenly implemented from the start. The autonomous provinces no longer paid taxes 
through the channels of the bureaucratic tax system, but gave tribute directly to the 
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 For example, when the Tibetans temporarily took over the capital in 763, no province responded to the 
emperor’s demand for help. When the emperor commanded nine provinces to march on a recalcitrant 
province in 775, these grabbed some parts of its territory but abandoned the campaign afterwards (Peterson, 
1979). The diversity and evolution of the relations between the imperial center and the provinces were 
furthermore influenced by the tensions with other provinces and with foreign threats (Graff, 2008).  
142
 Despite this, the North remained the most important area for the Tang during its rule. The provinces of Ho-
Pei and Ho-nan contained 25 to 30% of the population of the empire at the time of the Rebellion; the 
following loss of these provinces had important financial repercussions for the Tang (Peterson, 1979: 486). A 
subsequent demographic explosion began in the south between 742 and 1200 (Hartwell, 1982).  
143
 Its name refers to the taxation newly occurring twice a year (on summer and fall harvests). This new 
system theoretically abolished additional levies. From a fixed tax and service labour on each male household 
(excepting clergy, officials, and nobles), tax quotas were now to be set according to wealth and cultivated 
land; it was thus also aimed at merchants. 
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emperor. Without court appointees to supervise the process and with governors in control of 
private armies to add into the mix during political negotiations with the court, the imperial 
revenues dried out144.  
 
The government kept fiscal control, in 807, only on eight out of forty provinces, all set in 
the Yangzi (Peterson, 1979: 510). Even in such ‘loyal’ provinces, common practices now 
included big landlords bribing the authorities for ‘tax-shelter’, lists of registered households 
being kept away from imperial accounts, and the illegal levelling of additional taxes and 
levies. Due to the emperor's constant need of revenues to wage war against its provinces, a 
tax on the salt monopoly (this revenue arising from the more secure southern part of the 
empire) was established (Adshead, 2004: 50); soon followed taxes on tea and wine145. For 
the same reason, the imperial tax burden on the peasantry, now relying solely on the Yangzi 
region, dramatically increased146. Due to its incapacity to regulate the provinces and 
enforce the equal-field system, the ruling house was forced to recognise the owners’ right 
of disposal of their land, and this period witnessed the rise of great estates and increasing 
tenancy. 
 
The post-An Lushan period was thus fraught with further provincial upheavals, popular tax 
revolts, mutinies, and banditry. At times (as in 806 and 814-819), some provinces decided 
to formally reintegrate the Tang empire, and the first half of the 9th Century saw some 
relative imperial control reasserted. Overall, however, we see a pattern in which the varied 
balance of power between the imperial center and individual provinces, as well as among 
the latter, determined the distribution of revenues. An additional blow came from the south 
where, from 858 onward, alliances between landowners and merchants who had bought 
military positions defied the government and brought the wave of 'regional militarization' 
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 The implicit gain of power of appointment by the less loyal provinces (mostly located in the north-east) 
was particularly important due to the mode of distribution of revenues: from the prefecture to the province 
where each kept from taxes what was needed to cover its 'public' expenses/private revenues, and with only the 
remaining amount going to the court. 
145
 The monopoly commissioners however acquired a new autonomy in fiscal matters and right to self-
appointment, and those were titles concurrent to governors of such provinces (Wright, 1979: 53-55).  
146
 Moreover, the new cash-assessed tax system was hit by deflation, and the apportionment policy 
constrained the village to pay the tax of the numerous peasants fleeing this tax burden (Somers, 1979: 684). 
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also to the south (Lewis, 2009b)147. The Huang Chao Rebellions period (875-884) formally 
consecrated the fragmentation of the empire under its provincial lines. This refers to the 
leader of an important group of bandits who plundered vast parts of China and threatened 
the dynasty by taking the capital. Upon its recovery, the Tang were ruling mainly the 
capital’s territory (Cohen, 2000: 92). The last three decades of the Tang saw the 
transformation of fifty provincial regimes into a ‘dozen regional states’ (Somers, 1979: 
789). 
 
1.2.3 The ‘Five Dynasties’ and the building of the office-state 
The ‘Five Dynasties’ period (907-960) refers to the ‘dynasties’ which came from the Tang 
class of military governors, who successively ruled, each after a military seizing of the 
power of the immediate predecessor (once with the help of the Khitans148). They were 
located in the northern part of the former Tang Empire that the rebel Zhu secured, 
establishing the Liang dynasty following his overthrow of the Tang. This period is 
alternatively called the ‘Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms’ period. The Southern and 
Western parts of the former Chinese Empire (including the remnants of the Tang dynasty) 
were indeed ruled independently by outlaws turned ‘military entrepreneurs’ (Clark, 2009), 
and embedded in a web of intense diplomacy. The name of the period, coined by a Song 
official historian, 'tidies up a messy period with misleading simplicity' (Lorge, 2005: 17), so 
as to prove the legitimacy of the Song as heirs of the Tang in the passing of the Heavenly 
Mandate. 
 
Wang Gungwu (1963) had innovatively proposed that such dynastic periodisation should be 
set aside, in favour of an understanding of the late Tang to early Song (755-979) as a 
distinct process. According to him, the Tang model of regional governorship was mostly 
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 Local military offices, first bought by landlords for the legal and tax immunity this implied, also led to 
their participation in rebellions (Somers, 1979: 688). 
148
 The involvement of the Khitans in Chinese politics marked their founding of the Liao dynasty. The Khitans 
received what will be later called the Sixteen Prefectures for their help to the Later Jin dynasty in 
overthrowing the Later Tang (two of the five dynasties of the period). The Khitans fought for this territory 
when the second Later Jin ruler reneged on the Jin's end of the bargain. This led to the Later Jin’s demise at 
the hands of the Khitans who did not, however, manage to keep control of the 'Chinese Empire' beyond their 
Sixteen Prefectures. 
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developed in the consolidation of imperial power in the Northern part controlled by the 
Dynasties. These successive rulers thus consolidated the Emperor Personal Army as a 
governor’s army (in the intent that it surpassed in strength its provincial counterparts) and 
increasingly incorporated the elite through the centralised power of the Palace. In contrast, 
the Tang were based since its origin on attributing territorial areas to follower and 
surrendered armies, as military districts, without being supervised by imperial 
administration; it was therefore easy for them to transform into commissioners with civil 
and military powers and responsibilities (Mostern, 2011: 128, 134). It was the ‘Five 
Dynasties’ which implemented a different spatial reorganisation, displacing such former 
commissioners’ power by reducing their territorial reach or dispatching imperial-trooped 
outposts staffed by loyal servants, founding new prefectures nearby (Mostern, 2011: 141). 
The Song dynasty was therefore modelled on the period of ‘divided China’, rather than 
being a pursuit of ‘universal empire’ in which the (early) Tang is supposed to be a crucial 
instance. 
 
Such analysis must however be grounded more explicitly in the evolution of social power, 
in order to explain how the relative demilitarisation of the elite occurred, albeit as a 
protracted process. The more than two century-long military governors’ intense struggle for 
political accumulation, in late Tang regions as in one of the later ‘dynastic state’ or 
kingdoms, profoundly affected the composition of the elite. Over time, the former Tang 
'aristocratic clans' were killed, or at least became ‘diasporas’ divorced from their initial 
political and economic base and whose social network was diminished (Johnson, 1977; 
Tackett, 2008). From the mid-Tang onwards, many elite families migrated, often to the 
more stable South, whilst the Five Dynasties’ elites with ties to such short-lived dynasts 
were extremely vulnerable (Tackett, 2006). Such a long period of incessant warfare 
exhausted the resources of contenders outside of the capital Kaifeng (Lorge, 2011: 231), 
which administrative territory was enlarged (Mostern, 2011: 139), whilst the independent 
might of governors declined so that, by the beginning of the 10th Century, they were no 
longer in position to defy the imperial center (Wang, 1963: 5). The mid-Tang tendency of 
usurping of provincial agricultural and military colonies as landed estates persisted 
(Twitchett, 1959: 202), which could, concomitantly with the increasing attraction of court 
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and official positions, explain the re-orientation of power (and relative demilitarisation) of 
the former elite families which survived the late Tang regional militarization’s and Five 
Dynasties’ devastations.  
 
The first two Song emperors continued to influence this process of displacing the 
independent territorial power of the militarised elite by ‘outposts of state authority’ 
(Mostern, 2011: 153)149. The Song founder, coming from the military elite of former Tang 
regional governors, could have been merely establishing a ‘Sixth Dynasty’. However, he 
succeeded in the conquest of the Southern Ten Kingdoms (960-979) and in furthering the 
cooptation of the Northern military governors and allies. This occurred notably through 
marriage and allocation of positions in the capital, in order to cut the elite from their power 
base (known as the ‘dissolving military power over a cup of wine’ strategy). More than a 
natural reunification of China, this was a successful expansionist policy from one of its 
chief hereditary families of military governors, continuing the project of the preceeding 
dynasty which its founder had overthrown. The Chinese populations of the Sixteen 
Prefectures however remained under contending dynasties, the Khitan Liao, and then, from 
1125, the Jurchen Jin150.  
 
However, this establishment of the office-system does not signify that we can be content 
with the dominant literature’s analysis of Song’s internal relations, allegedly pacified, 
which is supposed to prefigure the subsequent Han or Sinified reigns. Rewarding of the 
Song elite depended certainly less on expansion and attribution of land. However, this still 
rested on attribution of political power and privileges, another specific form of the ‘political 
economy of titles’ varying according to the contestations around property and power. If the 
mid-‘Five Dynasties’ period signalled an important phase of state-formation, it was not 
toward a stable meritocratic system and coherent, uniform administration. Authority 
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 This trend can be confirmed by Hartwell’s (1982: 408) findings, according to which ‘Representatives of 
the Hopei-Shansi-Shensi military governor alliance provided forty-six percent of the incumbents in fiscal 
offices between 960 and 986’. Hartwell does not, however, use these data this way. 
150
 The legacy of Chinese imperial history, attributing only one Mandate of Heaven at any given time for the 
sake of establishing imperial legitimacy, has led most scholars to ignore these regimes, whose analysis is 
beyond the scope of the chapter. However, Standen (2007) interestingly argues that the Liao was a successor 
‘state’ to the Tang.  
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relations and political geography remained as much singularly contested as for other 
periods, and this holds the key to understand China’s trajectory as open-ended as Europe’s. 
 
1.3 The Song ‘gentry society’ 
The dominant literature understands the Song dynasty through its pacific, technological, 
and economic orientations, which allegedly ultimately sealed its fate by leaving it 
vulnerable to military invasion. The Northern Song is seen as the era of the coming to 
power of the Confucian scholar-gentry (shidafu) and of the consolidation of the office-state 
apparatus. The Song is also seen as the apogee of Chinese science (Needham, 1954), the 
Chinese ‘Renaissance’ (Gernet, 1972), the beginning of the modern period (the Kyoto 
school)151, the source of 'commercial capitalism' (Balazs, 1964), an instance of interrupted 
‘recurring growth’ (Jones, 1999), and a 'medieval economic revolution' (Elvin, 1973). As 
this period is characterised by important degrees of commercialisation and urbanisation, it 
has posed a series of questions which revolve around its incapacity to fully carry on modern 
development, i.e. what would be expected according to the commercial model. I will cast 
these phenomena in another light by anchoring them in broader socio-spatial and socio-
economic pre-modern relations in order to explain the social limits of Song 
‘modernisation’, the new importance of the office-system in intra-elite relations, the origins 
of the growing ‘gentry society’, and the flexibility of the tribute-system. This innovative 
perspective about the Song period hence challenges many assumptions about its 
‘modernity’, as well as outlines the ‘gentry studies’ inability to explain such elements. This 
is undertaken not to deny or minimise Song China’s significant achievements, but instead 
so as to better understand the origins and impacts of this original development – which was 
however still characteristically pre-modern.  
 
The history of the Song period can be summarised through the variations of class relations, 
building on Brenner’s thesis on eco-demographic crises conceived as products of the socio-
economic pre-modern system, to be put in geopolitical context.152 From the population 
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 This was the center of an important debate, within Japanese scholarship, between the Marxist Tokyo 
School and the Kyoto School. 
152
 However, the scarcity of primary sources imposes certain limitations for the verification of these 
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increase in South China, we can posit a tendency toward the subdivision of plots, following 
from the peasants’ strategy of social reproduction entailing them to have many children as a 
protection against the hazards of old age. The state-sponsored territorial expansion of the 
mid-11th Century and landlords’ reclamation of lands partially delayed the explosive effect 
of this tendency of the rise of land/man ratio - without however averting it. As the land 
possessed became too small to satisfy their subsistence needs, the peasants had to find ways 
to secure additional incomes, for example by weaving or working outside of their plots. 
This is, incidentally, what explains the seemingly incredible Song’s commercialisation.153 
This however translated into an increase of labour input and therefore a decrease of labour 
productivity. Moreover faced with rising taxation (deriving from the imperial need of 
revenues for war), many peasants had to pledge their land to landlords. This balance of 
power in favour of landlords was only to be exacerbated by the Song dynasty’s loss of 
territories to the Jurchen Jin from 1126. Overpopulation and proper demographic crisis 
followed from 1200 onwards, a period pervaded with epidemics (Chao, 1986; Hartwell, 
1982). This most probably led to a crisis in revenues for the landlord class and the state, 
explaining the reinvigorated conflicts between them over peasants’ labour.  
 
The scarcity of sources renders the Song tenurial pattern difficult to establish beyond 
doubt154, but it can be approximated this way. The Song inherited the large estates and 
(relatively) free land market from the late Tang following the decline of the equal-field 
system155. It is estimated that a third (Golas, 1980: 303) to a half (Chao, 1986: 113) of the 
population was landless, and that three quarters of the land was held by officials and 
landlords constituting 14 percent of the population (Golas, 1980: 304). McDermott (1984) 
observes variations in the control the landlord class exerted on its tenants. In short, bondage 
could be either to the land or the landlord; even if the requirement of non-agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
hypotheses. 
153
 These phenomena of ‘proto-industrialisation’ and ‘commercialisation’ are nonetheless specifically pre-
modern and unlikely to provoke a ‘take-off’. See Brenner (1997) and Huang (1990), whose works aim to 
explain this tendency toward ‘involution’, respectively in pre-modern Europe and the Yangzi Delta from the 
Ming onwards. 
154
 This gave rise to the important controversy about whether the status of the landless population should be 
considered as contractual tenants (a thesis put forward by the Kyoto School) or rather as servile and bounded 
labourers (as stated by the Marxist Tokyo School). 
155
 On the subsequent increase of land sale contracts, see Hansen (1995). 
  
135
labour services varied, juridical inferiority was the wider norm. Although the available 
sources do not permit us to clarify the numbers of tenants vs. bounded labourers, it is very 
likely that both coexisted156.  
 
The Song regime was based on tax collection through the office-system, whose capacity for 
capturing revenues varied temporally and geographically according to the balance between 
social forces. The Song taxation system adapted the mid-Tang two-tax system. Labour 
services were due according to the wealth of the land-owners (the native/resident 
households, whether small producers or landlords without official family connections). The 
land tax, of around 10% of the harvest, was paid by everyone, except guest/non-resident 
households (i.e landless people, either unfree labourers, tenants, hired farm labourers, 
craftsmen, or merchants). On the one hand, the state had to compete with landlords having 
the means to evade taxation, who accumulated increasingly larger estates by 'welcoming' 
indebted peasants and opening new lands for cultivation. As peasants’ land was 
increasingly insufficient to provide for subsistence and as taxation increased, this led 
peasants to mortgage or sell their land to large landowners, to work in large estates, or to 
pledge their labour (Mazumdar, 1998: 195). Officials greatly benefited from this tendency, 
themselves investing into large estates (Twitchett, 1962). On the other hand, more distant 
regions were governed by accommodation to different social relations, partly in order to 
tame the frequent native/peasant unrest and nomad invasions. For example, in Sichuan and 
on the frontiers in general, from the Tang conquest of these territories to the Song era, 
‘local magnates’ maintained peasants under personal bondage through their large private 
militias. These potentates competed for larger territories among themselves and feuds were 
highly personalised. This led Hartwell (1982: 377) and von Glahn (1987) to qualify this 
respectively as feudal (rather than ‘bureaucratic’) and as a dynamic akin to European 
villein/lord relations.  
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 Some scholars, such as Niida Noboru, Sudo Yoshiyuki, and Elvin (1973) argue for a type of European-like 
manorialism. This thesis is convincingly dismissed by McDermott (1984), at least for its qualification of all 
Song China’s class relations. The Song law clearly distinguished between, on the one hand, landlord/tenant 
relations, whose different status was institutionalised but whose relations were, nonetheless, subjected to 
imperial law, and, on the other hand, master/servant relations, the former owning ‘discretionary judicial 
powers’ over the latter (von Glahn, 1987: 51). 
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By the 11th Century, three quarters of the tax revenues were captured by military 
expenditures (Mote, 1999: 115). The Song were confronted by the Khitan Liao polity in 
North China (907-1125) and the Tibetan Tangut Hsi Hsia Empire (1038-1227). The Song 
became their vassal (which meant that they had to give them tribute) respectively in 1004 
and 1042. The dynasty also faced the Mongols, who had been united from 907 on. Faced 
with the increasing difficulty of accessing the agrarian surplus due to the landlords’ tax 
evasion in an economy of large estates, the Song tried to re-assess official privileges and 
the size of landholdings. Wang Anshi’s Major Reforms (1069-1073) however failed at 
stabilising the amount of peasant-owned or 'public' lands at the expense of the landlord 
class. This double challenge explains the Song’s turn to unique reliance on ‘commercial’ 
revenues. During the North Song reigns, the percentage of revenues gained from indirect 
taxes indeed steadily increased vs. those of land taxes (Liu, 2005: 94-95)157. Such indirect 
taxes included above all monopolies, commercial taxes, and tax farming. In the 1070s, the 
Song started a territorial expansion in the southwest and northwest in order to benefit from 
these salt mining regions (von Glahn, 1987) and to further control the tea trade and 
production (Smith, 1991). Revenues from commercial taxes and tax-farming arose from the 
maipu system. This refers to the competitive bidding of individuals to manage minor tea 
monopoly sectors (Lamouroux, 1996: 985; Smith, 1991: 137), minor tax stations158, or 
‘local projects’ (such as ferries, roads, bridges, alcohol shops, and the mining industry), in 
exchange for a fixed fee159. All this implied a re-privatisation of public power, from further 
empowerment of local magnates in newly colonised, and disputed, areas such as Sichuan 
(von Glahn, 1987) to the outright selling of shares of state power to private agents. 
 
The South Song period began in 1126 when the Jurchen Jin (1115-1234), having 
vanquished the former Liao regime, grabbed 35% of the Song population after long years 
of war in the Northern territories. In 1138, the Song became a 'vassal' of the Jin. It took 
years of uncertainties to tame northern warlords and restore the imperial power in the South 
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 Liu however infers from these data the emergence of a modern commercial economy. 
158
 Tax stations were established to collect land tax in newly settled areas (Clark, 1992; Mostern, 2003) as 
well as to collect tax on merchandises transported as part of China’s long-distance trade. When Liu discusses 
commercial taxes, he refers to the later type. 
159
 The revenues from the selling of rights for local projects by itself amounted to 10% of all state revenues in 
1077 (Liu, 2012). 
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(Tao, 2009). Following the war with Jin, banditry and rebellion were widespread, to the 
point that the center appointed many of their leaders to government positions. The 
acceptance of the peace with Jin might have had more to do with the emperor's need to 
curtail the power of its new, Tang-like, northern regional commanders than with the Jin 
threat per se. The ruling class was, in addition, deeply divided over the goals that the 
empire should pursue, witnessing power struggles over foreign policy (notably by former 
northern military governors seeking to recover their lost territories) and internal 
administration. 
 
The ‘localist turn’ (Hartwell, 1992) occurred during this period. Factionalism at court 
amongst families monopolising high-office holding (from the Northern founding elites and 
important families) was so exacerbated at the turn of the 12th Century that it rendered risky 
the former unique reliance on office-holding. This risk was further deepened by the new 
quotas, according to geographical provenance, of the examination system. As it was the 
local magistrates who recommended candidates, this propelled the former office-holding 
elite’s strategy of inter-marriage with local gentries. The latter, who could now more easily 
access to office-holding, therefore further diversified its strategies of social reproduction 
(Bossler, 1998).  
 
The ruling house continued via diverse strategies to secure revenues in its competition with 
the landlords, such as entrenching the tenancy system in order to avoid tax default, by 
reinforcing the landowners' right over their tenants (through anti-runaway laws, harder 
punishments against tenants, etc.). Alternatively, the Song tried to reduce the arbitrariness 
in landlords/producers relations through a series of 'enlightened' policies in order to protect 
its more secure tax base. Relief granaries were established in order to face recurrent 
subsistence crises, food riots, and landlord grabbing of peasant land. The landlords finally 
were, however, the main beneficiaries of such policies, gaining titles from their 
collaboration when not gaining hold of the public land attributed to peasants’ relief itself160. 
Other attempts to curtail the landlords’ increasing power extended to its family policies, 
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 See, among others, Hymes et al., 1993. 
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aiming at limiting the inheritance right of agnatic kin and daughters while enhancing the 
imperial claim on 'extinct households' lands (Bernhardt, 1999; Birge, 1999)161. Overall, the 
landlords' ability to grab land was further increased during the South Song era after the 
devastation of the Jin invasion. They increasingly had the upper hand, managing through 
connections to 'hide' their property from tax, and most of the time made the ruling house 
retract those policies which were not to their advantage (Hymes and Schirokauer, 1993; 
Twitchett and Smith, 2009). On top of fleeing from debt and frequent rent evasion, peasants 
increasingly revolted against the increase in additional taxes and labour services or long-
term tenancy contracts, practices which had become the norm. Their uprisings occurred on 
different scales and were directed either at the state and its officials or at the landlords (or at 
both, as these categories often concurred)162. The conflicts between landlords and the ruling 
house reached their apex following Jia Sidao’s Public Fields Law (in the 1260s), ascribing a 
maximum quota of land to be held and permitting the state to forcibly ‘buy’ over-quota 
lands.  
 
At that time, the Mongols governed North China and were about to conquer the South 
Song, an endeavour accomplished by 1279. However, the dynasty did not collapse because 
of its Confucian inclination. It rather collapsed because geopolitical competition induced 
fiscal crises and threatened the socio-political arrangement on extraction and redistribution 
of revenues. This acquired a specific form as for all dynasties, as did the form of re-
privatisation of ‘public’ power this led to. The Song Empire was caught within a 'multi-
state system' (Rossabi, 1983) seeing multiple contenders for the Heavenly Mandate. 
However, it was not an exceptional situation since the beginning of the empire: the period 
between the Han and Sui dynasties as well as the ‘Five Dynasties’ era are also characterised 
as being 'each under its own Son of Heaven' (Franke and Twitchett, 1994: 8). 'China' has, 
indeed, been 'among equals', and even among equal polities claiming the status of 'the' 
Chinese Empire, throughout an important part, if not most of its history163. Overall, this 
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 McKnight (2000) reaches similar conclusions on the increase over time of the state’s claim on extinct 
households.  
162
 The Fang La Rebellion (1120-1121) and Lake Rebellion (1130-1135) are the most covered Song peasant 
revolts. For a list of such revolts, see Deng (1999: 363-376). 
163
 Hui (2007: 12) shows that the presence of a universal empire was less frequent in the history of China than 
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illustrates that, like social agency, geopolitics does not matter only at times of transitions. 
 
2. Non-Eurocentric China/Europe ‘reciprocal comparison’ 
Once pitched against Chinese history, the flimsiness of the groundings of the concepts of 
office system and World Order becomes apparent. These are as misleading as their early 
modern Western counterpart of the emerging capitalist national states caught in the 
Westphalian international system. Where does a non-Eurocentric 'reciprocal comparison' 
lead us to, if we remove its naturalisation of Europe's differentia specifica, the assumption 
of its homogeneity, the postulate of universal rationality and the ontologising of categories 
of analysis? I shall first compare the long-term European and Chinese developmental 
trajectories and then specific pre-modern attributes of those polities. 
 
2.1 Europe and China in the long run 
During the lifespan of the Qin Empire's first unification of China to the South Song, Europe 
went from the Roman Empire to 'feudal empires' (650-950) governed by domestic lordship 
as during the Carolingian Empire rule, then to 'feudal anarchy' (950-1150) under banal 
lordship in the context of 'parcellisation of sovereignty’, and finally to the 'feudal state-
system' (1150-1400) and its landlordship (Teschke, 2003). It is only in the latter period that 
the relatively more centralised tax/office state and international system (both albeit still pre-
modern) emerged simultaneously upon the monopolisation of banal power by the victorious 
lords in their political competition. There were important differences among regimes due to 
varying 'local' adaptations upon the dissolution of the Frankish Empire164. Attempts to 
centralise sovereignty into the institution of kingship (or emperorship) imply the building 
of ‘personal ownership of the rights of taxation, trade, and legislation’, or more simply put, 
the ‘royal ownership of public power’ (Teschke, 2003: 171-172). Consequently, conflicts 
around power tended to take the form of struggles around the means to exercise 
sovereignty, as a right monopolised but not controlled (i.e. in the office and military 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
its division: ‘Overall, even the minimal definition yields only 936 years of unification throughout the long 
span of Chinese history. Unification was slightly more common in the second millennium (538 years) than in 
the first (398 years). If we take 221 BC when Qin established the first unified empire as the base year, 936 
years represent only 40 percent of 2,221 years.’ 
164
 For an overview of the Spanish, German, French, British, and papal long-term processes of state-
formation, see Teschke, 2003: 97-109.   
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institutions).  
 
Available China/Europe comparisons remain unsatisfactory as they revolve around the 
dichotomy of state-system vs. empire, as do the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives. In the 
literature on China, such divergence is mostly located in the Tang dynasty’s consecration of 
the political unification of China (e.g. Adshead, 2004; Scheidel, 2009). In contrast, I have 
demonstrated that this trajectory was far from a linear one towards absolute centralisation 
of power, however much punctuated by inter-dynastic interruptions. Taken both in its social 
and spatial dimensions, this trajectory can be seen as a series of moments in which 
contingent, but retrospectively intelligible resolutions of social conflicts and reproduction 
crises shaped the history of the Chinese Empire.  
 
Concepts derived from European history can only be used precautiously, as elements of 
comparison. The ‘Six Dynasties’ period could be viewed as the wax and wane of 
equivalents of medieval feudal polities. The notion of emperorship as a succession of 
dynasties inheriting a ‘state’ indeed seems to be imposed in retrospect on a history of highly 
militarised lordship patterns. The actors were interpersonally bonded through obligations of 
military assistance while they consistently feuded amongst themselves. At the end of the 5th 
Century, a particularly strong contender, the Wei, emerged in the North, more successful at 
elite cooptation through redistribution of fruits of recurring conquests. Challenges from co-
ruling nobles periodically implied the trade of one reigning warlord for another, but a 
distinct pattern was institutionalised which laid the basis for a more personalised rule less 
dependent on followers, the equal-field system. Far from being absolute and constant 
during the empires’ time span, as the myths of Oriental Despotism and AMP would have it, 
the ‘state’ property of land was first a strategy to extract surpluses and soldiery, and its 
range was limited to areas the dynast could relatively directly control (mainly around the 
capital). This could be implemented only within a context of constant conquests (including 
‘internal unification’) through geopolitical accumulation, as a means to further reward the 
nobility after the initial granting of relative territorial autonomy. Upon its halt and the fiscal 
crises and growing empowering of military governors this led to, re-privatisatisation of 
‘public’ power occurred from the mid-Tang on. China never fully reverted to proper feudal 
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anarchy as did Europe. Over the course of the first millennium of Imperial China, private 
forces however had to be re-'purchased' every step along the way through war, marriage, or 
financial compensations as in Europe (Gerstenberger, 2007). This led to the relative 
demilitarisation of forces as a two-century long protracted process only relatively 
completed in the 3rd reign of the Song dynasty. The Song were still in competition for the 
extraction of revenues from peasants, and how the ‘state’ institutionalised and granted 
access to differentiated rights to surpluses was still contested. This acquired particular 
intensity under geopolitical pressures. This is what cannot be captured by conceptualising 
the Chinese empire as a static long-term project kept whole by its bureaucracy and its 
unchallenged place in the World Order within a de-militarised narrative.  
 
2.2 Eurasian pre-modern elements 
Although clearly and eminently specific to its social trajectory, pre-Yuan Imperial China’s 
commercial activity, forms of property, office system, elites’ ways of social reproduction, 
and socio-spatial activity share many parallels with continental Europe’s absolutist states.165 
The European geopolitical system, class relations, and state forms were not unique nor 
somehow intrinsically leading to modernity: they had Chinese counterparts many centuries 
before. On the one hand, shedding light this way on the equally pre-modern character of 
Europe directly confronts the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives’ assumption of an early 
modernity in Europe. On the other hand, such comparison situating continental Europe and 
China on a pre-modern continuum implies the abandonment of a specific mode for non-
European civilisations, either Asiatic or tributary, or of picturing China as an inverted 
mirror of the West.  
 
The late Tang and Song reliance on monopolies and supervision of trade leads the 
traditional literature to conceptualise it as a ‘Great Divergence’ from Europe, due to the 
alleged autonomy of its merchants (Balazs, 1964166; Mielants, 2002). Rights to control 
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 Due to the comparatively early sophistication and complexity of the Chinese state apparatus, the 
comparison is generally better fitted with later continental Europe’s absolutist states than with European 
political units contemporary to the Tang and Song dynasties. The unique English agrarian capitalist path is 
excluded from this comparison.  
166
 Balazs borrows Weber’s thesis according to which self-government in China was a feature of the villages 
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some trade granted by the emperor emphasised that it was his to grant, as any other office; 
it also holds true for European monopolies and trading charters (Brenner, 1993; Teschke, 
2003: 205-208). The allegedly exceptional Chinese ‘prohibition’ of free trade was rather a 
common feature of China and Europe, as the key to wealth, both for the ruling dynasty and 
the private agents, involved restricting internal and international exchange. Fundamentally, 
in European and Chinese markets alike, profit was made in the sphere of circulation and the 
access to this sphere was politically constituted: it was precisely the politically induced 
obstacles to competition by the granting of privileges which accounted for the lucrative 
nature of such trade. 
 
This chapter also challenges the myth of the lack of class diversity in China. Contrary to 
Banaji’s (2010) definition of the tributary mode of production, the Chinese ruling class was 
not ‘owned’ by the state, whether we mean by this concept landlords or officials. The 
relations between the dynasty and the ruling class varied during this period. Heavily 
militarised landed aristocracies of the like of European pre-absolutist regimes were 
common until the Song. Even during the Song, landlords were independent from the state, 
as state service was only one strategy of social reproduction among others and this class 
kept the coercive means to ensure their domination over their peasants. Moreover, elites’ 
strategies of social reproduction were similar to Europe’s. Pre-modern pattern of ‘non-
development’ (Brenner, 1986, 1997), fuelled by conflictual relations, both between and 
amongst elites, ruling house, and producers, set in a likewise conflictual geopolitical 
context, led to fiscal, subsistence, and social reproduction crises. As in Europe, the Chinese 
elite could grab land and expand the taxation base: either from native populations through 
military means (particularly on the frontiers); from nature by opening new land for 
cultivation (using peasant’s labour); from other landlords or governors (particularly in more 
‘distressed’ times); or from the state, either ‘legally’ (through office, both through official 
lands and the advantages this status conferred) or illegally (by ‘sheltering’ indebted and 
formally free - thus taxed by the state - peasants). 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
rather than of the towns. 
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If the Chinese office-state can by no means be deemed to be the same as those of Europe, 
parallels can nonetheless be traced. Chinese dynasts’ recourse to venal offices occurred 
most notably during the ‘Six Dynasties’ and from mid-Tang to Song (in other periods, the 
sale of offices did not imply their hereditariness). This however departed from the office 
market spawned under the Ancien Régime (Gerstenberger, 2007: 383-388, 606-610; 
Teschke, 2003: 173-177). Even in ‘peaceful’ times, if offices were not straightforwardly 
sold, these were nevertheless to a certain extent ‘rented’ through patronage, sponsorship, 
and recommendations, becoming a source of legal and illegal income beyond the salary 
formally attached to such posts. The strength of mechanisms ensuring against total 
privatisation of public power (rule of avoidance, revocability, short tenure, non-hereditary 
character of offices, imperial approval of its agents, absence of sub-imperial power of 
appointment) were subject to the balance of power between the emperor and officials, 
either as landlords, governors, or warlords (their capacity to evade those mechanisms 
relying on militarily- and politically-constituted power).  
 
Modernity of military institutions and monopoly over violence are generally drastically 
backdated for early modern Europe as for Imperial China. The dynastic hold on the military 
institution depended, in China as in Europe, on the balance of power within the ruling class. 
After the ‘Six Dynasties’ era in which there were no pretension over monopolisation over 
violence, it was comparable (if by no means identical), at times, to the French venality of 
army offices and military entrepreneurs (Teschke, 2003: 184-189). Military positions were 
bought or militarily contended for during the Tang, who furthermore had to mostly rely on 
mercenary nomad troops from the An Lushan Rebellions167. Even the Song did not have an 
absolute monopoly over violence. Landlords acquired titles and tax exemptions for the 
organisation of local militias. Pretensions over such monopoly were particularly insecure at 
times of important geopolitical crises, such as during the threat of Tang-like privatisation of 
regional commands during the transition to the South Song. The ambiguous relations of the 
South Song with the Northern Loyalist rebel armies in Jin territories, given offices for 
nominal subordination, without being integrated in the imperial army (Peterson, 1983), 
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 It had also lost intermittently its monopoly over foreign policy, even prior to the An Lushan Rebellion. See 
Skraff (2012) on the usurpation of international relations by powerful Tang frontier commanders. 
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pertained also to such incompleteness.  
 
Far from being uniquely hierarchical compared to Europe, Chinese international relations 
shared important parallels with Europe during the times of the Westphalian treaties. The 
hierarchy/anarchy dichotomy, attributing divergent mechanisms to Europe and East Asia, 
does not capture the pre-modern nature of both systems. According to Wolhort et al. (2007), 
the balance of power was not operating in many non-Western international systems. On the 
one hand, this proposition must be extended also to Europe, equally plagued with 'predatory 
dynastic equilibrium' fuelled by geopolitical accumulation (Teschke, 2003: 233-238). On 
the other hand, the balance of power did not operate in China, but not because the tributary 
system promoted cooperation under China’s hegemony. It was rather for reasons similar as 
in the case of Europe. The tributary system was motivated by temporary agreements on 
coveted territories (often at the expense of 'nomads'), always re-negotiated so as to freeze 
the status quo favourable to some powers at some points. It also served the repeated re-
mapping of East Asia, which was, contrarily to IR and traditional Sinology literatures’ 
assumptions, the norm. The Chinese Empire did not unfold in a geopolitical vacuum: even 
in periods of 'unification', it was always threatened by other units, whether we qualify these 
as 'semi-nomads' (Tibetans, Jurchens, Xi Xia, Khitans) or 'Sinicised' polities (Korean and 
Vietnamese kingdoms, Japan). Processes of state-formation (including 'Confucianisation’ of 
many of those polities, including the 'semi-nomad' ones) happened conjointly in a context 
of war as prima ratio. China was not always at the apex of the World Order, and always had 
to contend for the Heavenly Mandate.  
 
In short, pre-modern empires in the East as in the West share similar characteristics. 
Exchange was subject to political power in a variety of ways. The ruling houses competed 
with other classes and polities for the extra-economic extraction of peasant surplus. 
Participation in the state apparatus meant a share in the distribution of these surpluses and 
its access was politically mediated. Incomplete monopolisation of military might took a 
panoply of forms, and the pre-modern polities interacted in a context of socio-political 
diversity of units. Only by investigating historically the forms that the agents gave to each 
social institution in power struggles occurring in distinct socio-economic and geopolitical 
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contexts can we successively apprehend the specificities of European (in the plural) and 
Chinese trajectories. 
 
Conclusion 
Significant parallels can be drawn between China and Europe through anti-Eurocentric 
reciprocal comparison, even if concepts pertaining to the latter’s trajectories can by no 
means be simply transposed to understand the social relations of the former. Their uttermost 
significance for confronting the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives lies in revealing the pre-
modern character of Europe, through the analysis of analogous processes and institutions 
that we have no difficulties as viewing as pre-modern in their occurrence in China. This 
implies providing means for understanding singularities, arising from particular conflicts 
around power defined and deployed simultaneously socially and spatially, within pan-
Eurasian broad pre-capitalist similarities. 
 
Most fundamentally, this chapter is a milestone of my intervention within the ‘Great 
Divergence’ debate. The California School has set the agenda for comparing Eurasian 
trajectories in order to demonstrate that Europe was on the same path than China until very 
late in their development. However, the California School’s neo-institutionalist framework 
comparing indicators of development conforms to an anachronistic conceptual framework 
reproducing Eurocentrism. This is what leads them to assume, like the traditional literature, 
the Chinese ‘state’ and World Order as perennial features of a given geopolitical 
environment or normative predisposition. For these scholars, the Confucian elite and 
empire are ultimately conceptualised at the origins of China’s divergent, stable, but overall 
un-progressive, imperial trajectory lasting until the contact with the West.  
 
The PM method has enabled me to challenge such assumptions about the Confucian 
benevolent elite and imperial form of political authority, as being consolidated under the 
Tang and Song dynasties and as historical features at the core of China’s rise or ‘non-rise’. 
Neither in Imperial China’s nor in pre-19th Century continental Europe can the origins of 
development and ‘non-development’ be theoretically derived from reified geopolitical 
environment and state forms. If the European international system and its state forms need 
not be considered as unique entities to be deciphered, neither does its Chinese and East 
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Asian equivalents. 
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Chapter Six – Late Imperial China in International Relations and Sinology. Beyond 
the Commercialisation Model 
 
Alongside the Ottoman Empire, Late Imperial China168 has constituted the subject par 
excellence with which to compare early modern Europe in order to stress the uniqueness of 
the latter. From the Renaissance thinkers to Marx and Weber, most classical works have 
identified in the Chinese empire obstacles the West overcame or never had to meet: 
despotism, passive ideology, rural economy, etc. Mismanaged by corrupted emperors and 
eunuchs, Late Imperial China shied away from world encounters and succumbed to 
barbarians’ assaults. Only the arrival of Europeans began to shake off the stupor in which 
this large but immobile power was caught for centuries.  
 
A different picture of Late Imperial China has arisen out of the combined assault of World 
History and the renewal of comparative history. Moving away from the depiction of China 
as stagnating and backward, such scholars have unearthed the Mongol interlinking of 
Eurasia, the commercial effervescence started by the Ming and the administrative 
achievements of the Qing. This is now a period we recognise as of intensified 
interconnections, first brought through the Mongol oecumene and subsequently extended 
through the inter-Asian tribute-system of the Ming. The territorial expansion of the Qing, 
forcing itself on the new Russian neighbours and deepening involvement with European 
traders, completes this narrative. Not only the literature in IR and HS recognises the 
important Eurasian interactions in which Late Imperial China historically took part (Abu-
Loghod, 1989; Buzan and Little, 2000; Chauduri, 1978; Hobson, 2004), but from this 
broadening of perspective to a pan-continental level has arisen a new field of enquiry: 
Eurasian similarity (Pomeranz, 2000). Whereas China was previously used as an example 
of the far end of the tradition/modernity scale (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006), diverse ‘early 
modern’ societies are now compared in terms of differences of degree rather than nature 
(Lieberman, 2009). 
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 In the literature, Late Imperial China encompasses the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) dynasties, 
sometimes reaching back to the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368). 
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The popularity of Frank’s ReOrient (1998), and more broadly of the California School’s 
works, is to be understood in this context. ReOrient has made an important contribution by 
imposing a global lens to appreciate the emergence of Europe. For Frank, the history of 
Late Imperial China is intertwined with this process, and China cannot likewise be 
understood without reference to its place in the world economy, at the apex of which it was 
for the 1400-1800 period.  
 
This departs from the orientations of the traditional comparisons in IR. As I have illustrated 
in Chapter One, in HS and economic history, debates about China usually revolve around 
how its socio-political organisation prevented the repetition of the European trajectory. 
Classical thinkers like Marx and Weber set this framework. This is still influential in IR, 
which builds on the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives understanding the Chinese state as 
despotic/patrimonial, whether ineffective or predatory (Hui, 2005; Jones, 1988; Mann, 
1986; North and Thomas, 1973) or tributary/imperial, and therefore pre-empting the 
participation of the merchant class (Anderson, 1974; Banaji, 2010; Mielants, 2007; 
Wallerstein, 1974). These scholars rely on mainstream assumptions in Sinology when 
studying the corresponding inhibiting political factors preventing Late Imperial China from 
undertaking a European-like development.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that in order to understand this period both the ‘national’ level 
of the traditional comparisons and the ‘global’ level advocated by Frank are inadequate. 
The level of the national state is faulty not because it diverts our attention away from the 
global one, as Frank claims, but for the distinctions it anachronistically attributes to pre-
modern entities, as does the ‘world economy’ category. This literature review establishes 
the theoretical grounds for the subsequent reconstruction of the history of Late Imperial 
China and comparison with early modern Europe. I will thus propose a method to 
understand the social contestations of, and changes to, forms of sociopolitical arrangements 
which were neither leading China away from continental Europe’s development path nor 
embodying an earlier incarnation of it. Moreover, this specific trajectory must be 
understood as breaking apart ‘China’ as a coherent unit of analysis. Crucial to this is the 
evaluation of the constant negotiations between what most scholars called ‘public’ and 
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‘private’ or ‘domestic’ and ‘external’ in order to elucidate how their delimitations arose 
from political struggles and were thus only partially and temporarily enforced. Conceiving 
of sociopolitical institutions as deriving from conflicts around property and power means 
that we should consider phenomenologically such notions and phenomena as moral order, 
Sinicisation, state regulation on trade, guilds, market, and lineages. Anchoring within the 
social-property relations and political geography of Late Imperial China the ‘political’ 
institutions traditional IR and Sinology see as impeding development as well as the 
‘economic’ activities Global Historians conceive of as modern reveals the fallacy of 
studying them as divorced from one another. The division of labour between ‘gentry 
studies’ and economic history has only served to mystify how both the definitions of state 
and commerce, or power and property, were always at stake and contested in complex and 
mutually imbricating ways. 
 
The chapter proceeds in three steps. Firstly, I will present the innovative thesis of ReOrient 
within the field of IR and critically evaluate its claim for a global perspective169. I will 
contend that Frank’s argument expresses the flaws of both the WST, i.e. functionalism and 
incapacity to explain changes and variations, and of the anti-Eurocentric commercialisation 
model applied to the ‘Rise of the West’, i.e. the inability to understand ‘Europe’s 
adaptability’ (Hobson in Bala, 2012) due to its understanding as a homogenous entity.  
 
This will bring me, secondly, to the debates in Sinology Frank’s thesis derives from. I will 
argue that Frank’s location in the traditional literature on Late Imperial debates between 
Neo-Smithians and Neo-Malthuseans is untenable as he is forced to fit, unsuccessfully, 
empirical data stemming from Malthusean patterns into a Neo-Smithian argument.  As 
Frank’s work is overly derivative, especially when it comes to ‘domestic’ elements, I will 
then turn in the next section to the scholars he bases his work on in order to bring his 
assumptions on Chinese development into focus. Frank’s thesis has to be thus situated 
within the Western Sinologist literature transposing the commercial model to ‘early 
modern’ China. This new Sinology, which includes the California School, contends with 
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 Although Frank is not himself an IR scholar, his works have strongly influenced debates within the 
discipline on this point. 
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traditional Sinology according to which the state and communal institutions like lineages 
precluded the following of the European developmental trajectory by their impeding of free 
markets and trade. Re-evaluating the wider social relations such institutions were grounded 
in reveals the limitations of both approaches. Among those limitations figure prominently 
their common abiding by the ‘dynastic cycles’ paradigm. Moreover, since it relies on the 
commercialisation model, the overall idea of Eurasian similarity proceeds by projecting 
capitalist characteristics onto both early modern continental Europe and Late Imperial 
China. These new Sinologists (like Frank) go beyond the traditional ideal-typified 
opposition between dynamic European development and the stagnating Chinese Empire 
only by inverting their positions, which ultimately likewise reifies the Chinese trajectory. 
The PM critique of the commercial model can therefore be deployed against this new 
Sinology whilst highlighting the specific social rationality governing Chinese trade 
relations. 
 
This literature review will finally lead me to an alternative perspective on Late Imperial 
China, outlined in a phenomenology of the Chinese economy. As specified in Chapter Four, 
such a phenomenology of power directly confronts the Eurocentric analytical anachronism 
of uncritically importing the modern vocabulary from experiences of European 
modernities. By anchoring social meanings in social property relations, this analysis will 
debunk a series of myths on the Chinese polity, revealed as such by sociologically 
interpreting rationality and drawing attention to what the elites contended for through a 
political economy of shares of ‘state’ power: the politically-constituted access to land and 
people. So after having criticised the new Sinology’s stance on Late Imperial China’s 
market, as well as the state’s relation to trade and state-society relations, my PM-inspired 
analysis will make sense of these social phenomena by studying the imperial doctrine of 
minsheng (popular welfare) and the contradictory ways it was used to enforce dynastic, 
gentry and merchants’ claims over this share of ‘public’ power. Beyond its parallels with 
European ‘enlightened’ governance, the sui generis political order through Confucian 
benevolence exhibits the specificity of conflicts over property and power in Late Imperial 
China. This will therefore provide an overview of spatial and temporal discontinuities in the 
Late Imperial period which will be further substantiated in the next chapter. 
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1. Late Imperial China in International Relations debates: the integration in the 
world-economy 
In this section, I will first summarise Frank’s method and his thesis on the impact of the 
world economy on the diverging paths of Europe and China, emphasising his understanding 
of the latter. A critique of the thesis he shares with other Global Historians, on the relation 
with the ‘Rise of the West’, will follow.  
 
1.1 Frank’s ReOrient thesis 
Frank’s ReOrient (1998) had a strong impact on the rehabilitation of the study of East Asia 
in IR. Frank’s major claim is that Asia dominated the world economy until the 19th Century. 
He incorporates the works of a plurality of Global Historians or proponents of the 
California School, whilst including in his overall conception of the working of a single 
world economy smaller world-systems studied by others, such as the Afro-Eurasian system 
(Abu-Loghod, 1991), the Pax Mongolica (Hobson, 2004), the Chinese tribute-trade system 
(Hamashita, 2008) and – albeit with major revisions – the now not so modern European 
world-economy (Wallerstein, 1974). Along similar lines as these Global Historians, Frank 
thus characterises the emergence of modern Europe as late and derivative of developments 
happening in the East. If he is also interested in the manner Europe benefitted from its 
interaction with the rest of the world (from ‘world technologies’ to material resources from 
its colonies), Frank’s primary focus is put on the workings of the world economy itself, and 
how it impacted on the position of each region170. The world economy furthering a global 
division of labor among its units undergoes Kondratieff cycles of expansion (‘A’ phase) and 
contraction (‘B’ phase). Frank is mostly interested in showing that China was at the apex of 
this system in the period 1400-1800 (an ‘A’ expansion phase), which he concludes from its 
higher productivity and positive balance of trade.  
 
This is where the European and Chinese paths intersect to radicalise Abu-Lughod’s thesis 
that the ‘decline of the East’ preceded the ‘Rise of the West’. In this period, the division of 
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 ‘Regions’ are areas in which the core mechanisms of the economy – trade and the division of labour - are 
more intensive than between them (Frank, 1998: 61). 
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labour was predicated upon the fact that the West had to pay (with silver) for the East Asian 
goods it sought since it lacked commodities to export in exchange (Frank, 1998: 66). This 
inflow of money stimulated the Chinese economy further by driving expansion, population 
growth and commercialisation, and by financing manufacturing. Moreover, it did so 
without inflation since it was also supported by an increasing demand for products, in 
opposition to Europe (Frank, 1998: 160-162). When its American silver influx dried out in 
the 18th Century, the West had to look for other options allowing it to continue to access 
the Asian markets. This incentive was strong enough for the West to lower its labour cost of 
production by innovating technologically (Frank, 1998: 292-293). Such a strategy was 
possible as, due to the inflow of capital from its colonies, the price of capital in the West 
was now cheaper than labor while the opposite was true for China caught in the declining 
‘B’ phase of its cycle. For Frank (1998: 304), Asia was then a victim of its preceding strong 
rise of productivity, in what is known as the ‘high equilibrium trap’ (Elvin, 1973). 
According to this thesis, demographic and productivity increases ultimately lead to cheaper 
labour and scarce resources, and thus to disincentives to invest in technologies. This is how 
Frank explains the rise and decline of regions through the impact of the division of labour 
enabled by the world economy. 
 
Frank’s comparison between Europe and China, built on Pomeranz (2000) and Chaudhuri 
(1978), leads him to conclude: ‘all available estimates of world and regional population, 
production, and income, as well as the discussion above on world trade, confirm that Asia 
and various of its regional economies were far more productive and competitive and had far 
and away more weight and influence in the global economy than any or all of the "West" 
put together until at least 1800’ (Frank, 1998: 174). When discussing Chinese domestic 
institutions, Frank resorts to the same strategy as used for his analysis of trade: he identifies 
the similarities between Europe and Asia. He does so without grounding them in their wider 
socio-political backgrounds, as those contexts where shaped by external economic needs, 
domestic institutions being determined by the necessities of the world economy and being 
the consequence rather than the cause of economic development (Frank, 1998: 206, 208). 
His study of Chinese institutions is therefore confined to stating that diverse market 
institutions, such as guilds and bills of exchange, were present there as well as in Europe, in 
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an urbanised, commercialised, and monetised economy. This is however more than a mere 
anti-Eurocentric strategy: it contains the important postulate that commerce per se breeds 
economic development through the division of labour and specialisation it furthers. The 
state’s main characteristic is thus that it did not interfere with the flourishing of the 
economy, allowing a free market in land and labour. The Chinese state was pushed by 
external economic exigencies to provide the minimal requirements for this economic 
flourishing. These include the provision of a transport infrastructure, expansion of arable 
land, and more generally the support of trade and promotion of ‘national economic 
interests’ (Frank, 1998: 205).  
 
1.2 Frank’s ReOrient. A critique 
Theoretically, Frank’s thesis shares the flaws of the broader WST. Its original twist lies in 
Frank’s application of the characteristics of Wallerstein’s 16th Century capitalist world-
economy to a world economy spanning throughout the history of mankind. It replicates and 
extends Wallerstein’s functionalism. By pushing WST to its extreme, Frank’s new model 
however has the merit of laying bare two characteristics of this theory: the flattening of 
differences and the conceptualisation of trade itself as the motor of development. Since 
state character derives from the exigencies of their position within the world economy, the 
origin and transformation of political regimes, as well as variations between those faced 
with similar international constraints, are hence bound to be left unexplained, except by 
recourse to geo- or techno-determinism.  
 
Empirically, Frank’s view on the shift in favour of Europe does not hold either. Even if 
Frank would stress its temporary and relative character on top of its lateness, his thesis on 
the ‘Rise of the West’ shares the same pitfalls as the other would-be anti-Eurocentric 
narratives. The common key contention of Pomeranz, Hobson, and Frank is that the 
opening of the world horizon, whether by integration into the world-economy, 
globalisation, and/or discovery of the New World, was causally linked to the ‘Rise of the 
West’, whether through the channelling of resources, importation of technologies and ideas, 
and/or the division of labour it created. In a nutshell, we are never told why a certain 
amount of goods at any given point in time would make a difference in development. All 
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thus rely on these Global Historians’ empirical findings of a take-off, one I have 
demonstrated before that could not be found in Europe taken as a homogenous entity.171  
 
Similarly, the only way Frank can assess who is at the apex of this world economy at a 
given point of time is by its degree of specialisation. What was this Eurasian similarity 
before the effects of the world economy kicked in and put Europe on a different path? To 
enquire further into the potential pitfalls of such an analysis on empirical grounds, we must 
go back to the Sinology on which Frank relies.  
 
2. A reassessment of the ‘economy’ of Late Imperial China in Sinology debates 
Given that an analysis of Chinese development proper is found wanting in Frank’s work, let 
us turn to the broader ‘revisionists’ or Californian Scholars who also uphold the ‘Eurasian 
similarity’ thesis172. I will first locate them in the wider body of Neo-Smithian Sinology. I 
will thereafter enquire further into the assumptions of the commercialisation model adapted 
to China’s context, more specifically the Neo-Smithian views on Late Imperial China’s 
market, trade, and stability. I will show how the very indicators whose validity Frank takes 
for granted have to be understood in the specific context of China’s social relations. In this 
context, I thus want to ask: what are the consequences of demographic growth? How to 
conceptualise China’s commercialisation? Did the influx of silver led to a further division 
of labour? How was trade organised? I will demonstrate that those are questions which 
cannot be answered without referring to the ways power was socio-politically constituted.  
 
2.1 Neo-Smithians and Neo-Malthuseans in Sinology: Frank’s ambiguous positioning 
Broadly speaking, in the field of Sinology on Late Imperial China, the origins and effects of 
the important wave of Ming-Qing commercialisation form the object of explanation. 
Different perspectives contend however on their significance. This debate opposes the Neo-
Malthuseans seeing this as pertaining to a characteristically pre-modern development 
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 See the Introduction and Chapter One. 
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 In the literature review, I have contended with the method the California School uses to understand the 
‘Great Divergence’. Here I evaluate its analysis of the social development of Late Imperial China proper. 
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(Elvin, 1973)173 to the diverse approaches qualifying this commercialisation as modern, the 
Neo-Smithians. Among the latter figure very different schools, from the Western paradigm 
stressing property rights parallels between China and Europe (Buoye, 2000; Raswki, 1972) 
to the Chinese literature on ‘capitalist sprouts’ and the California School. In all those  latter 
works, it is implied that ‘trade was the deus ex machina’ (Isett, 2007:155) either rendering 
peasants, landlords and merchants subject to market imperatives (in Western Sinology) or 
transforming ‘rentier and gentry landlords’ presiding over bounded and servile tenants into 
‘common and managerial landlords’ using wage labour (in Chinese Marxist Sinology).  
 
Albeit arguing that this commercialisation pattern was induced by ‘external’ factors (by the 
influx of silver and increased demand for export) rather than ‘internally’ created, Frank 
argues like the California School that Chinese development was boosted in a Smithian 
fashion by increased specialisation and division of labour brought by commercialisation 
accompanied by demographic growth. This leads to a conundrum when explaining the 
Chinese development halt around 1800, and neo-Smithians then resort to neo-Malthusean 
explanations. Neo-Smithians indeed assume an allocation of labour to the most rewarding 
specialisation, in terms of productivity, as long as there are such opportunities. This drying 
out of opportunities ranges from Pomeranz’ missing ‘ghost acreages’ to traditional 
Sinology’s Western imperialism, but all revolve around resource constraints leading to the 
high level equilibrium trap. From that point, they argue that the neo-Malthusean principle 
applies, as the previously productive economy boosted by the cheap cost of labour becomes 
a disadvantage in terms of labour-saving innovations.  
 
Could it be in fact that labour intensification was there all along, as a result of the 
characteristically pre-modern decline in land/labour ratios upon demographic growth174? 
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 Neo-Malthusians use price theory to explain the internal and inevitable dead-end of pre-modern economic 
development, through the relative changing costs of land and labour induced by demographic increase which 
led producers to adopt labour-intensive methods. 
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 However, this labour intensification did not arise from the cheapness of labour given its wide availability 
(as the neo-Malthusians would have it), if only because the inverse proposition does not hold (Isett, 2007: 
177). In situations where labour was scarce, as in Qing Manchuria, peasants were not inclined either to adopt 
labour-saving methods. This is because the ‘choice’ of methods is not based on price mechanisms, but rather 
has to be deciphered in taking into account the wider social relations. 
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This could explain the impossibility for the California School to empirically describe a rise 
in labour productivity, despite their theoretical framework being based on it. Whichever 
characteristic is attributed to the Ming-Qing commercialisation, for such a thesis about the 
natural flourishing of the Chinese economy to hold, Frank has to presuppose that the 
‘obstacles’ to a market economy traditionally brought up in the literature on China were a 
chimera. As he does not challenge this literature himself, we have to turn to the scholars his 
work is derivative from to fully understand his thesis. I will therefore next survey the 
traditional assumptions in Sinology and the critique the commercialisation model makes of 
it so as to locate Frank’s fellow Neo-Smithians, mainly Pomeranz but also Takeshi 
Hamashita, Robert Marks, and Wong, within these debates.  
 
2.2 The commercialisation model applied to Late Imperial China: a critique 
Traditional Sinology has usually focussed on understanding the Chinese political and 
cultural institutions which made its developmental path unique in world history. Three main 
elements stand out, all of them being generally intertwined with the pervasiveness of 
Confucianism. Firstly, Sinologists study how the imperial state and lineages175 shaped 
Chinese society, introducing strong biases in the land market (Beattie, 1979; Ebrey and 
Watson, 1986; Faure, 2007; Zurndofer, 1989). The second contention revolves around the 
state control of, if not hostility to, commerce, not limited to, but including, bans on trade 
(Balazs, 1964; Huang, 1974a; Weber, 1951). Finally, Chinese history is seen as defined by 
the periodic decline of dynasties brought about by imperial corruption and mismanagement 
(Fairbank, 2006), and the gentry’s engrossment (Bol, 2003). Basing his claims on 
California School works, Frank opposes these first two tropes in mainstream Sinology, on 
erroneous grounds, I will argue, because his conception of a free market and free exchange 
pertains to the broader commercialisation model. After that, I will illustrate how those 
Californian Scholars do not contend with a defining feature of traditional Sinology, the 
postulate of Late Imperial China’s continuity and cyclical history. My critique of the new 
Sinology’s stance on these three issues will be grounded in its lack of understanding of 
social institutions and agents through the prevalent social-property relations. Stemming 
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from Christopher Isett’s and Sucheta Mazumdar’s PM-inspired work, this critique draws 
the implications of their analyses of the Chinese patterns of trade for a wider understanding 
of the manner ‘political power’ was contended for in Late Imperial China, moreover 
pointing out this way the Eurocentric aspects of the new Sinology’s studies based on the 
commercialisation model. 
 
2.2.1 Free market 
Like the Sinologists following the commercialisation model, Frank contends with the 
notion that political factors impeded a free market in land and labour, or at least a freer 
market than in Europe. He thus follows Pomeranz’ assumptions, who states that, whatever 
their particularities, ‘Chinese property systems seem to have facilitated transfers of usage 
rights and ownership to those who were positioned to make the most productive use of the 
land, and to have provided the security and flexibility needed to encourage long-range 
investment in the productivity of the land.’ (Pomeranz, 2008: 102) Among those 
particularities are the ‘right of first refusal’ (where kin is offered the first buying option), 
‘conditional sale’ (peasants preserving the right to re-purchase the land they sold), multiple 
ownership, and lineage lands176. Pomeranz concedes that the family was most of the time 
the unit of production and that there existed strong customary rights favouring tenants. 
According to him, we cannot however presuppose that such institutions are per se inimical 
to growth because even in Europe modern economic development did not start from a 
perfectly free market. He discovers that whereas European customs led to such limits to 
improvement177, this was not the case for China where peasants nonetheless adopted the 
best technological innovations because of the security of their property use which provided 
an incentive to it.  
 
Despite Pomeranz’ originality in confining to China the relation between (albeit customary) 
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 There are historiographical debates about the extent of such customary limits on free land transactions. 
Pomeranz, following Buoye (2000), minimizes their extent, whereas Isett (2007), Mazumdar (1998), and 
Huang (1985, 1990), basing their claim on, among others, Xu Tan, argue that there were strong communal 
practices governing the land market. However, my argument against Pomeranz goes beyond this controversy.  
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 Pomeranz argues that the technologies available in Europe required investment on a scale which 
necessitated large holdings to which hereditary tenancy worked contrary (Pomeranz, 2000: 74). Once again 
we find a contingency argument in his works, if not a techno-determinist one.   
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property rights and innovations, this argument is a well-established one in the Western 
literature adapting to the context of Late Imperial China the neo-classical thesis according 
to which secure property rights lead to modern economic growth. In the end, this is merely 
a subverting of North’s thesis, which has already been criticised in Chapter One. Such 
scholars find in the East the equivalent of what is assumed in classical narratives to be at 
the origins of the ‘Rise of the West’. Given our previous demonstration that we find only in 
England modern development (attested by rising labour productivity) during this period, we 
can thus add Imperial China to other instances, namely continental Europe, where secure 
property rights did not propel a take-off. Like neo-classical economics, the California 
School presupposes a homo economicus who will act according to capitalist principles 
before such social relations are established, i.e. agents who will naturally specialise and 
innovate even though they were under no pressures to do so and despite the fact that, in 
their context, this would mean undermining their means to secure their material needs. This 
way, Frank and Pomeranz partake in the wider Western Sinology’s Eurocentric flaws of 
unproblematically assuming a universal rationality driving the relationship of agents to 
institutions, whereas, I shall argue, we should enquire into the use agents made of the 
institutions to reproduce themselves socially. 
 
Before making this point, we have to note that Frank also draws on Pomeranz (2000: 80-
85) to support his claim that the labour market was freer in China than in Europe. Servile 
and bound labour was giving way in the late 16th Century to free small landholders; once 
their dependent status had disappeared, such free peasants, tenants and wage labourers 
could moreover be encouraged by the state to migrate to places with lower labour/land 
ratios. There is a near consensus in Sinology on this event, although disagreements over its 
origins178 and significance persist. As long as this new free status is viewed as a sign of 
freedom to allocate one’s work in areas leading to a systemic and sustained increase in 
labour productivity (rather than representing a mere extensive agricultural growth which 
would over time lead to the same patterns of increased labour input those peasants were 
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154). Pomeranz is silent on this subject. 
  
159
fleeing from), this once again postulates behaviours which run contrary to the social context 
which governed them179. I shall argue that it is not the freedom or un-freedom of labour 
which matters the most. What is most significant are the battles those freed peasants 
concomitantly choose to fight, i.e. for customary rights to land preventing their separation 
from the means of subsistence in order to avoid market dependency. Wage labour was one 
of the strategies towards this end. This demonstrates that land was still the preferred way 
for them to allocate the household’s labour, despite the presence of ‘market forces’ and, 
most importantly, in the objective of not being subjected to them.  
 
Pomeranz (2000: 69-70) is right in saying that it is less the operating of the free market 
according to neo-classical theoretical criteria which matters to assess modern development 
than the question of whether extra-economic elements impeded efficiency in the use of 
land. He exemplifies the typical neo-Smithian strategy of showing that development 
occurred despite its ‘traditional’ obstacles, land and loan transactions and ‘highest yield per 
acre’ being found in the Chinese regions where such institutions were widespread180. He 
nonetheless only partially shakes off the neo-classic assumptions by omitting how lineages, 
secure tenancy, and other customary institutions shaped social life, if only by not providing 
the impetus to use the market in a ‘capitalist’ way (i.e. by relying on it for subsistence). 
Fundamentally, Pomeranz assumes that investment in increasing the productivity of land 
was the only option for agents, or at least the most rewarding. The very presence of the 
institutions he mentioned would however prove otherwise. I will indeed show that, in these 
commercialised regions, the institutions made available, or enforced, strategies of social 
reproduction which did not imply an allocation of labour in response to the market 
conceptualised as free. This will confirm that ‘highest yield per acre’ is not a useful tool to 
measure sustained economic growth, i.e. increase in labour productivity, given that it could 
also be the result of labour intensification alone and thus involution (Brenner and Isett, 
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 For the sake of clarity, a note must be made on regions in Late Imperial China. Important differences 
existed especially between regions of interest here, that is, between the lineage-based coastal provinces of 
South China (Fujian and Guangdong), the Yangzi Delta, the north China plain, and Manchuria in the North 
East. The first two were the most commercialised regions Pomeranz alludes to. During the Qing period, they 
witnessed the higher rate of rent relations, in contrast to the banner estate economy of Manchuria and the 
smallholder peasant economy of North China.  
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2002; Huang, 2002), as was the case for those highly commercialised regions. I will look at 
the manner in which customs and institutions involved in the commercialisation acted to 
circumvent market forces, from the perspectives of lineages, landlords, and peasants. 
 
In highly commercialised coastal South China regions such as Guangdong, it was tenants’ 
uprisings and the state-backed concomitant strengthening of tenancy rights which led the 
landlords to invest in lineages institutions (Beattie, 1979: 128-129), in order to secure their 
extra-economic access to the social surplus. For the elite, lineage institutions provided a 
means to protect their sources of income in the forms of land and various commercial and 
infrastructural ventures, both against peasant resistance and other lineages. Such lineages 
disciplined the peasants with rent or loan payment arrears by threatening their village 
membership and concomitant rights, like access to village commons. Lineage feuds were 
common as they were a means for landlords to get access to land which could only be 
grabbed by force, because of the communal restrictions on the land market. Both lineage 
lands and markets were so vied for (Faure, 2007: 218-232). Control of the lineage market, 
where the peasants of the lineage had to sell, implied lucrative measures-rigging and 
additional fees. It also gave landlords an opportunity to bid for the lucrative tax-farming 
lineage involved, as it was the lineage head who was responsible for the collection of state 
tax on all lineage lands (Mazumdar, 1998: 241). 
 
In all commercialised regions, including the Yangzi Delta, another way the landlords 
secured their income was by lending money to peasants. However, contrary to Pomeranz’ 
claim, this was far from a signifier of productive use of land. Landlords/merchants gave 
loans to producers as part of the pre-emptory purchase of a predetermined quantity of crop 
product before the planting and harvesting (Isett, 2007: 269-270)181. It therefore prevented 
peasants from selling their harvest at the best market price. Landlords could also require 
from peasants the cultivation of specific cash-crops as rent payment (Mazumdar, 1998: 
289-290). Peasants had no incentive to adopt efficient methods as they were no longer 
responsible for the crop after having struck the deal in either of those two situations and as 
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they were not in competition with other producers. Moreover, the fact that merchants were 
making their profit by limiting competition furthermore prevented free market impetuses to 
operate, as we shall see below. Consequently, contrary to the Sinology commercialisation 
model’s assumption, peasants were not free to choose where to sell (which could have 
provided them with incentives to produce better goods more efficiently) either on account 
of their ties to the lineage market, the ‘system of forward dealing’, or through the landlords’ 
imposition of cash-crop cultivation as rent payment.  
 
For their part, peasants used the communal institutions to preserve their tenancy and 
ownership rights and therefore their control over their means of subsistence. However, most 
peasants were also bound to spend a part of their labour to produce for the market. This was 
due to the fact that, from the mid-Ming period onwards, smallholders faced a state tax 
assessed in cash, while the relation to their landlord mediated how the rent was assessed for 
the tenants. The peasants nevertheless persisted in cultivating an array of goods for their 
own consumption, as a ‘safety first’ strategy. They did not switch from this ‘micro-level 
specialization’ arising from extra-economic pressures to a situation which would have 
rendered them vulnerable to the risks of depending fully on the market to survive 
(Mazumdar, 1998: 406). Peasants still sought to ensure against the vicissitudes of old age 
by having many children, and this extra labour not absorbed in production for subsistence 
was used in diverse ventures, from cash-crop cultivation, household weaving, and second 
harvest in winter to additional spreading of fertilizer (Brenner and Isett, 2002: 637-638).  
 
Crucially, rather than improving productivity as Pomeranz would have it, this peasants’ 
management of household production aimed to protect the basis for self-subsistence by 
whatever means, however labour-intensive they might be. This paralleled landlords, 
merchants, and lineages’ strategies deriving from, and furthering, land and labour surplus 
acquisition via non-market means. Considering the strategies deployed by landlords and 
peasants, commercialisation was therefore not based on a secure land market conducive to 
improvements but on bounded transactions alongside production for subsistence. This 
commercialisation happened through the reinforcement of, rather than despite, communal 
institutions. 
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2.2.2 The state and trade 
Once again in agreement with the commercialisation model, Frank contends with 
traditional Sinology’s claim that the Chinese state hindered commerce. He does so by 
stating that 1) the tribute-system was in fact commercial exchange in disguise, 2) trade 
continued despite the state’s bans, and 3) the state sponsored the division of labour. The 
first claim has its roots in Hamashita’s work. I have already demonstrated in Chapter Four 
that the Chinese World Order was not reducible to a mere commercial network, but it did 
also include this element. I have also to agree with Frank’s second claim regarding the 
persistence of international trade despite the official bans, a now widely acknowledged fact. 
It is Frank’s third claim which poses problems, for this is where the relation of trade to 
development is asserted. Frank is mostly interested in the continuing maritime trade, 
whatever its nature (private, illegal, or tributary), because it is a pillar of his thesis on the 
proportion of a country’s trade within global trade determining its place within the world 
economy. The complex and changing nature of trade points to an important characteristic of 
Imperial China’s commerce: the delimitation between ‘public’ and ‘private’ was a crucial 
instance of contestation of political power, between private agents involved in trade, 
including officials, and between those agents and the ruling house. This fact begs for 
further enquiries into the role of merchants, their social identity, the source of their profit, 
and their changing relation with the rulers.  
 
I shall argue that, if there was no congenital dynastic hostility to commerce, it nonetheless 
did not put China on the path of a qualitative breakthrough precisely because of the relation 
of commerce to production. I will therefore contend with Frank’s postulate that the export 
economy is a crucial feature of ‘industrial ascendance’, building on Chauduri’s work to 
state that merchants involved in foreign trade ‘intervened directly in industrial production’ 
(Frank, 1998: 166, 212). I argue that this is not enough to assume a non-conflictual relation 
between merchants and the state on the grounds that the Chinese state interfered less in the 
economy than in Europe, except for promoting competition, and that Chinese commercial 
taxes were low, as the California School and more broadly Sinology’s commercialisation 
model postulate. Such a model merely turns around the traditional ‘Rise of the West’ 
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narratives, according to which the European commercial economy proved better than the 
Chinese agrarian order. According to this new Sinology, it was such a Chinese focus on 
land taxation and providing of exchange infrastructure which allowed trade to naturally 
develop. On the contrary, I will demonstrate that, like the impact of international trade, the 
input of the Chinese polity in inter-regional specialisation followed a characteristically pre-
modern pattern. 
 
The Chinese domestic institutions fostered, according to Frank, by international trade 
(guilds, money-shops, etc.) were inherently inimical to sustained growth. I have already 
shown that a Chinese free market at the local level was a chimera; free competition at a 
higher level of the merchant hierarchy is one as well. The organisation of Chinese 
merchants within guilds and the multiplicity of intermediaries precluded a trickle-down 
effect from international trade to the production realm. From the guilds monopolising trade 
with the West through its hong merchants to similarly licensed brokerage firms at the 
provincial level (yahang), to unlicensed smaller brokers acting as middlemen in standard 
markets (jingji) and the diversity of itinerant merchants (keshang) linking county markets to 
village markets where local merchants (zuoshang) interacted with the producers or 
landlords, all made their profit by limiting competition, fixing prices and monopolising 
certain markets by sectors of trade activity or regions (Mazumdar, 1998: 302-312; Mann, 
1987). Since merchants made their profit this way, they also reinvested their money in these 
market limitations. Higher profits were not created by investing in more efficient 
production (something those with capital could not do because of the peasant household 
base of production), but through politically-constituted price differentials through the use of 
monopsonies and monopolies. Merchants did also invest in land182 but their strategies did 
not differ from those of landlords that I have outlined above. Despite a discourse 
condemning astounding profit-making by merchants, the Chinese rulers relied on their 
associations to supervise trade regulations and collect taxes183. So even if Frank is right in 
                                                 
 
182
 Frank and Pomeranz make this argument to prove the relation between trade and production, but other 
scholars like Wong (1997) would disagree and maintain that merchants and landed elites remained distinct, on 
the basis that the Confucian gentry elite was selected purely on a meritocratic basis.  
183
 The state was nevertheless also in competition for revenues with these guilds whose members sought 
degrees (more often than not by purchasing them or taking advantage of the special examinations for 
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denouncing the myth of the inimicality of the Chinese state to trade and merchants, it does 
however not follow that the social power the dynasty allowed them was ‘economic’ and 
conducive to profit-maximising strategies according to capitalist criteria. The only way 
capital originating from international demand influenced Chinese production was by 
inducing the privileging of certain crops at a given time. As stated above, international 
capital influenced Chinese production not by inducing an optimisation of the production 
process but through the system of forward dealing. This brought only micro-level 
specialisation within peasant households with extra labour but far from more efficient 
production or abandonment of subsistence production. Contrary to Frank’s statement, the 
effects of inter-regional specialisation and division of labour induced by foreign trade were 
thus very limited, a subject I turn to next. 
 
International trade and its link to cash-crop cultivation is only one part of the massive 
quantity of Chinese trade during the period of commercialisation. The dynamics behind the 
imperial promotion of regional trade within China identified by Frank should also be 
questioned. Frank draws here on a wider literature in Sinology emphasising the uniqueness 
of the Chinese state’s involvement in grain circulation. This involvement is often associated 
with Confucian benevolence (Will and Wong, 1991; Wong, 1997), but others (e.g. Marks, 
1998) have sought to link inter-regional trade through specialisation to intensive growth, as 
Frank does. I will argue that far from being a result of the silver influx and a proof of 
economic dynamism, regional specialisation within China occurred because of the limits of 
extensive growth based on labour intensification and territorial expansion. The Qing 
involvement in the economy (through expansion of arable land, transport of agriculture, 
grain redistribution184, etc.) was certainly impressive and did permit long-term growth. This 
was albeit one sustained by a ‘Malthusean-Ricardian type of agricultural expansion’ (Isett, 
2007: 13). 
 
To elucidate China’s inter-regional trade, we first have to understand why peasants turned 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
merchants which had higher rates of success) in order to avoid tax. They even hereditarily passed their 
licences on to their next of kin (Mazumdar, 1998: 245-246, 315-316, 320). 
184
 Over time, merchants carved out a more important place within the grain circulation but they still made 
their profits according to the extra-economic strategies outlined above. 
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to production for the market. As noted above, this was partially due to the landlords’ 
exerting pressure in favour of cash-crop cultivation. Another factor derived from high 
population growth combined with partible inheritance. The resulting land subdivision led to 
smaller and smaller plots which increasingly became insufficient to ensure the peasants’ 
subsistence. At the same time, many plots became too small to absorb all the available 
labour of the household, and some was consequently channelled into proto-industry, even 
though the returns were lower than in agricultural work (Isett, 2007: 213). This tendency 
occurred in regions where families settled early, as in the North China plain, Yangzi delta 
and Liangnan, which faced grain shortages from the 18th Century onwards. The core of 
inter-regional commerce consisted of grains and soy-beans (used as fertilizer) produced in 
relatively newly settled Manchuria, middle Yangzi, and Taiwan (so regions with higher 
land/labour ratios) being exchanged for clothes produced within the ‘cores’. As illustrated 
by Isett, the Manchu expansion of Chinese territories was thus a necessary condition of the 
possibility of long-term growth because it allowed the production of grain surpluses in 
‘peripheries’ which could be channelled to ‘cores’ with grain deficits. So Frank is right in 
pointing to the importance of a regional division of labour within China; however, the 
reason it was crucial to the Chinese economy was not because of its fostering of a Smithian 
pattern of growth, but because it delayed Malthusian crises. 
 
Contrary to Frank’s (1998: 160-162) assumptions, Chinese peasants did not choose to 
cultivate given crops because of the international demand, thereby responding to market 
signals encouraging them to allocate their labour more efficiently. They did so to preserve 
their grip on land, which implied either growing specific crops in order to meet to their 
landlords’ requests or to be able to pay the state’s tax in cash, or devoting their extra labour 
to proto-industry in order to survive on their small plot (Huang, 1990: 102). Commodity-
production never displaced production for subsistence; it was rather done for the very aim 
of perpetuating it. 
 
2.2.3 The Late Imperial China continuity 
Finally, I will demonstrate that Frank implicitly abides by the ‘dynastic cycle paradigm’, 
from which the California School also has generally done little to dissociate itself. Its 
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understanding of Late Imperial China is indeed one of steady economic and demographic 
growth disturbed only by short dynastic transitions. The core argument of Frank, the 
California School, and Sinology’s commercialisation model is that Chinese political 
institutions did not impede its economic development. A theory of the Chinese polity is 
however absent from their model, because of its very premises. Beyond giving a minimal 
position to the state, these authors actually only define it by what it does not do. Authority 
relations have no role in their theorisation because the state is conceived as operating in 
another realm than the economic one, as production and commerce are dissociated from the 
means of political domination. By this theoretical move, these authors complemented the 
dominant model in Sinology: ‘gentry studies’. ‘Gentry studies’ are characterised by a focus 
on state-society relations, in which the fiercer debates revolve mostly around which side, 
either the state or local elites, was predominant in any given period185. Contributions to 
these debates are characterised by a narrow definition of political power, since the 
motivation of agents to have a share of it remains non-elucidated. This view is possible 
only due to the assumption of the logically and historically distinct realms in which the 
‘political’ and the ‘economic’ are assumed to remain.  
 
I do not wish to repeat the critiques already addressed to this paradigm in Chapter Four. 
However, the reliance of the commercialisation model on the assumptions of ‘gentry 
studies’ offers a good springboard to criticise their common adherence to a wider paradigm 
which they both belong to: the ‘dynastic cycles paradigm’. It seems paradoxical for 
scholars like Frank, Pomeranz, and Wong aiming to overcome Eurocentrism to subscribe to 
the common prejudice of the ‘unchanging China’. This will however remain the case as 
                                                 
 
185
 For sake of clarity, it must be noted that what the term gentry encompassed produces by no means a 
consensus among those studying Late Imperial China. There is usually a distinction between lower- and 
upper-gentry. Shengyuan held only a district degree, whilst provincial (juren) and metropolitan (jinshi) 
degrees paved the road to office-holding. Such degrees conferred a gentry status to the family of the degree-
holder and, during the Ming, multiple privileges to all its members (later on restricted by the Qing rulers). 
Shengyuan multiplied for this reason during the Ming period. The gentry accumulated land at the same time, 
but those degree-holding landlords can be differentiated from commoner landlords. As stated in Chapter Four, 
for my part, unless whilst discussing ‘gentry studies’, I will generally use the terms landed elite or landlords 
for all those engaged in exploitation of tenants, whether they held a degree or not and, more specific for Late 
Imperial China, whether they were also involved in commercial activities. This is because, on the one hand, I 
consider degree- and office-holding a strategy among others open to this class and, on the other hand, the 
Ming-Qing reigns witnessed the merging of commercial activities, degree-holding, and land management 
(through lineage in the South).  
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long as they avoid recognising the imbrications of domination and exploitation dynamics in 
pre-modern societies. It is indeed alongside these tensions that social conflicts unfolded in 
Late Imperial China, between and among the ‘gentry’ (whether we understand by this the 
officials or the landlords), merchants, the ruling elite and the producers. This is the non-
problematisation of the competition among the former groups for the social surplus 
produced by the peasantry, as well as the renewed strategies of the latter to resist this 
exploitation, which explains how these Californian Scholars can think of the ‘political’ and 
the ‘economic’ as ships passing in the night. The picture that emerges is one of an enduring 
Chinese state preoccupied by raising revenue and preserving a stable social order whose 
role as a mere extra could enable commercial activities to flourish in parallel. This 
conception of a benevolent and enlightened benign Confucian order, which even ‘alien’ 
(Mongol and Manchu) regimes must adopt to govern the Chinese society, must be 
deconstructed in order to reveal the social negotiations around the power balance this order 
embodied in the different and always contested institutionalisations of compromises 
between these aforementioned classes.  
 
Wong (1997) also abides by the dynastic cycles paradigm by postulating that, within each 
cycle, the elite was relatively powerless and pleased to collaborate with the state’s 
Confucian agenda. This gentry’s submissiveness is assumed to rest upon its inability to 
reproduce its power over generations because of the absence of primogeniture, i.e. the 
Chinese family practice to divide property equally amongst the sons (e.g. Fairbank and 
Goldman, 2006: 21). Wakefield (1998) has however powerful dismissed this myth of 
unhampered property fragmentation. Chinese elite families indeed had many legal and 
customary means to ensure their property against this division process, from lineage trusts 
to commercial ventures186. This illustrates the need to conceptualise how property was 
politically constituted in order to understand different social features of Imperial China, 
from waves of commercialisation and long-term impact of patterns of inheritance on 
property preservation to the different ‘internal’ and ‘external’ articulations of the 
‘Confucian state’. 
                                                 
 
186
 See also Bossler (1998) for such an argument on the Song period. 
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I argue for establishing stronger relations between patterns of commercialisation and ‘elite 
dominance’ through focusing on changing social property relations in order to make sense 
of the conflicts between the ruling house and the ‘gentry’. This is something which remains 
out of reach of both the commercialisation model and gentry studies which assume, within 
the dynastic cycles paradigm, that gentry power was growing over the course of Late 
Imperial China and over the course of each reign. Introducing the variable of the producers, 
i.e. asking over what did the rulers and gentry contend (beyond ‘dominance’ for the sake of 
it), demonstrates that state/gentry relations institutionalised different forms of re-alienation 
and re-privatisation of political power. This crucially differentiated the Qing from the Ming 
period, after the impact of the successful peasants’ revolts and the shaking off of their 
dependant status and assertion of their claims to land. Commercial activities remained 
nonetheless at the center of Ming and Qing exploitation practices, which accommodated 
different institutions of property and labour as politically constituted forms of power which 
were at the core of contestations among and within classes. Both periods involved a ‘local’ 
fusion of domination and exploitation which circumvented rather than embraced the free 
market. The ruling house and the gentry did so by enforcing different rights over the objects 
of their competition: labour and land. The power of the landed elite had changed in relation 
to producers by the end of the Ming, and in consequence a different relation with the 
dynastic power was institutionalised. This was embodied in varying imperial rhetorics 
towards gentry and merchants, a subject to which we have to turn next. 
 
3. A phenomenology of China’s economy through minsheng management 
In the works abiding by the commercialisation model, it is assumed that the Chinese state 
and classes remained more or less the same during the Late Imperial period and did not 
affect economic growth and trade. I have already demonstrated that the conceptual 
vocabulary used by rulers and official historians in their implementation of the Mandate of 
Heaven (both over its population and ‘external’ actors) mirrored the social relations in 
which the state was contested (simultaneously from ‘within’ and ‘without’), and existed as 
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a product of the enforcement of dynastic politics187.  Here I want to ground in social 
property relations and conflicts around power the imperial rhetoric toward moral order that 
traditional Sinology takes for granted. For this, I will analyse the imperial discourse on 
peasants, ‘gentry-merchants’, and Chineseness.  
 
Late Imperial China’s ideology revolved around an important ‘commitment’, to borrow 
Wong’s (1997: 92-93) term, to provide for popular welfare, as embodied in the notion of 
minsheng. Although it was a recurrent commitment throughout Imperial history, minsheng 
was particularly put in the forefront of imperial discourse during the Qing reign. The 
widely recognised benevolence of the Qing polity was expressed in its ‘enlightened’ 
policies geared toward low taxation, the protection of tenancy rights and the free status of 
the peasantry188, and its promotion of inter-regional grain trade and granaries. This 
Confucian discourse must be seen as having been enabled by the smallholder economy the 
Qing rulers found themselves faced with (in consequence of the peasants’ gains following 
the 17th Century uprisings), and as being enforced in order to lessen the competition over 
land and labour with the landed elite.  
 
Promoting popular welfare indeed meant political access to the control of social surplus 
extraction, or shares in its redistribution. It involved consolidating rights to ‘economic’ 
exploitation through political, symbolic, military, and juridical means of domination. This 
was true for the Qing central policies aimed at the protection of the basis for taxation, but 
also for officials, lineages, and even merchants who all contended for, and benefitted from, 
the administration of benevolence. The Qing rulers did ‘enlist the help’ of landed elites and 
merchants who thus ‘participated in extending the reach of state power and authority’; it 
was however not because in China ‘notions of class did not matter’ (Wong, 1997: 107) but 
                                                 
 
187
 The office-state and the tribute-system were equally prominent in Late Imperial China, and the imperial 
ideology which spawned from them is equally instructive on the blurring of the ‘economic’ and extra-
economic power and of the distinction between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ during this period. 
However, as I have theoretically discussed this topic in Chapter Four, I will not rehearse this here and leave 
the analysis of these two important socio-political institutions for the Yuan-Ming-Qing period to the next 
chapter.   
188
 Among such particular policies figure: the codification of peasants’ gains during their 17th Century 
rebellions; the ‘never raise tax’ edict of 1713; the tax waiving for peasants opening new land; and the ban on 
landlords’ rights to exercise private justice over their tenants following the abolition of status differentiation. 
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precisely because they did.  
 
Minsheng involved the state’s undertaking of the responsibility to ensure popular welfare, 
but others competed for a share of the political power this task involved. Traditionally, 
minsheng was implemented through provincial and local offices. It was contended for 
because officialdom was based on accepted corruption governing the alienation and 
privatisation of parts of public authority. Certainly, provincial tax quotas were set by the 
center and salaried officials remitted those quotas through the taxes they collected locally. 
However, amongst the panoply of ways they used their status to personally accumulate 
revenues, these officials were informally allowed to raise diverse surcharges and fees to 
‘complement’ their incomes (their salaries being notoriously very low) and recruit clerks 
who were undertaking the officials’ tasks. According to the Ming and Qing legal codes, 
corruption was a ‘private offense’ committed by an official which involved a search for 
private gain (Parks, 1997)189. Such offenses encompassed the officials’ customary fees and 
surcharges mentioned above (the collecting of extra money beyond the fixed quotas), as 
well as gifts between officials (which implicitly referred to exchanges of favours). 
However, in imperial and officials’ administrative memos and debates, such informal 
surcharges and the officials’ gift giving culture were pragmatically accepted as necessary to 
provide for the officials’ means of administration and to foster ‘social harmony’190. 
Consequently, there were always debates on how to differentiate between ‘a conventional 
“gift” and a corrupting “bribe” ’ and on ‘how much was too much’ regarding customary 
fees (Parks, 1997: 979, 981; see also Will in Kreike and Jordan, 2004). However, since such 
corruption had always eschewed any definite method of assessment whilst at the same time 
being at the heart of informal practices, and because all officials could be prosecuted on 
                                                 
 
189
 I exclude here frauds, forgery, scams, and impersonations. See McNicholas (2007, 2013) on this. I also 
exclude extortions (also discussed in Parks, 1997). All these offenses were not systematically prosecuted, for 
diverse reasons, similarly to the corruption discussed here. They however need to be discussed as a distinct 
topic as they were not as informally accepted within rulership and officialdom as were customary fees and 
gifts.  
190
 Officials’ ‘private’ and ‘public’ expenses were undifferentiated. Officials’ salaries were insufficient to 
provide for this, but also for provincial and imperial ad hoc emergency requests and customary gifts to 
superiors. Provincial officials relied on those, notably for their ‘personal’ expenses of imperative prestige 
apparatus (e.g. in matters of lifestyle, clothing, and imperial tribute to remit to the emperor). See Parks (1993). 
On the issue of customary fees as a widespread informal practice, see Zelin (1992). 
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these grounds - generally for political motives as part of struggles within the elite – in 
practice almost none were (Parks, 1997). 
 
Those traditionally entitled to participate in the administration of minsheng sought to 
monopolise such political privileges. The gentry’s uneasiness in sharing the benefits of 
implementing minsheng can be illustrated by its resistance to newcomers. Virtue was 
discursively used to justify the gentry’s entitlement to its position and exclude others, 
especially merchants who sought to enter the administration of minsheng upon their 
growing importance in the commercialised economy. Officials indeed opposed the 
appointment of members of the ‘commercial classes’ through the new means available to 
them: ‘gentry-merchants’ were viewed as one source of the deterioration of virtue within 
officialdom. Merchants invested in the building of Confucian private academies (e.g. the 
Donglin Academy) and literati coteries (e.g. the Restoration society) as a way to secure 
success in examinations in order to get gentry status and the privileges it implied 
(Wakeman, 1998)191.  
 
There was however an easier way to acquire rights to benevolence. The right to implement 
minsheng also could be purchased, in the form of degrees, official positions, and 
promotions. Office venality was a legal, codified, and accepted enterprise with a 
systematised and widespread character under the ‘system of contributions’ begun in the 
early Ming and which acquired further importance during Qing reigns (Kaske, 2008, 2012; 
Marsh, 1962; McNicholas, 2007; Zhang, 2010). These purchases were nonetheless wrapped 
into the moral order rhetoric by being portrayed as ‘contributions’ to public works or relief 
measures within a system through which commoners could in this way prove their 
worthiness of gentry status. The Late Imperial China dynasties employed gentry through 
tax-farming for the lijia  tax collection (during the Ming), and sold to the highest bidders 
the right to collect tax amongst the militarised lineage gentry and guild merchants (during 
the Qing) who wished to participate in the Confucian order as a politically constituted 
entitlement to surplus extraction. 
                                                 
 
191
 It thus reveals their pursuit of si (private interest) despite their very ideological claim being to curtail this si 
affecting officialdom, amidst the Ming factionalist struggles. 
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Officialdom was of course a lucrative avenue to ‘care for the people’, but so was 
participation in the grain redistribution which was crucially needed due to the grain deficits 
mentioned in the previous section. The imperial rhetoric toward trade varied during the 
Ming and Qing reigns192. Regarding the grain circulation undertaken by merchants, the 
Qing rulers went from stating that ‘to harm the merchants is to harm the people’ to 
qualifying them as ‘treacherous and traitorous’, depending on ‘the relative alignment of 
merchant behaviour with bureaucratic interests’ (Isett, 2007: 251). Outsourcing this task 
meant partially privatising minsheng and state power, by including merchants in the surplus 
redistribution chain; discipline by the rulers was at times needed to limit the merchants’ 
increased squeezing of peasants.  
 
Equally ambiguous was the official rhetoric toward international trade. This brings further 
illustrations of the anachronism of using the modern vocabulary of internal/external and 
public/private distinctions to understand Late Imperial China: those ‘dimensions’ were 
rather used in unique combinations to enforce control over shares of political power. 
Although remaining the same individuals, traders and the landed elite engaging in 
commerce were sometimes praised and taxed, and sometimes portrayed as a threat being 
externalised as wokou (Japanese bandits). Officials recognised that they were the same 
(Chinese) people under different regulative circumstances193, but nonetheless used this term 
connoting barbarians outside the tribute system over the one for ‘sea bandit’, haizei (Reid, 
2010:17-19). Particularly prominent in the 15th and 16th Century during the Ming trade 
ban194, these Chinese pirates were deeply intertwined with local gentries (Chin, 2010; 
Lorge, 2005: 126-127; Mazumdar, 1988: 66-75). An (illegal) Chinese militarised maritime 
empire under the control of the Zheng merchant family appeared in Taiwan during those 
                                                 
 
192
 An example relevant to imperial ideology toward promotion of trade which is sometimes used by 
proponents of the commercialisation model to illustrate proto-industrialisation is the ‘men plow and women 
weave’ doctrine, whereas I would contend that this demonstrates instead the household base of commodity 
production. 
193
 Reid (2010:17) quotes a Ming official: ‘When trade is permitted, pirates become merchants. When trade is 
prohibited, merchants convert to pirates’. 
194
 Those official bans were mostly proclaimed from 1371 to 1567, but they were also periodically reasserted 
afterwards.  
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years, and the Ming faced with the Manchu threat had to concede to them later the (legal) 
rulership of all Fujian. These ‘Ming loyalists’ would be crushed by the Qing only in 1683, 
the later continuing the maritime ban until then in order to isolate the Zheng empire. From 
that point onwards, the Qing rulers were playing on the blurred lines of ‘private’ and 
‘public’ trade according to their interests. For example, during tense relations with Japan, 
they encourage private trade instead of missions (thus ‘allowing the people to earn their 
living’) but when specific goods were needed (e.g. copper) they financed private traders 
and brought them to the status of ‘state merchants’ (Mazumdar, 1988: 95-99). 
 
Minsheng was enforced according to the balance of class forces and was thus unevenly 
spread geographically and temporally. In coastal provinces of South China, during the Qing 
period, the landed elite managed over time to partially usurp this ‘responsibility’ through 
the institution of lineage. One area where minsheng was not implemented during the Qing 
reign was Manchuria. In order to consolidate its power, the Conquest Elite was willing to 
borrow the Chinese ideology (and govern through it in China proper) insofar as it remained 
compatible with the preservation of the Manchu culture. Manchu military distinctiveness 
became associated with its geographic origin, ethnic purity and hunting skills beyond 
enduring martial preparedness per se (Isett, 2007: 24-27). The special status of Manchuria 
during the Qing reigns was cast in those terms but this geographically-anchored Manchu 
ethos also reveals the role of Manchuria as serving as imperial patrimony to reward noble 
followers and military units. The northeast was beyond the reach of minsheng, a zone of 
manorialism and servitude unlike China proper where such practices were abolished.  
 
The Yuan territory was as unevenly governed as the Qing’s. The cultural tolerance and 
ability for acculturation the Mongols were praised for (Chua, 2008) meant that parts of the 
Great Yuan ulus were under the aegis of minsheng, while others were governed along the 
lines of earlier Mongol traditions of rulership. Such ‘steppe practices’ were notably visible 
in the appanages (akin to the Manchu elite lands) or in the Yuan extended realm of 
influence (e.g. Koryo and Tibet) indirectly governed through a ‘Eurasian elite created by 
the Mongol empire’ (Robinson, 2009: 8-9). The Mongol appanages preserved a source of 
power for the Mongol elite who had been granted such princely lands, following the 
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Mongol ideology according to which the empire as a joint patrimony belongs to the 
extended ruling family. This might be cast in specific terms by ‘alien’ rulers, but this is not 
foreign either to proper ‘Chinese’ dynastic founders’s practice of rewarding their family and 
conquest elite with such personal basis of power195.  
 
Studying ‘alien’ rules might in fact reveal more parallels with ‘Chinese’ rules than 
oppositions, despite the common assumptions of national historiographies from states 
formerly attached to the Mongol empire. In such studies, enforcement of rules is 
understood as exclusively belonging to ‘alien invasions’, but this provides for a springboard 
to illustrate its occurring in dynastic politics as well. Diverging interests between the Qing 
Manchu elite and the bureaucracy, between the Ming imperial rulers and the gentry, or 
between the Yuan Mongol nobles, the wider Mongol empire polities and the nanren196 have 
to be recognised and understood as similar instances of competition over property and 
people taking different forms. Overall, we have to acknowledge the duality of ‘foreign’ 
rules in China and their cultural manifestations, but that they also had proper ‘Chinese’ 
counterparts which were as specific and, more importantly, as illustrative of the pre-modern 
character of Late Imperial China’s merging of the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’, the 
‘political’ and ‘economic’, and the ‘public’ and ‘private’. 
 
In short, sui generis political orders cast within specific ideologies were dependent on the 
outcomes of socio-political conflicts and shaped by opportunistic strategies. These orders 
cannot be captured as merely being the result of general trends of dynastic cycles in an 
overall static evolution through Confucian benevolence. A modern conception of the state, 
whether explicitly expressed or brought by conceiving it as embodying a realm distinct 
from logics of exploitation, must thus be set aside for the Eurocentric anachronisms it 
implies. Enquiring into the conceptual vocabularies used in specific contexts reveals this, as 
will the next chapter’s comparison between continental Europe’s ‘enlightened’ Absolutist 
states and Confucian China governed through its unique form of benevolence, i.e. 
minsheng. 
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 This is attested for example by the Ming creation of eighteen hereditary princedoms.  
196
 This ethnic division of the population under the Yuan dynasty referred to the inhabitants of South China. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have challenged both the picture of Late Imperial China offered by 
traditional Sinology, in which China is seen as caught in cyclical patterns of stagnation, and 
with the portrayal given by the new Sinology, according to which China, due to its 
commercialised economy, was comparable with Europe taken as a singular and 
homogenous entity. For this, I have made three main empirical points which run counter to 
the California School’s findings: there was no ‘efficient’ market in land, labour, and 
products; commercial relations were politicised; and ‘state-gentry’ relations varied 
according to the balance of class powers. This emphasises my different anti-Eurocentric 
strategy. The California School feels compelled to affirm that China was ‘as good’ as 
Europe in terms of the key element indicative, according to them, of ‘development’: the 
non-interference of political institutions in the ‘economy’, i.e. trade and market exchange. I 
contend that this is still a Eurocentric analysis because it derives from an ontology based on 
the experiences of European modernity. I propose instead a reconstruction of the social 
rationality specific to Late Imperial China whilst critically interrogating the parallel 
assumption that there was such a non-interference of political institutions in the ‘economy’ 
in continental Europe. 
 
Frank’s thesis relies on a series of indicators to make the case for China’s superiority during 
the 1400-1800 period and partakes thus in the wider commercialisation model in Sinology. 
However, indicators such as those derived from the international balance of trade must be 
used with caution for the pre-capitalist era, both for Europe and for Asia. According to 
Frank’s argument, China’s monetised economy was highly productive and international 
economic exchange only augmented this. It rests on a series of problematic assumptions 
based on the universalisation of the distinctions between the economic/political and 
inside/outside in societies where such distinctions did not exist empirically – assumptions 
at the heart of Eurocentric analytical anachronisms. Frank’s comprehension of Late 
Imperial China’s economy therefore runs parallel to, rather than contradicts, the 
state/society relations model of ‘gentry studies’ and the ‘dynastic cycle paradigm’. In 
opposition to these views I argue that understanding the role of silver imports requires 
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unravelling how its access and use was politicised. Trade also has to be conceptualised as a 
social practice enmeshed with other strategies the ‘gentry’ used to reproduce its position. 
Fundamentally we need to evaluate how the producers were affected (if at all) by the 
international market. In the end, this reveals that the modern concern of increasing 
productivity was not on these social agents’ agendas, given the social context they found 
themselves in. If it was always present in one form or another, commerce did not mean the 
same thing for social agents throughout the history of mankind. Recognising the anchoring 
of agents’ behaviours in their relations to social institutions precludes the Eurocentric 
assumption that the way they were organised under European modernity is a transhistorical 
given. In Imperial China, commerce linked a series of actors in relations which are not 
easily revealed without enquiring into its specific social property regimes. Socialising 
rationality this way is a core component of any anti-Eurocentric method. 
 
The Chinese polity did promote trade to a certain extent, but it did so in ways and for 
reasons Frank cannot comprehend given his method and his reliance upon the 
commercialisation model. Understanding imperial ideology in terms of a political economy 
of the implementation of minsheng reveals social conflicts around power in which power is 
conceptualised as political access to land and people. Minsheng was a sui generis construct 
of Chinese politics, as were the conceptions of the ‘state’ and its relation to other polities – 
the latter were embodied in the office-state and tribute-system being passed within the 
Heavenly Mandate to those being able to implement this order. Parallels with European 
politics can however be traced by deconstructing what such conceptual vocabularies meant 
in terms of specific social property relations and how they expressed conflicts around the 
extraction and redistribution of social surplus. This is what I will endeavour to do in the 
next chapter, after having further substantiated my conception of the history of Late 
Imperial China until the time of what has been called by the California School the ‘Great 
Divergence’. 
  
177
Chapter Seven – Reconstructing the History of Late Imperial China until the ‘Great 
Divergence’ 
 
This chapter resumes the historical reconstruction of China's socio-economic development 
in geopolitical context, informed by PM, from 1279 to the late 18th Century. Its main 
conclusion is that, contrary to what much of the anti-Eurocentric literature in IR, HS, and 
Comparative Economic History argues on the case of Late Imperial China, the polity's 
overall long-term trajectory during this period showed remarkable similarities to 
'Europe's' pre-19th Century experience, beyond the parity in living standards alleged by the 
California School. These similarities are visible in three fields: economics/social, 
politics/state, and geopolitics/military. Conflicting strategies of social reproduction not 
dissimilar to those in Europe pitched peasants, landlords, merchants, and the ruling house 
against and amongst each other, and this governed the equally changing ‘economic’ 
landscape of China over time in terms of relations to land and property and patterns of 
commercialisation. The ‘political’ nature of the elites’ strategies in their competition for 
producers’ surpluses means the Chinese ‘state’ was just as much contested for as it was in 
Europe, and was therefore far from embodying a stable and unchanging Confucian order.  If 
there was no ‘China’ as a coherent entity motivated by gong (public good), it was likewise 
not governed through wen (civil – opposed to military): as in Europe, geopolitics was both 
an arena of competition and accumulation which made frontiers and polities particularly 
unstable since it was land and people that were contended for. This means that the timing 
and the causes of China's supposed economic parity, or even superiority, over and against 
'Europe' - as much of the recent anti-Eurocentric revisionist literature argues - need to be re-
assessed. This re-assessment will proceed by centering the analysis on the relations 
between social-property-relations, contested authority relations, and wider geopolitical 
relations in order to de-reify and properly historicise the Chinese trajectory. 
  
The chapter suggests that Imperial China's geopolitical relations within the wider East-
Asian international context were as contested, bellicose, and militarised as late medieval 
and early modern geopolitical relations in the nascent European inter-state system were. 
This challenges the thesis made by Realist and English School authors that China, 
conceptualised as a homogeneous and unified 'imperial actor', stabilised and pacified the 
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East-Asian international sub-system to the extent that its actors prioritised (internally and 
externally) status and social harmony over European-like competition for wealth and 
power. It also challenges the parallel thesis, made by the California School, that China's 
specific geopolitical organisation enabled an economic breakthrough to sustained growth 
driven by imperial pacification. In this original twist of the neo-Weberian narrative, China’s 
diverging ideological, political, and geopolitical organisation made for comparatively 
steadier and unhindered market expansion, until in the 19th Century when unintended 
consequences of the disadvantageous path of ‘competition from within and from without’ 
interfered with this. Furthermore, I argue that, just as Europe's early modern, multi-actor 
character was not a sufficient condition for Europe's economic 'take-off', we should not 
expect that China's geopolitical position within this bellicose sub-system could ipso facto 
have led to either military-strategic parity with, or superiority over, 'the West' due to,  as 
some neo-Weberians argue, pressures towards military investment and commercialisation.  
 
This argument therefore directly challenges the prevailing IR literature and the, primarily 
neo-Weberian-inspired, historical-sociological body of work on Late Imperial China. In 
summary, this literature argues that Late Imperial China diverged in being eminently stable 
due to, (1) spatial ordering principles (in IR), and/or, (2) ideological/political commitments 
(in HS). These variables are deemed so important as to explain China’s alleged coherence 
as a unit (political centralisation), East Asian geopolitical stability (territorial integration), 
and their steadily flourishing economies (exchanges and commercialisation) over half a 
millennium.  
  
These arguments have direct implications for the debate on the transition or non-transition 
to capitalism or sustained growth in China in the fields of comparative economic history 
and world history. Here, I will return especially to Pomeranz’ thesis, which locates the 
‘Great Divergence’ between the 'East' and the 'West' not in the 16th Century, but defers it to 
the 19th Century. I will contest his argument that, prior to the 19th Century, China was 
wealthier and more advanced than 'Europe', partly on empirical grounds, and partly on 
conceptual grounds. I have already discussed the problems with Pomeranz’ empirical 
claims about Chinese development, especially regarding the discrepancies between what 
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his theoretical model expects of agents’ behaviour (specialisation and innovation) and 
empirical data (e.g. increase in labour productivity), and his actual description of economic 
patterns (namely labour intensification). Here I am interested in further demonstrating how 
it is the California School’s basis for comparison (Yangzi Delta/England and China/Europe) 
which misleads these authors, both regarding the origins of modern development and the 
(geo)political divergence. I will argue that we should instead compare Late Imperial China 
and continental Europe with each other and in opposition to England. 
  
Accordingly, throughout this chapter I argue that the generic comparison between 'East' and 
'West' - China and Europe - relies (with a few exceptions) on the false assumption that early 
modern 'Europe' constituted a coherent and self-evident socio-political category of analysis. 
I argue that this represents an erroneous starting-point, obscuring the very different patterns 
of social, economic, political, and military development that prevailed within and between 
Europe's various polities. England stood-out within Europe as the only place experiencing 
an increase in labour productivity and overcoming Malthusian crises due to the emergence 
of capitalist social property relations in the countryside from the 17th Century onwards. 
This PM analysis crucially overcomes in this way any Euro-centrism, forsaking the 
assumption of unique and inherent characteristics to Europe in favour of an understanding 
of the ‘Great Divergence’ of England as an outcome of socio-political conflicts, rather than 
as a contingent (the California School) or pre-destined (the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives) 
event. I argue that such recasting of politics and geopolitics at the level of social agency is 
imperative for an analysis which is both anti-Eurocentric and sociologically convincing.  
 
However, the anti-Eurocentric potential of PM has not been fully developed yet, as its 
progress in moving beyond the sociology of the West has mostly been done in response to 
diverse findings of proto-modern features in the ‘East’, and through the strategy of 
highlighting the non-development of non-western polities and empires when compared to 
the already capitalist Britain (Brenner and Isett, 2002; Wood, 2003)197. Pre-existing PM 
analyses of China have taken the form of demonstrating how Qing China’s Malthusian-
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 But see Hoffman (2008) for an example of a PM analysis of a non-Western power which does not 
subscribe to this usual practice. 
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Ricardian dynamics were antithetical to Britain’s Smithian development. Although 
providing important insights on Qing agrarian (Isett, 2007) and commercial (Mazumdar, 
1997) relations, these studies do not sufficiently draw out the approach’s potential for 
innovative problematising and politicising of socio-spatial relations and authority relations. 
Widening the comparison can show not only that Imperial China and European continental 
powers were likewise locked in pre-modern patterns, but also that Chinese agents deployed 
a wide and original repertoire of strategies of empire management and resistances.  
 
The period covered starts with the Mongol conquest of China and the establishment of the 
Yuan dynasty in 1279, retraces the reign of the ‘native’ Ming, and ends in 1786, i.e. the 
conclusion of the Qianlong reign which marked the pinnacle of the Manchu Qing Empire. 
During that time, China was crucially re-mapped. Only the Ming governed mainly what 
was considered the previous traditional Chinese territory, i.e. the central and southern 
region around the Yangzi delta. In its restricted sense (i.e. without considering its linkage to 
the broader Mongol Empire), the Yuan dynasty ruled over much more territory than the 
Song at its zenith, incorporating regions to its North, South, and West (notably Annam, 
Liao territories, and the province of Yunnan), whilst its indirect rule extended into Korea 
and Tibet. The Qing Empire drastically expanded westwards and controlled roughly what is 
contemporary China, plus Mongolia, Manchuria, and Taiwan. To make sense of Late 
Imperial China’s history, we must go beyond the narratives of an expansion of China - 
albeit punctuated by hiatuses - towards its ‘natural’ boundaries, and socially problematise 
the political geography of Imperial China.  
 
To this end, this chapter proceeds in two broad steps, beginning with a historical 
reconstruction of Late Imperial China’s history, before undertaking its comparison with 
Europe. In this first step, I will pay particular attention to the transformations of the office-
system, the tribute-system, class relations, and imperial ideology in order to highlight how 
differences in the governance of territories were grounded in conflicts over land and people 
which must be understood as property conflicts. Although following the traditional division 
in terms of dynastic eras, my analysis will emphasis long-term patterns developing across 
dynasties, such as transformations of the relations to land and property, commercialisation 
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and proto-industrialisation, and privatisation of authority. I will first retrace the particularity 
of Yuan rule of China. I will argue that although uniquely grounded in typically Mongolian 
institutions and imperial project, this dynasty witnessed conflicts around state power which 
were not so different to other Chinese dynasties. Section Two will cover the return to Han 
rule under the Ming, marked by important commercialisation patterns but whose reign 
ended in massive peasants’ uprisings. I will demystify the perception of a peaceful Ming in 
its ‘domestic’ as well as ‘international’ relations.  The last historical section will explain the 
Qing remodelling of social property relations, grounded in specific strategies of empire 
management which are left unexplained by the narrow framework of Sinicisation.   
 
In this manner, the basis for a comparison with continental Europe will be set. This 
historical reconstruction will allow me to highlight the Eurocentrism of both, (1) the 
traditional comparisons which obscure the similarities in European and Chinese 
geopolitical environment, imperial ideologies, and strategies of social reproduction, and, (2) 
the belief in HS of China that there were sufficient continuities in geopolitical and 
state/society relations during this period to see it as representing a distinctive model. This 
will allow me to conclude on the impact of my historical findings and comparison for the 
debate on China and Britain’s ‘Great Divergence’, which has been mostly based on de-
militarising and ironing out changes in the Chinese trajectory. These two pitfalls still 
pervading anti-Eurocentric IR undermine their objective of de-essentialising the European 
trajectory as unique in world history. 
 
1. Reconstructing Late Imperial China’s history 
 
1.1 The Yuan dynasty 
The Mongol rulership of Late Imperial China is mainly understood as an interlude. In the 
IR literature on China, the Mongols’ attempt to govern like the Chinese is taken as proof of 
the centripetal force of the Chinese tribute-system or office-state (e.g. Kang, 2005: 72; 
Zhang and Buzan, 2012: 33). This reflects the historiographical debates in Sinology which 
still revolve around the topics of ‘barbarian’ invasions and the alienness of the dynasty. The 
Yuan reign is mostly conceived along the lines of an irreconcilable antagonism between the 
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Mongol and the Chinese ways (as in Franke and Twitchett, 1994). The Yuan dynasty could 
thus never manage to happily merge the feudalistic, personalised, autocratic/democratic198 
steppe legacy to the bureaucratic and centralised Chinese style. Given this nature of the 
debates on Yuan China and given also the lack of sources on this period, there are few, if 
any, social history works devoted to class relations. My main contribution will be to assess, 
and go beyond, the ‘Mongol Sinicisation or Chinese barbarisation’ debate by making sense 
of the Yuan socio-spatial specificities (relative to the administration, the rule of succession, 
and the inclusion in a wider empire), as well as the adapted Chinese institutions in terms of 
conflicts around property and power. I will argue that these elements can be compared to 
those of the ‘native’ dynasties, not as examples of more or less successful Sinicisation, but 
as part of the wider repertoire of strategies of social reproduction through the 
administration of Chinese territories. This will exemplify the character equally rooted in 
dynamics of appropriation of the alleged benevolent and peaceful political and geopolitical 
institutions of the ‘native’ or ‘Sinicised’ dynasties, which is held as the source of China’s 
departure from European trajectory. 
 
1.1.1 The conquest of China and the Mongol legacies 
The steppe unification under Genghis Khan occurred from 1206199 onwards. At its apex 
under Genghis’ successor Ogodei (1227-1246), the Mongol Empire reached from central 
Europe, the Russian principalities, and the Persian Empire to Northern China territories, 
including the initial territories of Central Asia. Genghis’ succession is worth recalling as it 
will influence the patterns of the geopolitical relations of Yuan China whilst shedding light 
on the Mongol property system which lingered on in parts of Yuan China. During his 
lifetime, Genghis had designated his third son to succeed him as qa’an (ruler of all the 
Mongol empire)200; he had also given Mongol homeland territories as ‘appanages’ to his 
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 The institution of the kurultai can be seen as a form of deliberative military assembly, whereas the overall 
Mongol style of ruling is more often identified as overly concentrated in the hands of one or a few. 
199
 On the emergence and consolidation of the Mongol empire, see Barfield (1989) and Di Cosmo, Frank and 
Golden (2009). Di Cosmo (1999) also describes the changes from Genghis’ ‘trade-tribute empire’ to Ogodei’s 
‘trade-tribute-taxation empire’ to Kubilai’s ‘direct-taxation empire’. 
200
 The term qa’an as ruler of the ‘ulus of the center’ must be differentiated from the term khan which refers 
to subordinated rulers of khanates as components of the wider empire. Those khanates will form the Il-
khanate in Iraq/Iran (under the Toluid line through Hulegu), the Kipchak (under the Golden horde of the 
Jochid line), Yuan China (under the Toluid line through Mongke and Kubilai), and Tranxoania in Central Asia 
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four wives’ first sons. These would later form important imperial lines, i.e. Ogedei, Jochi, 
Chagatai, and Tolui. At that time, those territories, understood as pasturelands and subject 
peoples, did not conform to the later khanates which were later associated to these lines, 
and included revenues from other conquered sedentary societies belonging to the ‘ulus of 
the center’ in a complex pattern of rights201.  
 
The Mongol rule over Chinese territories started at the time of the South Song (1126-1279), 
upon their take-over of the Jin polity (1125-1234), itself having made of the Song their 
tributary. Ogedei governed North China as part of the wider Mongol empire (through the 
qa’an and the other ulus’ representatives) until his death in 1241, followed by Güyüg 
(1246-1248) and Mongke (1251-1259). Under the reign of the latter, his brother Kubilai, 
being responsible for the conquest of modern Yunnan as a first step in the campaign against 
the South Song, was already regarded as the de facto ruler of China (Jackson, 1999: 29). 
The outcomes of the following struggles for succession is what gave shape to the four 
khanates and put an end to the Mongol empire as a unified administration upon the 
accession of Kubilai to the throne after the kurultai of 1260 and its assertion of Toluid 
control over China and Iran (through his brother Hulegu) (Allsen, 2001: 52-53). This 
traditional steppe practice assembled all leaders for important decisions (such as 
succession), in which every line showed their military might to support their case. Although 
often portrayed as a clash between sedentary and nomad perspectives (the Toluid opponents 
being the Chagatai and Jochid lines ruling more indirectly over ‘Russia’ and Central Asia), 
this khuriltai is best viewed as a war over the contested ruling of West Asia and the 
apportioned lands. 
 
1.1.2 Governing China 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
(under the Chagatai line). 
201
 Jackson’s (1999) discoveries led to such understanding of the late formation of the well-known four uluses 
(modern day Russia, Iran/Iraq, China, and Central Asia). This system of shares or apportioned land, inherited 
from the ‘nomad culture’ (or social-property relations), endured as a ‘diplomatic tool’ during later wars and 
alliances between the khanates (Allsen, 2001). Conflicts between these ‘second-generation uluses’ around 
revenues from allotted territories also endured, notably in the war between Kubliai and Qaidu of the Chagatai 
khanate around hereditary rights on Caucasian territories – the war through which the Yuan dynasty 
eventually gained Mongolia (Hodong, 2009). 
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Similar strategies of social reproduction governed relations between the elites and the 
ruling line in China from the initial conquest of the North to the eradication of the South 
Song. Expansion was crucial for this. When Kubilai became qa’an as well as khan of North 
China, Yunnan, and Annam were already within the Mongol zone of influence, in a loose 
administration which kept the native rulers in place. Expansion continued, notably 
including the full pacification of the Korean kingdom of Koryo in the mid-1270s. The 
conquest of the South Song proved more difficult: it took a decade before all loyalist 
insurrections were tamed, in 1279. A series of demands of submission to the Mongol 
empire, their refusal being met with punitive expeditions, were undertaken in parallel in 
Japan (1268), Burma (1273), Champa (1281), and Java (1289).202 The Mongols adapted to 
the social-property relations they encountered during their campaigns of geopolitical 
accumulation, providing for different avenues to reward the elite which later turned into 
important social conflicts once the surplus they could extract dried out.  
  
Comprising only one third of the overall Chinese empire’s population due to the 
devastation related to the prolonged wars, North China had already been divided into 
appanages conferred on Mongol nobility and military leaders, enfeoffed as princes, upon its 
conquest. The appanages-holders hereditarily presided over their assigned households 
which had a statute of boundservants, serfs, or slaves. Upon the initial conquest of the Jin, 
38% of the population (in the North) was under such jurisdictions, and it averaged around 
15% during Kubilai’s reign – at least for those declared (Mote, 1994: 660-663). This was 
already a line of divide between the Mongol nobility and the ruling house, since Ogedei’s 
reign in North China, the de facto ruler (albeit mostly primus inter pares) (Allsen, 1994). 
 
The social surplus the Mongol nobility so extracted from its peasants was reinvested with 
the ortoy. Those Muslim merchants funnelled the Mongol money into maritime and 
caravan trade. They also used it for money-lending to individuals and for tax-farming with 
local government offices, under diverse bureaus and lesser related offices (Endicott-West, 
1994: 599-600). Those communities were already involved in trade partnerships with the 
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 Only Burma and Champa had to resort to giving tribute to Kubilai. 
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Mongols since earlier Genghid conquests (Allsen, 1989). The Pax mongolica had indeed 
favoured the establishment of trade routes across the Eurasian landmass, a lucrative activity 
to tax for the Mongols who also invested through these commercial agents. Kubilai partly 
succeeded in diminishing the arbitrary rule of the appanage-holders and their private levies, 
by imposing instead (on top of the corvée services) annual grain and head taxes to be 
remitted to the center and then divided with the nobility, but this remained an important 
source of conflict even during his reign (Endicott-West, 1999: 90-93). 
 
The Mongols reproduced their social position through annual imperial grants (according to 
the principle of allotment to princely lines, here originating from South Song conquered 
territories), annual revenues from the appanages, and joint commercial ventures, but also 
from the official position of daruyaci and its designed official lands. The daruyaci was part 
of the system of dual-staffing imposed on all Yuan territories (in parallel to the usual 
Chinese-style office-system). It was a hereditary position due to the adaptation of the yin 
privilege203, a position first won through participation in military campaigns or service in 
the Imperial guard (Endicott-West, 1999: 65, 75). Such offices were mostly reserved for 
Mongols through the system of ethnic classification. During the Yuan dynasty, the 
population was divided in this manner between the Mongols, the semu (Western Central 
and Inner Asians), the Han (people from North China and Manchuria), and the nanren 
(inhabitants of South China)204. 
 
The central regime extracted its revenues partly from South China where there was 
continuity in the social-property relations. The nanren did not see either the northern 
devastations or its imposition of new social-property relations on important parts of the 
population. Diverse strategies were used to co-opt the elite and appease the population, 
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 As seen in Chapter Five, this refers to the privilege whereby capital officials bestowed similar status to 
members of their family. 
204
 The Yuan also established in parallel a hereditary classification of families, mainly into commoner, 
military, artisan, and salt worker households. Enduring during the Ming and Qing periods, each military 
household had to provide one soldier and one supplementary trooper, and was conferred stipends, grants, and 
exemptions in exchange. Corruption was endemic, from military officers falsely boosting their number of 
troops to retain more salaries or selling ‘leisure time’ to their soldiers as bribes in exchange of ‘exemption’ 
from service. In North China in 1241, 1/7 of the population belonged to such households (Mote, 1994: 644). 
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such as lighter taxes than in the North. Kubilai rapidly extended the privileges granted to 
religious groups to the newly created category of ‘Confucian households’, composed of 
those 100 000 households who claimed degree- or office-holding status from the Song 
period (Mote, 1994: 637). This hereditary status conferred stipends and exemption from 
service duties. The route to regular office for these men involved direct recommendations, 
and marriage patterns reflected this, but there was continuity with the South Song era in the 
‘localist’ strategy of having a family member who was an official so as to gain the related 
fiscal and legal privileges (Hymes, 1986)205. The South Song pattern of very large estates 
appears to have continued unabated. 
 
Beyond these differences in administration and inter-elite relations between the mostly 
‘landlordist’ South and the ‘feudal’ North, the Yuan ulus also encompassed a panoply of 
uniquely governed territories. Another important source of revenue was the newly 
conquered and differently administered territories of the wider Yuan uluses (sub-polities). 
Most of them consisted of the attribution of fiefs to local leaders in exchange for annual 
tribute and military assistance, loosely administered through the Pacification 
Commissions206. In other important regions, including Tibet and Korea, new elites were 
created through inter-marriage with the Yuan imperial line. The territories in Northeast Asia 
were particularly prone to overlapping jurisdictions between Mongol princes, Korean-
favoured dynastic families, and the regular office-system, whose Branch Secretariat was a 
tool for contention over rights of surplus extraction between these two groups and the 
imperial center (Robinson, 2009). This precarious equilibrium between the central 
administration and localised princely rule came under attack after Kubliai’s death in 1294. 
 
1.1.3 The fall of the Yuan  
This period is seen as the culmination of the antagonism between Mongol and Chinese 
ways (Dardess, 1973, 2003). This is partly true, but rather in the sense that the drying out of 
the revenues from expansion entailed more conflicts of redistribution within the elite and 
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 The examination system was revived from 1315 to 1335 but it was not even the minor route it was during 
the Song. In 1333, only 2% of officials held a degree (Dardess, 1994: 563). 
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 For an example in the southwest, see Herman, 2002. 
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those took a ‘cultural’ aspect207. It initially opposed the ruling house to the Mongol 
appanage-holding nobility. Revolts from princes were not unheard of, however, during 
Kubilai’s reign208, but this reached another level in mid-Yuan in a context of halted 
expansion and rampant inflation. From the first imperial succession struggle after Kublai 
died without a designated successor, Yuan politics was characterised by a huge increase in 
imperial grants to the Mongol nobility and proliferation of ‘supernumerary’ offices and 
titles (sold or given), geared toward securing the support from the princes. Purges and 
coups d’État were frequent to the point that as many as nine emperors reigned during these 
four decades.  
 
The last Yuan emperor, Shun-ti, reigned for a comparatively long period (1333-1368), 
albeit very soon to be on a drastically reduced region and on a rebellious population. This 
period has been called the renewal of an ‘inter-state system within [Chinese] borders’ 
(Cohen, 2000: 150) and the ‘regionalisation of Yuan rule’ (Dardess, 1994: 582). This 
happened in a context of ecological disasters209, famines, dire exploitation of the peasants, 
and widespread banditry. Its beginning is usually traced to 1351 and the rebellion of the 
peasants corvéed to rechanneling the Yellow River in the Huai region. Localised sectarian 
movements such as the Red Turbans and bandits captured cities. Since officials and 
landlords were targets for the Red Turbans, bandits, and peasants alike, self-defence was 
organised at the local level (Dardess, 1970: 548-549). The Yuan encouraged regional and 
local resistance, so warlords (also sometimes ‘repented’ pirates and bandits) emerged by 
being given titles and ranks. Their allegiance soon became tenuous and these leaders with 
independent bases of power started competing among themselves for population and 
territories. If the rebellions were temporarily tamed, from 1355 onwards imperial control 
was restricted to the capital area. Regional regimes, whether under rebels, bandits, or 
formerly loyal warlords, carved out pieces of the north and the south, whilst polities like 
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 The ‘lack of orderly imperial succession’ (Lorge, 2005: 91) characteristic of this period was however not 
due to a Mongol practice. The Mongol principles of succession through the kurultai were indeed loose 
(Barfield, 1989: 266) but the Chinese principle of primogeniture was used by the Yuan dynasty and heirs were 
designated by the current ruler. 
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 This is notably attested by such a North-Eastern prince, Nayan’s, attempt in the late 13th century. 
209
 Among other environmental devastations, the Yellow River changed its course and the bubonic plague 
claimed millions of Chinese lives; this corresponds to the ‘Little Ice Age’ beginning in 1270. 
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Koryo and Tibet cut themselves loose from Mongol rule.  
 
The North Red Turbans declared in 1355 their wish to restore to power a rebel Song 
dynasty with the emperor Han Lin-er. Despite the benevolent image of its leader who 
became the Ming founder, the renewed North Red Turbans - under Chu leadership since 
1356 - militarily co-opted and conquered their political rivals. He was finally victorious 
against his rival contestant of the title of prince of Wu, the loyalist Chang, in the lower 
Yangzi in 1367, after having defeated Chen of the South Red Turbans210 in 1364. The 
remnants of the Yuan dynasty fled to the steppe and the Ming dynasty was proclaimed in 
1368. 
 
1.2 The Ming dynasty 
In IR as in Sinology, Ming China is understood as embodying the model of internal and 
external harmony which the Qing later emulated. State/society relations and interactions in 
East Asia are seen as having been essentially pacified through the office-system and the 
tribute-system. This peaceful, inward-looking agrarian society might even have been a 
condition for facilitating its wave of commercialisation (Rosenthal and Wong, 2011). 
Firstly, I will upset this traditional view of Ming benevolence in its ‘external’ relations 
(Zhang and Buzan, 2012) by outlining how the ruling house’s drive to accumulate revenue 
did not disappear with the return to a ‘native’ reign. I will show that the tribute-system had 
other objectives than merely enabling Confucian order in the region and that this is far from 
being a notion which can explain all Ming geopolitical relations. I will build on works 
recently opposing the traditional view of the predominance of civil, rather than military, 
inclinations in the Ming government (Lorge, 2005; Swope, 2005). I, however, go beyond 
these accounts by showing that while stressing that all Chinese dynasties were built on - 
and maintained through - military power, we must go further in anchoring this in social 
property relations (rather than merely linking this to a generic imperial concern for state 
survival) if we are to succeed where Kang (2010) failed, i.e. in making sense of the two 
‘anomalistic’ wars of the period. I will then argue against the IR view that we can consider 
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the Ming and Qing reigns as one entity, the stability of which can be explained by similar 
commitments to benevolence pacifying relations with the gentry and ‘society’ (Wong, 
1997). This is what bringing back the agency of the producers, rather than merely 
considering them as a tax basis, leads to. I will demonstrate that Ming patterns of 
commercialisation occurred through a routine economy of violence, and were, singularly, 
concomitant with status differentiation. I will show that because of war-induced crises, the 
Ming state did not live up to its alleged benevolence and meritocracy, instead increasing 
levels of taxation and allowing the landed elite to further increase levels of exploitation and 
partake in a political economy of titles, tax exemptions, and semi-privatised sectors of 
‘public’ activity. Uniquely drawing this way the links between Ming’s enmeshing of 
geopolitics, authority relations, and commercialisation, and understanding them as 
contentions around extraction and distribution of revenue, illustrates that even this dynastic 
archetype of Imperial China’s peacefulness and stability – the alleged ultimate source of 
divergence with the European state-system – does not correspond to IR and Sinology’s 
assertions. 
 
1.2.1 Early Ming: conquests and tribute-system 
1368 marked the proclamation of the new dynasty where the rebel, Taizu, became the 
emperor, Hongwu (1368-1398), but not the end of wars of conquest. The Yuan dynasty still 
held the three enormous provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Shaanxi until 1382, as well as 
Manchuria and Mongolia (Lorge, 2005: 105-108). We should not, however, be led into 
believing in the thereafter ‘defensive’ stance of the Ming because of the ‘non-
interventionist’ imperial edict. In 1395 the earlier position (dating from 1371) was officially 
reiterated according to which the Ming would do no harm to neighbouring states it 
recognised through the tribute-system, which included among others Korea, Japan, Annam, 
and diverse South Asian kingdoms. Control over land and people, however, continued to be 
contested through state power from ‘within’ and ‘without’. Territorial disputes with Korea 
and the Mongols were not over211. The tusi system, which conferred hereditary titles to 
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 Raids and punitive expeditions plagued Ming relations with the different Mongol polities throughout the 
dynasty. Relations the other polities maintained with the Mongols were also an object of dispute in their 
relations with China. For example, the first two Ming emperors refused to recognise the new Yi emperor 
  
190
native chieftains in the southwest along the Yuan dynasty model, was not only a way to 
pacify and integrate neighbouring regions, but also ‘a system of appointment […] which 
blurred the distinction between foreign vassals and autonomous territories beyond direct 
imperial control’ (Wang, 1998: 313). In this sense, this was a means to destabilise and 
fragment the various expanding kingdoms of the region (mainly Burma, Laos, and Annam), 
and to claim – even a loose - sovereignty over (and revenues from) their land and people. 
Their inclusion among the tribute-system and into the list of states not to be invaded should 
not blind us to such Ming aggressive foreign policy. Relations were neither hierarchical nor 
anarchical amongst East and Southeast Asian polities because they were based on a 
constant remodelling through assertions of sovereignty, conceived as a personal source of 
revenue. 
 
However, the Mongol threat in the north was important enough to encourage the Ming to 
seek the relative pacification of relations with states in the south through the tribute-system, 
as a temporary agreement on sovereignty claims. This also factored in Hongwu’s decision 
to enfeoff the ‘princes of the blood’ – initially nine of the emperor’s sons - on the 
frontiers212. The creation of eighteen hereditary princedoms over Hongwu’s lifetime gave 
the princes independent military power and sovereignty on their estates. Usually seen in 
traditional Sinology merely as an ill-advised decision and an anomaly, this is best 
understood through the prism of the privatisation of authority relations and thus as one of 
the available strategies to manage geopolitical relations. The traditional rewarding of 
military leaders and those who pledged allegiance to the new dynasty with nobility titles 
and imperial land grants was also part of this, although emperors would struggle with them 
mostly for their encroachment on nearby land and fiscal imperial authority.213 The 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
because of this. The early Ming lukewarm relations with Korea were additionally complicated because the 
region of Liaodong was coveted by these three actors.  
212
 This strategic move was also made in order to further assert control over the rebellious Central Yangzi. 
213
 The 1373 edict against such encroachment was more a proof of the widespread occurrence of such 
phenomena than of the implementation of this policy. The purges between 1380 and 1394 however later built 
on such pronouncements (Langlois, 1998: 134). The subsequent emperor Jianwen did the same to curtail the 
rapidly growing power of the Buddhist clergy - who had became powerful landowners under Hongwu 
patronage - by restricting the amount of land they were allowed to own. This is why they will later rally to the 
Prince of Yan’s revolt (Chan, 1998: 190-191). Rewarding of surrenderers had its counterpart in punishment of 
rivals’ supporters. The Jiangnan region supported Taizu’s rival, so its gentry experienced punitive taxation 
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princedoms would, however, be the reason for the short-lived reign of Hongwu’s successor, 
his grand-son214, Jianwen (1399-1402). This second Ming emperor tried to assert more 
imperial control over the princes and abolished five of the princedoms. In response, the 
powerful prince of Yan, whose fief was in Beijing, openly revolted in 1399. Within three 
years he captured the capital (Nanjing) and proclaimed himself the rightful successor of 
Hongwu, as emperor Yongle (1403-1425). He was to be the one who ultimately managed to 
curtail the power of the princes. Yongle created his own nobility, giving titles to those who 
helped in getting him to his position and to those who subsequently followed him in his 
later campaigns (such as against the Eastern Mongols), through his ‘activist’ foreign policy 
for which he became known.  
 
Yongle’s decision to annex Annam in 1407 has puzzled historians, who generally attribute 
it to a personality trait or a series of misperceptions215. This occurrence makes more sense 
when geopolitics is viewed as embedded in dynastic interests. This was foremost an 
intervention in a war of succession in which Yongle could have gained if not, firstly, for the 
weakness of his client – the Tran dynasty – and, secondly, the fierce resistance to the Ming 
annexation which impeded any steady flow of revenue from this new province developing. 
This is an enigma in the traditional literature only because it takes for granted the peaceful 
goal of the tribute-system and turns a blind eye to frontier politics. Despite the claims of the 
imperial ideology, the shifting of alliances and remapping of the East and Southeast Asian 
polities’ territories was a constant216. The subsequent wars, conquests, and state 
consolidation that the Ming defeat triggered among Vietnam, Champa, Cambodia, and Laos 
(Wang, 1998, 317-318) should be enough to dispel any idea of a Chinese empire evolving 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
(the southern provinces bore a disproportional tax quota during the Ming), if not the seizure of their land. 
However, private landlords managed to appropriate the newly dynastic-owned land after Hongwu’s reign 
(Bernhardt, 1992: 41).   
214
 Hongwu bypassed the principle of primogeniture to declare as heir the son of his dead first son (then heir 
apparent) rather than his second son.  
215
 See for example Kang (2010) or Twitchett and Mote’s (1998) Cambridge History of China. 
216
 Another example of this in the Southwest is the Shan-Ming war occurring later in this period (1440-1449). 
This conflict started when one of the Shan polities was emboldened by the Ming defeat by Annam and 
decided to carve out territories from the Yunnan province. This dragged Burma into the war, to which the 
Ming later refused to give the promised territory of Luquan (Wang, 1998: 325-326). The Annam-China war 
had a wide impact which is best understood by socially conceptualising territoriality. Relations with Champa 
(another Chinese tributary state) were also tarnished by the Ming refusal to give back, once it had conquered 
Annam, Champa territories the previous Annamese dynasty had claimed (Chan, 1998: 271).   
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within a geopolitical vacuum. Rather than being the result of pure geopolitical competition, 
this was one variance of conflicts over property and power - to which also belongs the 
tribute-system and the husi system - where ‘imperial control’ is not an objective in itself but 
an opportunity to extract and redistribute social surpluses. 
 
Another ‘historical anomaly’ of the early Ming period, understood only in its symbolic 
aspect, is the eunuch Zheng He’s voyages. Mandated by Yongle, Zheng undertook seven 
expeditions in South East Asia between 1405 and 1433. This was at the same time a ‘show 
of force’ and an expedition with mercantilist overtones, opening ‘routes’ to trade. Since 
1371, trade was officially to be conducted exclusively through tribute missions, so that its 
profits could end-up in imperial coffers. This prohibition of private trade neither meant a 
turning away from international commerce – as tribute missions flourished – nor a 
disappearance of private trade – which was renamed as ‘piracy’ (Mazumdar, 1997: 68-69). 
The tribute missions were composed both of luxury goods for the elite and consumers’ 
products. As further propelled by Zheng voyages, the tribute-system was a convenient way 
for the state to channel revenues ‘against domestic rivalry’ – the ‘pirates’217 being 
supported by the coastal gentry (T’sao, 1982: 233) - as well as a geopolitical instrument, 
resulting in an ingenious tool at the disposition of dynastic interests. However, Chinese 
superiority should not be exaggerated and the tribute system, at times, had also been a way 
to make the most out of relations with other states that the Chinese dynasties were unable to 
conquer.  
 
1.2.2 The mid- to late-Ming: commercialisation and uprisings 
A new trend in Ming studies focuses on the important commercialisation which took place 
from the 16th Century onwards (Rawski, 1972; Li, 1998). Different goods were 
commercialised according to the region, but the most notable ones were silk, cotton, and 
grain. Upon Frank’s (1998) impetus, work by IR scholars on China tend to emphasise how 
the already important inter-Asian trade became inter-related with Europe through the arrival 
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 As seen in Chapter Six, they were moreover often wrongly portrayed in imperial ideology as non-Chinese. 
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of the Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese218. However, in order to gain access to Chinese 
markets, the European traders had to enter through the important network of private, though 
illegal, trade sponsored by the defiant coastal gentry and officialdom, and we shall see that 
this was only one part of the wider routine economy of violence which contradicts the IR 
vision of a conflict-free environment favouring commercialisation (as promoted by Wong, 
1997). Moreover, this commercialisation must be understood as a case of pre-capitalist, 
involutionary, ‘proto-industrialisation’ deriving from the diminution of the land/labour ratio 
upon the impact of demographic growth and the peasant subdivision of holdings. This 
affected patterns of urbanisation, production, and marketisation (Huang, 1985, 1990), and 
Ming commercialisation was uniquely based on an estate economy. 
 
This estate economy had its origin partly in the nobility’s descendants whom successive 
emperors had created, both in the capitals and provinces219. It was also due to landlords and 
agnatic groups forcibly appropriating land and profiting from indebted peasants, on whom 
the tax burden increasingly fell (Elvin, 1973: 235; Mazumdar, 1997: 196). The status of the 
peasants varied enormously, ‘ranging from hereditary servitude to voluntarily indenture for 
a limited period’: alongside tenants who owed mainly rent to their landlord (diannong), 
there were also peasants having pledged to them their property (the touxian system) or their 
labour (the maishen system), these latter processes having affected up to 20-30% of the 
population of the Jiangnan region (Mazumdar, 1997: 198-199). It is impossible to assert the 
percentage of tenancy and people with servile status across China during the Ming: their 
number varied depending on the province, as did the degree of servitude every category 
implied, from hereditary bound-servants to chattel slavery status (Wakeman, 1985: 616-
624). The overall trend is that the gentry was usurping more and more land from tax-paying 
registered households, a process which reduced imperial revenues as the degree-holding 
families were exempted from taxes. These changes in tenure patterns in favour of 
increasing estates and absentee landlordism, along with a diminishing free-holding 
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 The latter conquered the trading port of Malacca in 1511. 
219
 This was also aggravated by Yongle’s costly move, completed in 1419, of the capital to Beijing, his former 
princely fiefdom. This entailed, on top of the mass relocation of peasants to the Northern Metropolitan Area 
and the imposition of an extra levy (for the transport of grain to the capital) on the Southern provinces, the 
grant of imperial estates to relatives and eunuchs – in control of 15 to 45% of the region’s land (Robinson, 
2011: 36).  
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population, were enough to lead the Ming to the ‘Single whip’ reform (Bernhardt, 1992: 39-
42). The former lijia organisation for tax collection and labour services220 exempted tenants 
from corvée; as their number grew, this system consequently became obsolete. Also 
enabled by the influx of silver international commerce brought, this commutation of the 
service duty into a tax payable in silver was officially applied everywhere in 1581 - after its 
early adoption in the south from 1436 – and contributed to the further commercialisation of 
the Ming economy, since a part of the harvest had to be sold for silver. 
 
These patterns of growing estates and commercialisation relied on an ‘economy of 
violence’ strongly under-represented by the literature. This operated routinely through the 
local officials and their yamen (the clerks and wider staff they hired), the gentry and their 
private militias, and the court elite and its militarised entourage.221 Power (in the form of 
state functions) and property (imperial and private lands) were contended for militarily. 
Piracy in an increasingly commercial economy ran parallel to this mixing of illicit force and 
official functions. The routine economy of violence was even further exacerbated in the late 
16th Century. This was the beginning, at the local level, of ‘ongoing violence for the control 
of irrigation works, of markets, of fields and harvests, inter-lineage feuding and feuding 
between rival gangs of smugglers and pirates’ (Mazumdar, 2001: 98)222.  
 
Parallel to - and enmeshed with - this economy of violence, existed a political economy of 
shares of ‘state’ power expanding over the Ming period which explains its characterisation 
as the 'forfeiture of public authority to private agents' (Smith and von Glahn, 2003) and 
factionalism. On top of the opportunity to act as ‘tax-shelters’ for indebted peasants whose 
land the gentry acquired, degrees allowed their holders to benefit from the ‘privatisation of  
authority’ at sub-imperial levels. Private agents benefitted from usurping of the lijia 
function (and its many additional fees and surcharges imposed in exchange for this 
‘service’), ‘charitable’ institutions (e.g. estates and granaries), but also ‘benevolent 
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 This institution, created in 1381, organised the rural population in units of 110 households responsible for a 
variety of local services, including tax collection and its remittance to the local officials.  
221
 At times, this structural feature of Ming China exploded, as in the events of the Rebellion of 1509. This 
rebel threat to the dynasty was not the exceptional product of an evil eunuch recruiting bandits but instead 
revealed the routine elite patronage of ‘men of force’ (Robinson, 2001).  
222
 Such lineage feuds were mostly prevalent in South China coastal provinces. 
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markets’. These were founded in the wake of Ming commercialisation by local landlords 
investing in their control over the grain market and pricing (Mann, 1987: 73-74). Powerful 
lineage groups used the private academies and literary societies (like the Donglin Academy 
and the Restoration Society) as a means to increase the chances of social upheaval, through 
preparation for exams and the building of connections needed to access high offices. These 
were also centers of political dissension, their existence being a source of contention with 
the imperial center (Elman, 1993). By that time, the eunuchs, used by the emperors as their 
private agents, had formed important networks of patronage at court which nourished 
factionalism. Factionalism, and the political purges it entailed, could be very lucrative to 
the emperor’s entourage, as the confiscated lands of the accused were awarded in turn to 
favourites (Wakeman, 1985: 336). 
 
Such diminution of state revenues due to tax evasion and peasant ‘tax-sheltering’ combined 
with increasingly expensive stipends to the nobility223 and rising military costs in the 1590s 
created a ‘war-induced fiscal crisis’ (von Glahn, 1996: 162). This could not be entirely 
made up for by the widespread purchase of rank, and increasingly of proper official 
positions also, which constituted an indispensable source of revenue for the Ming dynasty 
in times of heightened military expenditures (Huang, 1974b: 244-246; Ho, 1964: 32-33)224. 
The 1570-1610 ‘military revival’ (Swope, 2008: 70) included emperor Wanli’s (1572-1620) 
’three great punitive campaigns’: against a mutiny in the northwest (in 1592); indigenous 
rebellions in the southwest (led by a hereditary official acknowledged through the tusi 
system in 1590-1600); and Hideyoshi, who was pursuing the unification of Japan. The 
Imjin war (1592-1598) must be understood in the context of the politicisation of trade and 
the contestation of territory as a source of dynastic revenues. Japan tried to invade Korea as 
a springboard for an invasion of China, since the Choson dynasty refused to join in such a 
projected expedition. Short of such conquest of China, Hideyoshi wanted to gain access to 
trade with the Ming. Korea asked protection from the Ming and was granted it, enlisting 
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 The imperial family entitled to stipends grew over the centuries to the point that, at the beginning of the 
17th century, 80 000 persons were dependent on such stipends, the cost of which reached more than the 
government’s total tax revenues (Wakeman, 1985: 332). This does not include the ‘meritious’ nobility’s 
stipends. 
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 Wanli also had to send his eunuch staff to the provinces in order to squeeze out more profits under the 
‘Mining excises and commercial taxes’ program.  
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China within this war. The war ultimately reached a stalemate and its issue was a Ming 
victory by default after Hideoyoshi’s death. In the meantime, Nurhaci established the Latter 
Jin dynasty - from which the Manchus later emerged – and the wars with Wanli this gave 
rise to were additional heavy military expenses. The building of the Great Wall connecting 
garrison posts, starting in the 1550s, indeed never repelled Mongol attacks. 
 
As it was peasants’ labour intensification, enserfment, and increasing share of the tax 
burden which powered the Ming commercialised economy, there were important peasants’ 
uprisings overlapping the Ming/Qing transition. This began in the late 16th Century, gained 
momentum in the 17th Century, and endured until the 1720s in a process where the peasants 
freed themselves of their legally dependent status and won major gains in terms of tenancy 
rights. This was a phenomenon which cut across statutes and regions during the late Ming 
period. In South China, massive tenant revolts in the 1590s (Tanaka, 1984) were later 
joined by boundservant-serf rebellions in the Yangzi region in the 1630s-1640s (Oyama, 
1984). Uprisings also occurred in the rest of China and were specifically aimed at 
redistributing wealth and land and the abolition of dependant status (Mazumdar, 1997: 202-
203; Walker, 1999: 40-50). Famines and epidemics raged from the 1620s, leading to severe 
depopulation. Combined with the demographic losses due to these widespread revolts and 
to the Manchu wars, this enhanced the bargaining power of the peasants in relation to their 
landlords (Brenner and Isett, 2002: 615). On top of proper uprisings, peasants destroyed 
evidence of their rent or dependence relations and/or fled from their landlords. 
 
The consequences for relations between the state, gentry, and peasants, and the history of 
the institutionalisation of the peasants’ gains, are best left to be explained in the next 
section. It is however important to note that peasants had already begun, during the late 
Ming period, to gain ownership of land or secure tenancy rights leading to politically fixed 
rent. In the North, peasants acceded to the ownership of the vacated land they came to 
occupy, due to the more severe devastation of the region. In the South, peasants bought 
permanent tenure or rights of cultivation (‘topsoil rights’) or opened land for landlords in 
exchange for these. This system of dual ownership gave subsoil rights to the legal owner 
(the landlord) who was responsible for the tax payment, whereas the peasant acquired 
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security of tenancy: as long as he paid the rent - which could not be raised, he could not be 
evicted from the land, whilst he still could sublet, mortgage, or sell his topsoil rights 
(Bernhardt, 1992: 25). 
  
These rebellions and war-induced fiscal crises paved the way for the Manchu ‘great 
enterprise’ (Wakeman, 1985). During Chongzhen’s rule (1628-1644), court factionalism 
and dissensions over the means of increasing imperial revenue amongst representatives of 
the Northern and Southern gentries – and partly carried on through eunuchs and societies - 
reached new heights. A Northwest alliance (rallying the upper gentry of the Shanxi, Henan, 
and Shaanxi provinces dislodged from offices in these court struggles) arose and captured 
Beijing in April 1644. Less than two months later however, the Manchus ended their very 
short reign and sealed the fate of the Ming dynasty. 
 
1.3 The Qing dynasty 
As this was the case for the Sinology of the Yuan period, focussing exclusively on the 
debate on the alienness or Sinicisation of the regime risks occluding the social changes a 
dynastic transition might imply, here in the form of the institutionalisation of new social 
property relations which peasant struggles gave rise to, from the late Ming onwards. The 
17th Century was a period of fundamental transformations in the balance of class forces: 
producers were foremost concerned in securing their access to land whilst officials and 
landlords mainly sought to find ways to reproduce their shattered social power. Whether 
Mongol, Han Chinese, or Manchu, the dynastic house was always alien to most of these 
agents and what is to be studied is foremost what entailed the re-organisation of alliances 
between the ruling house and regional and local elites. The story of Ming loyalism and 
bannerification of Manchuria of the early Qing reigns nonetheless illustrates the way 
cultural perceptions interplayed with struggles for power. I will show that Qing 
commercialisation proceeded along different patterns than during the Ming period and that 
the Qing dynasty was sustained by a unique politicisation of trade, benevolence, and a 
highly differentiated administration of China resulting from the peasant uprisings. This 
cannot be captured by their portrayal as ‘Sinicised’, as this term refers to an ideal-type of 
China which never existed. Moreover, such problematisation of space, empire, state, 
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property, and conflicts in the new Qing social relations – crucially lacking in the neo-
Smithian and IR analyses– further demonstrates that the category of ‘China’ does not hold, 
and thereby neither does the narrative of its distinctive, enduring (geo)political stability 
allegedly setting it on a opposite path to Europe. 
 
1.3.1 From the creation of the Manchu to the political consolidation of the Qing dynasty 
Based in Manchuria in the Northeast, the Jurchens225 interacted with the Ming as 
participants in the unofficial tribute-system: they received titles from China and traded 
through tribute missions and border markets. The Jurchen elites lived on large estates 
worked by serfs and bound-servants (often prisoners of war), but their economy relied also 
on hunting and on plundering – more often than not China’s border regions. Nurhaci was 
one Jurchen clan leader officially recognised by the Ming from 1583. He unified the 
Jurchens, and then the Mongols in 1593. Within the Jurchen polity, the ruling house and top 
aristocracy were organised in a militarised system called the Eight Banners, in a process 
which eroded clan ties. From 1613, Nurhaci built military colonies by ‘rusticating 
bannermen’. Between 1618 and 1623, he made important conquests in the Ming fertile and 
populous territory of Liao-tung. As his successor, his son Hung Taiji (1626-1643), gained 
annual tribute (from 1627) and military contributions (from 1636) from Korea, and he also 
led the three major plundering invasions of China proper. The following child emperor 
Shunzi (1644-1661) was under the regency of Dorgon, Hung Taiji’s half-brother, who led 
the conquest of Beijing in 1644. 
 
Meanwhile, Ming loyalists were organising in the secondary capital of Nanjing. Their rule, 
fraught with struggles for imperial succession and difficult relations with gentry and 
warlords, did not last long as the Qing army arrived there a year later. Most officials and 
local gentries submitted to the Manchus, having to adopt the Manchu hairstyle. Loyalist 
rebellions nonetheless occupied the banner armies for the next two decades, notably the 
rebellions of the Three Feudatories (1673-1681) and the Zheng maritime empire (1661-
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 The term Manchu was adopted only in 1635. On the building of the Manchu polity from its Jurchen origins 
to the conquest of Beijing, see Crossley, 1999, Perdue, 2005: 109-132, Roth-Li, 2002, and Wakeman, 1985: 
23-86, 157-224. 
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1683)226. After these conquests and the crushing of resistance, the Qing had to find a way to 
repopulate devastated areas and to invite elite collaboration. 
 
1.3.2 The Manchu ethos in Manchuria 
The unique regime established by the Qing in Manchuria was as a result of the southern 
part of their homeland and North China being depopulated both of producers and elites at 
the beginning of their reign. Upon the emperor’s order, the ‘Conquest elite’227 based in 
Manchuria had moved south where the banner forces were needed. Estates’ owners in 
North China had already fled the Northwest rebel armies and the Banner Armies (or been 
integrated into the Conquest elite). The early Qing emperors took this opportunity to claim 
Manchuria as ‘imperial patrimony’ and carve out estates for military farms upon the 
demobilisation of bannermen. Due to the degree of depopulation, the Qing rulers also had 
to encourage peasants’ opening or restoring of land for production and to reward with rank 
and office those who could recruit them until 1668 (Isett, 2007: 33). Free peasants (such as 
convicts and prisoners of war) were brought into banner elites’ manors to become 
serfs/bound-servants (the traditional basis of the Jurchen organisation). The Kangxi 
emperor (1662-1722) thereafter sought to ban new Han migration to the Manchu homeland. 
For cultural, strategic, and economic reasons, Manchuria was at the heart of imperial 
concerns (Isett, 2007: 23-42). The Qing heartlands were believed to be preserving Manchu 
ways, foremost the military skills needed to preserve hegemony and undertake subsequent 
conquests. The region was also crucial for defence against Russian and Jurchen invasions. 
Its estate lands were moreover imperative in the rewarding and social reproduction of the 
Qing aristocracy. Establishing measures to segregate between Han commoners’ villages and 
bannerlands and to prevent further Han colonisation was necessary to protect the integrity 
of bannermen manors.  
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 The Qing had to empower surrendered Ming generals in order to fight off revolts. When further sovereign 
powers were refused to the Prince of Yunnan and Guizhou, he rebelled, joined by the Princes of Guangdong 
and Fujian. Another Ming loyalist, Zheng - whose family had built an important maritime trading network - 
chose to move his forces to Taiwan, dislodging the Dutch. In order to cut supplies for the Zheng maritime 
empire, the Qing decided in 1662 to ban trade and to evacuate the coastal cities of five provinces by 
displacing their population inland. Faced with this formidable adversary, the Qing conquered Taiwan only in 
1683. 
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 Isett (2007: 7) uses this term to designate ‘the ruling house, its coterie of noble followers, and its elite 
military units – the Banner Armies’. 
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1.3.3 Violence and Qing benevolence in China’s small-holder economy 
If the Manchu ethos was at the origins of Qing administration in the Northeast, the 
‘Chinese’ ideology of minsheng228 attended to the Qing governing of China proper. Despite 
its ‘alienness’, the Qing rulers were the first Chinese dynasty in a long time to seek to 
protect peasants and promote popular welfare, at least in China proper229. This is, however, 
because a different socio-political terrain awaited the Manchus there, rather than due to the 
‘Sinicisation’ of their rule.  As stressed above, the political power of the landed elite had 
been shattered by the repeated uprisings and the gain of peasants’ control over their land 
and labour. The new taxation system shed light on the aims and limitations of the Qing rule. 
In 1713, the emperor proclaimed the ‘never raise tax’ edict. From 1750 onwards, tax was 
linked exclusively to the ownership of land: the poll tax was merged with the land tax and 
service labour was abolished. Once combined, these policies resulted in the protection of 
the Qing tax base. This promoted households’ registration as well as the mobility of 
peasants, encouraging them to re-settle abandoned farms and to open new land. Ensuring 
peasants’ gains in politically fixed rent and maintaining low taxes for small-holders also 
reduced the risk of indebted peasants’ flight to tax-protected estates.  
 
In North China, where peasants had secured ownership of land, tax was levied directly on 
peasants, who were responsible through their village organisation to remit taxes to officials 
(Huang, 1985). Peasants in fact paid for tax collection, since surcharges in the form of 
customary fees were expected to be gained by the sub-bureaucracy yamen’s runners (Reed, 
2000). For South China, where tenancy was now the norm, the new addition to the Qing 
code of legislation on rent relations restricted the power of landlords. This limited the fiscal 
privileges of the gentry and abolished their rights to private justice over their tenants and to 
turn peasants into slaves or bound-servants. The Qing however could not dispense with the 
role of landlords in the collection of tax, which was ‘paid out of rent’. The ruling house 
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 As explained in Chapter Six, minsheng expressed the benevolence of the Chinese state in ensuring popular 
welfare through its governance. 
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 Ming law was adapted in the Qing code promulgated in 1646, including the differentiation between 
‘master and slave’. However, given the situation the Qing rulers encountered in China proper, such legislation 
was mainly used in Manchuria. The Qing officially codified in law peasants’ gains in 1727. 
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therefore supported in law and practice the landlords’ rights to collect rent, with yamen’s 
runners enforcing the payment of defaulted rents (Bernhardt, 1992: 31). This arrangement 
had the double advantage of decreasing the power of the gentry - with whom the ruling 
house was in competition for the extraction of social surplus - whilst enlisting this group for 
administrative purposes (Mazumdar, 1997: 211-217; Shigeta, 1984).  
 
This Qing institutionalisation of peasant gains forced the landed elite to seek new ways to 
preserve its social power, such as investing in lineages, tax-farming, bounded markets, and 
commercial ventures230. This gave way ‘in the early Qing [to] a decisive shift from elite 
power based specifically on the control of land and peasants to elite power based more 
broadly on semi-bureaucratic public activity’ (Bernhardt, 1992: 14). Diversification of their 
activities was the key for the Qing elites’ preservation of their power: this gave rise to the 
era of ‘gentry-merchants’ (shengshang)231 facilitated by the commercialised economy and 
the easiness to purchase degrees. This latter common feature of Imperial China was 
exacerbated under the Qing (Ho, 1964; Kaske, 2008, 2012; McNicholas, 2007; Theobald, 
2013; Zhang, 2010)232. Selling of titles was a widespread and regular practice planned in 
the state’s finances, whereas the selling of appointments proved crucial in times of war. A 
proxy system through which officials embezzled - acting as intermediaries for this 
funnelling of contributions - and a parallel system in which scholarly establishments 
themselves sold similar licences concurrently emerged (McNicholas, 2013). 
 
The Qing also enlisted the help of merchants in the collection of commercial taxes by 
supporting their organisation in associations and guilds. At the local level, yazhang 
merchants built on their ‘liturgical’ role to invest in ‘parapolitical control’ whilst officials 
diverted revenues by selling these merchant licences (Mann, 1987: 94). The Kangxi 
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 These strategies are discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
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 This term is widely used amongst Qing historians after Chang Chung-li (1962). See also Ho (1962) and 
Esherick and Rankin (1990) on gentry families undertaking commercial activities.  
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 Purchasing a degree was in fact a purchase of the right not to pay the percentage of labour services due in 
the combined tax and of immunity to legal punishment, as well as being a first step in the entry to 
officialdom, through the ‘regular’ appointment system or purchase of a post during temporary sales occurring 
in times of financial need for the state. The contribution system could also serve acting officials, for example 
purchasing promotions.    
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emperor (1661-1722) had rescinded the ban on overseas private trade from 1685, as the 
ruling house and its favoured allies had interests in it – the imperial household sponsored 
through loans specific trades, including the copper trade (Mazumdar, 1997: 95). Such 
interests become evident through the study of the Imperial Household Department 
(Thornbert, 1977). On top of its administration of the imperial landed estates, this imperial 
branch supervised the salt administration as well as the monopolies in ginseng and copper. 
The latter monopolies’ profits went directly to the pockets of the imperial family and were 
also used for the prestige economy of gift giving. This Department also administered 
commercial taxes, including those from foreign trade. These custom duties, through its 
famous bureau at Canton, combined pre-set quotas to be given to the center as well as 
informal surcharges lining the pockets of officials, as was the case for other offices. 
However, on top of these regular taxes and customary ‘squeezes’, the superintendants eager 
to preserve their lucrative positions collected an extra tax, funnelled to the ‘Privy Purse’. 
This excess tax became direct personal revenue for the Qing rulers. 
 
Following this re-opening of China to foreign trade, commercial activity increased, but this 
was due also to proto-industrialisation and the promotion of inter-regional grain trade. This 
other aspect of the benevolence of Qing administration relieved central regions affected by 
structural shortages of grain – due to the subdivisions of plots - with the over-production of 
the relatively newly colonised areas233. This was undertaken by one important guild of the 
deputised yazhang. The preservation of the Qing tax base in the 18th Century relied on this 
and on the promotion of the colonisation of peripheries - for example, through tax waivers 
for the opening of new land under Yongzheng reign (1732-1735). These new arrangements 
between the ruling house and elites which derived their profits either through land, 
commerce, or both functioned as much – and maybe even more - through routine violence 
as during the previous period. Lineage feuds, forced appropriation of land, private 
vendettas to assert trade monopolies, and recourse to the political protection of yamen’s 
forces were endemic because property was politically (and thus militarily) constituted. This 
was a race to appropriate shares of ‘state’ power by participating in gong (public good), 
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 This system is discussed in Chapter Six. 
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around which the discourse to legitimise oneself or exclude others was organised. 
 
1.3.4 Qing geopolitical accumulation 
If Manchuria and China proper were uniquely administered, so too were the later additions 
of Taiwan, Tibet, Mongolia, and Turkestan (including Xinjiang). These regions had never 
been under Ming control. Since the beginning of the dynasty, Russian colonisation 
advanced towards Qing territories. Relations between Russia and China were further 
complicated by conflicts on terms of trade and rivalry for the allegiance of Mongol tribes in 
the region. After a series of armed conflicts, the Qing and the Romanovs re-drew the map 
of the region in 1689 through the Treaty of Nerchinsk, carving out territories from diverse 
tribes and foremost the Zhungar Mongol polity (1671-1760) (Perdue, 2005: 161-173). The 
Qing built on these Western Mongols’ succession struggles to integrate most of this region 
(Western Mongolia and Xinjiang)234. The conquest of Turkestan and its oases as a by-
product of this conquest was completed in 1765. Following struggles between different 
Mongol polities to control Tibet235, the Qing took the opportunity to re-map this region in 
1724, dividing it into territories for the Dalai-lama and his noble houses and in distinct 
territories for two Mongol tribes (including the Khoshots, Tibet overlords and Qing allies), 
administered in the same way as the bannerlands in Manchuria (Perdue, 2001). The Qing 
also carved out territories to be attached to China’s provinces.  
 
This integration of the immense Western region allowed better regulation of trade and tax 
revenues whilst providing additional land to be opened by Chinese peasants236. The Qing 
used different ad hoc strategies, including bannerification, forced and voluntary 
(encouraged via tax remittance) emigration of Chinese population (on merchants’ or 
bannermen estates, or on land they owned), implantation of branches of the office-system, 
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 The Western Mongols had accepted tribute since 1653, but relations were still tumultuous. 
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 The Khoshot Mongols in Xihai (roughly to the West of the North-Western province of Shaanxi, squeezed 
between Tibet and Inner Mongolia), were overlords of the Tibetan polity to its South. Qing-Khoshot relations 
were harmonious, as these Mongols submitted to the Manchu polity from 1637 onwards. The Qing had to re-
capture Tibet in 1720 against the Zhungar taking control of it in 1717. The Khoshot thereafter tried to re-
establish control over Tibet. 
236
 Herman (2014) argues that we should also take into account, while analysing the Qing extension of power 
in the West and Southwest, the importance of their copper resources, then used as currency. 
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and loose governance through the Ming tusi system. There is no space here to describe each 
of the different Qing types of administration in Central Asia237, but the actual social-
property relations and extraction and redistribution of revenue depended on the strength of 
the system already in place, the degree of resistance, and the strategic and economic 
importance of each territory to the empire. 
 
Other suppressions of rebellions and enlarging of Qing frontiers against nearby polities 
formed parts of the Qianlong ‘ten great campaigns’, but the end of his reign in 1796 marked 
the beginning of the decline of the Qing dynasty. This is also where our reconstruction of 
Imperial China’s history, according to the California School’s parameters of the period of 
similarity, must end, so as to return to the debates on the comparison with early modern 
Europe. 
 
2. A return to the non-transition debate: Comparison with Continental Europe  
This comparison is centered on the only European state form which could pretend to rival 
Imperial China in its political centralisation and territorialisation. My main focus will be on 
the classical ideal-type of European state-formation, Absolutist France, even though I might 
sometimes refer to social practices shared with other European polities. I argue that there 
were important similarities in geopolitical environment, imperial ideologies, and strategies 
of social reproduction between Late Imperial China and continental Europe. These 
similarities are obscured by the myth of the Sinicising Chinese benevolent and peaceful 
culture. This represents a further argument to undermine the Eurocentric assumption, in the 
traditional narrative of ‘state-system versus empire’ dichotomy, of a homogenous Europe 
whose development contrasted with the diverging case of China. 
 
The erroneous assumption of the Sinicisation model is that it presumes the singularity of 
the Chinese state, based on the transhistorical ideal-type of the office-system, and the 
uniqueness of its geopolitical environment, characterised by Confucianised polities, 
presided over through the equally benevolent tribute-system, and challenging ‘nomad’ and 
                                                 
 
237
 Perdue’s China Marches West (2005) is the main reference on this. See also Di Cosmo (1998). 
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state-less neighbours. This leads it to oppose this Sinifying and exceptional Chinese ‘state’, 
surviving in an unequal and dichotomised regional system, to a European state-system, in 
which the neo-evolutionary pattern of geopolitical competition led to a world of similar 
territorial sovereign states. On the one hand, this reifies the European international system 
of the period, better understood as a ‘multi-actor Europe’ (Teschke, 2003: 95-112), 
composed of feudal or territorial monarchies, ‘city-states, city-leagues, the Empire, the 
Church-State, merchant-republics, aristocratic-republics, and peasant-republics’. The 
European ‘states’ forming the ideal-type of the neo-Weberian picture are best understood 
through the consolidation of absolutist regimes in the course of expansion and political 
accumulation. This must be understood in turn by the previous divergence of Spanish, 
German, French, and British social trajectories occurring upon the outcomes of socio-
political conflicts during the encounters of specific social regimes by post-Carolingian 
elites trying to colonise Europe. 
 
On the other hand, this traditional comparison relies on a simplistic distinction of political 
forms between Han China and its stateless neighbours. Whilst Genghis Khan’s Mongols 
were mostly from nomadic and distinct ethnic origins, the pre-conquest Jurchens and 
Manchus were not, having built polities resembling those of the Song or Ming dynasties238. 
There was therefore nothing regionally unique about the ‘Chinese’ (or Kang’s four 
Confucian polities’) tax-office state. It was nevertheless as specific as it was for other 
polities in the region, and as varying in its imbrications with state-elite relations during 
native and alien dynasties. Moreover, Late Imperial China was not left in a geopolitical 
vacuum any more than it was during the previous periods reviewed. Even the mighty Qing 
were challenged as much by the Zhungar Mongol state as by absolutist Russia until 1760, 
in a contention for power pitching three great empires against each other - and we should 
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 The dichotimisation of alien and native rule moreover leads to unanswerable questions. Was the gentry the 
Mongols encountered when they conquered North China ‘Chinese’ because their families had lived under the 
Song from 960 to 1125, or ‘alien’ because they rallied to the Jurchen Jin state from 1125 to 1234? Were Taizu 
conquests more natural and welcomed by the Jiangnan gentry, the perceived heart of China, when they were 
dispossessed for having supported another anti-Yuan warlord? We fare slightly better if we rather tackle the 
issue of the manner in which the non-Chinese governed. But why would the Manchus abandon their own tax-
office state upon conquering China? For sure, the pre-Conquest Manchus functioned also with serfdom and 
estates but these were hallmarks of the Song and Ming as much as their centralised state apparatuses. 
  
206
not anachronistically exclude from this the one which simply did not become a nation-state 
nor should these three ‘empires’ be considered as motivated differently than the European 
‘states’ on the (geo)political level (Perdue, 2005: 1-4, 18). Resistance and occupation are 
certainly enmeshed with cultural differentiation, and I have pinpointed in this way elements 
of the Mongol conception of ulus and appanage rights, Manchu ethos, and ‘Chinese’ 
imperial ideology. Still, whatever the origins of the conqueror ruling houses, outside of the 
territories they reserved for their entourage239, they had to govern estranged elites and 
producers whose changing power and relations were the Yuan, Ming, and Qing’s more 
important concerns. To summarise, just as there was no Europe composed of similar types 
of state with permanently equal power, there were not two single and opposite types of 
polities with unequal power in East Asia. 
 
In fact, the imperial ideology borrowed by ‘alien’ and ‘native’ dynasty alike bore some 
resemblance to European ‘enlightened’ absolutisms. The French despotisme éclairé or 
German Bauerrnschutzpolitik were no more magnanimous and based on Reason than the 
Qing implementation of minsheng. It is difficult therefore to pinpoint an ‘alien’ type of rule, 
moreover as the regional differences in administration in any given regime discourage any 
association between ethnic origins and style of governance. Through minsheng, the Qing 
took advantage of the changing social property relations in China proper to secure their tax 
base by institutionalising the new relation to land which the peasants had already enforced 
against landlords. This bears similarities to the building of the French absolutist state 
following the 14th Century crisis. As in 16th Century Imperial China, the French lords were 
faced with a peasantry confronting them from a position of relative strength. Consequently, 
they were unable to raise rents or to evict them. Participating in state activities became one 
of the best avenues to reproduce their social power, but at the same time the monarchy was 
consolidating in law peasants’ gains in order to weaken the lords’ position against whom 
the Crown was in competition for producers’ revenues (Brenner, 1985). We thus see similar 
strategies on the part of the peasants, landlords, and states in France as in China, which 
gave way to a restructuring of their inter-relations. Contrary to what Wong (1997) affirms, 
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 Whether in the forms of appanages, princedoms, or bannerlands, these were essential to all ‘native’ and 
‘alien’ conquest dynasties as a means to reward its elite.  
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peasant protection was not unique to Confucian China, neither was it a benevolent act. 
 
The strategies of social reproduction of the Chinese ruling houses were similar (but once 
again, by no means identical) to Europeans’. These dynastic strategies are summarised in 
Teschke (2003: 220-222). Dynastic houses could try to squeeze the peasantry or to sell 
parts of state power. Among strategies of geopolitical accumulation, we find territorial 
expansion or state-backing of trade. The selection between these strategies depended on the 
balance of class forces. These strategies are rarely outlined as such in the literature on 
Imperial China because of its generally neutral conception of the state. When they are, this 
is attributed to the ‘alien’ character of the rulers. I contend that all these strategies were 
employed by the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties alike. We should not view the taxation 
system merely as a way to ensure the daily execution of state functions, but as a means of 
appropriation and distribution of revenues among the elite. I have also outlined how the 
state was directly or indirectly (i.e. within the tribute-system, through the ortoy, or via the 
ruling house’s private investment) involved in commercial ventures backed by military and 
political means. Likewise, the widespread practices of selling ranks, official positions, and 
licences for para-political activities were ways for the ruling house to raise revenues by 
privatising its power. There were in addition diverse ways for the ruler to expand its tax 
base by controlling land and people, such as the promotion of colonisation, the tusi system, 
the tribute-system, the Pacification Commissions, and outright conquests.  
 
The Mongols and Manchus’ conquests might be presented as anomalous in Chinese history, 
but they rather illustrate the relations between geopolitical accumulation and redistribution 
of wealth to the ruling class, such additional revenues facilitating socio-political 
arrangements which reduced the risk of producing and non-producing classes’ revolts 
against their rule. Faced with comparatively stronger ‘external’ foes and an emboldened 
‘internal’ gentry weakening the power of the peasants and the state’s capacity to extract 
surpluses, the Ming dynasty diversified its geopolitical strategies for acquiring revenue. For 
each dynasty, however, socio-spatial relations were decisive, since military investments - 
induced by the need to allow the ruling groups to maintain their class power - provoked 
fiscal, and ultimately social, crises. This is obviously not to say that the diverse European 
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trajectories and the one of Imperial China were identical. These dynasties however 
similarly drew on a wide and overlapping variety of pre-modern strategies, and the non-
development this entailed was in stark contrast to what was happening in Britain, as argued 
in the Thesis Introduction.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the pre-modern trajectory of Late Imperial China under the 
Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. I have grounded in social-property relations the 
transformations of the state, relations to property, and political geography between and 
within dynastic reigns. One of the most important changes during this period was the 
transformation brought to the relation between the ruling house, the landlords, and the 
producers following the peasant uprisings beginning in the 16th Century and whose gains 
were institutionalised in the following centuries. This historical reconstruction has 
demonstrated the insufficiency of the traditional literature’s focus on continuity and 
stability apart from periodic dynastic transitions. This has also questioned the bases of the 
division between ‘native’ and ‘alien’ rules.  
 
This chapter also aimed to go beyond the traditional PM analyses of China in relation to 
Britain. I have argued that a more thorough study of state power and socio-spatial practices 
could re-route the debate on an alleged East/West dichotomy, by illustrating there were 
proto-modern elements neither in Imperial China nor in continental Europe. My 
historicisation of the Chinese state and East Asian international system has established that 
these were much more dynamic and conflictual than it is generally acknowledged, precisely 
because they were the site of on-going contestations over land and people - as was the case 
in continental Europe also. By ruling out the origins of divergence in exclusive pan-
European features, this re-problematises the ‘transition debate’ as an outcome of socio-
political conflicts and undermines the conflating of European trajectories into one model to 
be opposed to Imperial China. Brenner (and Isett, 2002), Huang (1985, 1990), Isett (2007), 
and Mazumdar (1997) have convincingly demonstrated that even the most commercialised 
regions of Ming-Qing China relied on family production and functioned alongside pre-
modern patterns. This destabilises the California School’s assumption of a ‘Eurasian 
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similarity’ between - at the very least - the Yangzi Delta and Britain, since only the latter 
exhibited patterns of modern development visible in terms of increase of labour 
productivity and demographic trends. My contribution adds to these crucial findings a 
parallel comparison highlighting the pre-modern similarities between Imperial China and 
continental Europe, which further undermines the Eurocentric belief in the dichotomy of 
their political and geopolitical forms, deemed to model their different types of 
development.  
 
In the end, such a comparison through the operationalisation of the anti-Eurocentric PM 
method leads me to affirm, against the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives, that no pan-European 
uniqueness existed during this period. Neither did any ‘Eurasian similarity’, due to the 
divergent case of Britain. Socialising geopolitics and rationality, whilst historicising our 
analytical categories, in order to explain specific developmental trajectories thus results in 
re-evaluating the basis of comparison for the debate on transitions and non-transitions, and 
in asserting the imperative to go back to social agency in order to understand the ‘Great 
Divergence’.   
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 Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis started by asking if a non-Eurocentric understanding of China’s ‘non-rise’ was 
possible. It aimed to contribute to the problematique of the similarity and dissimilarity 
between Chinese and European development through a return to the debate on the transition 
to capitalist modernity. Despite originating within the fields of HS and economic history, 
this topic is crucial to IR because it involves the issue of the temporal and spatial location 
of the dynamics which gave rise to modern geopolitics. More specifically, this thesis has 
asked what were the conditions of possibility for IR’s abstract categories of the ‘state’ and 
the ‘international’ to emerge, and has critically evaluated their adequacy for accounting for 
historical praxes within Europe and China. 
 
I have argued that the levels at which IR and HS discussions of developmental divergence 
have taken place impede the understanding of the reasons pre-modern paths led to such 
diversity. From the comparative stance of the initial debate on the transition to capitalism 
and the subsequent ‘Great Divergence’ controversy in political development, to the Realist 
and English School’s theorisations of international systems and Frank’s global economy 
perspective, what was missing was a way to make sense of social agency in the interactions 
between these ‘levels’, or, to better phrase it, amongst the social institutions of authority 
relations, geopolitics, and market dynamics. It is here that the issue of Eurocentrism and the 
need for a social theory of IR meet. Analytical anachronisms continue to prevent these 
approaches, all of which question the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives, from sociologically re-
problematising the divergence in a non-Eurocentric fashion. Chapter One described what I 
argue to be the four overlooked facets of Eurocentrism, culminating in the reification of 
spatial entities, geopolitical dynamics, rationality, and spheres of social activities, as a 
Eurocentric legacy of the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives. The empirical part of the thesis, 
contesting the major ‘Great Divergence’ analyses240, has proven that they all face the same 
                                                 
 
240
 The term ‘Great Divergence’ analyses is used here to refer more broadly to all authors, studied in the 
thesis, who re-theorised the divergence of Chinese and European developmental trajectories. This category 
therefore goes beyond the California School, and encompasses also Zhang and Buzan’s English School 
analyses, Kang’s Realist model, and Frank’s WST. 
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pitfalls as the traditional studies they aim to dislodge. 
 
The first unaddressed problem in all these analyses is the self-evident character of the units 
of analysis studied. A critical interrogation of what was ‘China’ or ‘Europe’ at a given time, 
and why it became so, is more than a question of historical specification. The mobilisation 
of these categories as unproblematic stems from assumptions about the working of the 
‘international’. This second Eurocentric pitfall of naturalising the European international 
system leads to presupposing its long-term consequences, from which eventual 
isomorphising state forms and agent behaviours are inferred. In this way, comparisons 
between Europe and China turn ultimately into mere exemplifications of the impact of 
diverging spatial ordering principles, which are themselves already held as theoretically 
secure. This is the case not only for Frank’s functionalist theory of the world-economy, but 
also for Kang and Buzan’s comparisons between hierarchical and anarchical international 
societies and Wong and Rosenthal’s finding of an original divergence in ‘spatial 
economies’.  
 
Such disinterest in the historical reconstruction of authority relations and geopolitical 
orders and in a social understanding of geopolitical dynamics in turn weakens the anti-
Eurocentric argument of a late and ‘accidental’ ‘Great Divergence’, as formulated most 
notably by Pomeranz. For it turns out, in such analyses, that everything was already set for 
the universal, profit-maximising rationality of agents to develop across Europe, whether or 
not such phenomena are claimed to have been already present in an ‘incipient’ form in 
China. These narratives take the form of analyses of, on the one hand, the ‘state’ and the 
‘international’ and, on the other hand, the ‘economy’, which are initially dissociated from 
one another. These dimensions are later reconciled by asking how the first two (‘state’ and 
‘international’) impacted on the liberation of the immanent forces of the third. This 
overlooks the social anchoring of rationality, which I have argued to be the third facet of 
Eurocentrism, and derives universal theoretical concepts from the ontologising of 
categories based on a specific narrative of the European experience(s). The questionable 
spatial categories of Europe and China, as well as the notions of Confucian state, Chinese 
World Order, and pacified internal market and world-economy, all rely on the problematic 
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assumption of the universality of the inside/outside and economic/political differentiations 
in world history. This fourth Eurocentric pitfall is what makes it impossible for these ‘Great 
Divergence’ scholars to ask the crucial question: ‘how has it become phenomenologically 
possible for social agents to conceive the relation between power and space in these terms?’ 
(Lapointe and Dufour, 2011: 5) 
 
These Eurocentric conceptual anachronisms, which the ‘Great Divergence’ debate has 
imported unchallenged from the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives, have important implications 
for the understanding of the transition to modernity. I claimed that the ‘Great Divergence’ 
scholars’ inability to historicise, politicise, and sociologise the institutions of the state, 
market, and geopolitics leave them ultimately unable to sociologically explain the 
fundamental rupture towards modern political geography (the distinction between the 
domestic and the international) and modern development (the formal separation of means 
of domination and exploitation). The ontologising of these distinctive ways to organise 
spatial and social relations renders invisible the fundamental similarity between continental 
Europe and Imperial China: the politicisation of the economy and the governing of 
geopolitics by dynamics of appropriation. Despite belonging in this way to a pre-modern 
continuum, authority relations and geopolitical orders within Europe and East Asia were 
eminently singular. Transitions and non-transitions to modernity are best captured, I argued, 
by reconstructing political subjectivities and social agency at the origins of diverging 
historical trajectories, in a move towards challenging the IR understanding of its political 
and spatial categories as fundamentally, and Eurocentrically, settled. 
  
In the following pages, I will highlight the thesis’ contributions to both the field of HS and 
IR. I will first summarise my empirical findings, and stress their importance for an agential 
understanding of Chinese long-term development beyond traditional Sinology. I will then 
turn to my double contributions to IR theory, regarding Eurocentrism and a social 
theorisation of geopolitics. Lastly, I will outline what such findings lead to in terms of 
understanding 19th Century China, in the period following the ‘Great Divergence’. 
 
1. A new Historical Sociology of China 
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This thesis started from the recognition that the HS of China is surprisingly weak in terms 
of this methodological tradition’s commitment ‘to unravel the complexity that lies behind 
the interaction between social action and social structures’ (Hobson, Lawson, and 
Rosenberg, 2010: 3361). I demonstrated that the origin of this weakness lies in the HS 
reliance on Sinology’s state-gentry paradigm, itself only partly dissociated from the 
‘dynastic cycles’ paradigm characteristic of Chinese imperial ideology. HS has therefore 
not fully succeeded in overcoming the prevalent perception of China as a universal empire 
stretching over nearly two millennia, which was rendered eminently stable by Confucian 
order and pacified relations with ‘internal’ and ‘external’ actors.  
 
In contrast, my critical engagement with historiographical debates has challenged these 
assumptions of stability, hegemony, and immutability. Chapters Five and Seven have shown 
that authority relations in China and interactions with other polities adopted tremendously 
different forms over time. This has been argued to be the case because pre-modern social 
conflicts took the form of competition for political power and privileges and struggles 
around the extra-economic institutionalisation of inequalities, reverberating on the very 
forms, and contested nature, of the Chinese ‘state’ and political geography. Such an analysis 
has proven able to explain what was circumvented to by IR’s reliance on Sinology’s 
traditional paradigms: dynastic transitions, prevalence of wars, marginalisation of the 
examination route in access to office, changing attitudes towards inter-regional and 
international exchanges, and variations in the degree of territorial integration and political 
centralisation. The key element guiding my counter-narrative has been to propose a 
phenomenology of power of the Mandate of Heaven and benevolence, presented in 
Chapters Four and Six, which demystified, respectively, the analytically assumed 
inside/outside and economic/political differentiations. In this section, I want to re-
emphasise how this grounding of political and geopolitical patterns, processes, and 
institutions within changing social-property relations is necessary in order to avoid the 
‘Great Divergence’ scholars’ shortcomings in drawing out the implications of the new 
historical literature on China. 
 
The California School was certainly innovative in portraying Late Imperial China as a 
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vibrant example of economic dynamism, and as a power both at the apex of its regional 
system and on par with Europe. According to these scholars, this was enabled by China’s 
contrasting (geo)political organisation. This assessment was grounded in recent Sinology 
works which engaged with persisting myths regarding China’s demographic and economic 
patterns. It has long been taken for granted that Imperial China diverged from Europe due 
to the absence of fertility controls and autonomous merchants. Sinology has been 
revolutionised by recent studies counter-arguing that an array of strategies were used to 
control the number of children born, leading to fertility rates at least comparable to Europe, 
(Lee and Campbell, 1997; Lee and Wang, 1995) and that important waves of 
commercialisation occurred under the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasty (Li, 1998; Shiba, 
1970), whilst coexisting with a lively inter-Asian trade system (Hamashita, 1994). The 
California School builds on these works to propose that such controlled demographic 
growth and unimpeded exchanges led to Smithian development, as it did in Europe, 
because of a similar incapacity/unwillingness of the elite and the state to interfere with 
commercial exchanges. 
 
As it is derivative of the state-gentry paradigm, the California School relied in this way on a 
series of propositions, the explanatory power of which ultimately resides in varying state 
strength. I have rather started by asking how a series of forms taken for granted in 
traditional Sinology, such as ‘state’, ‘society’, and ‘economy’, were phenomenologically 
understood by agents. I have therefore asked how these newly revealed demographic and 
commercial patterns could have originated from, and impacted on, agents’ behaviours, 
whilst taking account of the fact that their rationality should be socially contextualised in 
this manner. This led me to contend empirically and theoretically with a series of 
postulates, all of which are deemed to have a causal role in China’s ‘Smithian 
development’: political non-interference in the economy, secure state/society relations, and 
‘China’s’ (geo)political stability.    
 
Firstly, I have showed that Chinese commercialisation (in the California School’s language, 
development) is not to be explained by the distance between the ‘state’ (or the ‘political’) 
and ‘commerce’ (or the ‘economy’), but rather through the very politicisation of the 
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economy itself, or in other words the imbrication of relations of domination and relations of 
exploitation. Commercialisation was not a linear and natural outcome of demographic and 
market expansions. Its social origin lies in proto-industrialisation, enabled by the traditional 
pre-modern strategy of the intensification of peasant family labour through commercial 
ventures (less rewarding than their working of their land), as occurred when peasants were 
confronted with the inability to ensure their subsistence from their unit of land, following 
from the subdivision of plots. I have therefore rejected the conceptions of Chinese 
commercialisation as referring to zones of free labour and land markets (Pomeranz, 2000), 
as powered by international demand (Frank, 1998), and as structurally derivative from the 
large ‘spatial scale’ of China’s pacified exchanges (Rosenthal and Wong, 2011). I have also 
contested the relation these scholars establish between commercialisation and the alleged 
absence of international competition, thereby enabling China to invest in welfare and 
economic infrastructures. Commercialisation has rather been shown to have been amenable 
to different types of social-property, authority, and geopolitical relations. For example, 
Song commercialisation occurred within a (relatively) small territory, in the context of 
tremendous military expenditures and geopolitical uncertainty. Under the Ming, 
commercialisation relied on a form of state/gentry ‘collaboration’ in maintaining status 
differentiation between servile or slave peasants and landlords, whilst external trade was 
governed by the tribute-system. The Qing period displayed yet another pattern of 
commercialisation, through its smallholders’ economy in which peasants’ freedom and 
rights to land were backed by the rulers, in a context of ‘free’ external trade. The Qing’s 
unprecedented territorial expansion moreover provided the conditions of possibility for 
Chinese inter-regional trade. Given these differences, waves of commercialisation are 
therefore better explained through the changing ways the economy was politicised, 
depending on the manner peasants, landlords, merchants, and rulers were able to 
‘internally’ and ‘externally’ assert their power. 
 
Enquiring into such agentially-led changing patterns of social-property, authority, and 
geopolitical relations entails, moreover, a revision of Weberian Sinology’s key postulate of 
stability and continuity in state/society and state/gentry relations. According to this 
widespread understanding of Imperial China, the Chinese state taxed producers in order to 
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ensure the preservation of the (domestic) social order and (geopolitical) state survival. In 
these narratives (e.g. Fairbank and Goldman, 2006; Levenson, 1968), the degree of 
state/gentry collaboration impacted on the imperial state’s penetration of society and the 
reach of its infrastructural power; this explains why dynasties waxed and waned. Each 
dynastic cycle started with the state having a strong grip on the gentry, whose power 
gradually increased until the ruling house’s share of revenues declined to the point that it 
was left unable to resist rival would-be dynasts (Hall, 1986: 42-43; Bol, 2003: 4).  
 
In order to summarise my own reconstruction of the Chinese trajectory, I will explain how 
the insights generated by my alternative framework led me to challenge: the dynastic cycles 
paradigm’s relegation of the conflictual moments to inter-dynastic periods; its under-
theorisation of dynastic transitions; and the historical ‘deviations’ from the paradigm’s 
expectations. My re-conceptualisation of successive Chinese polities within their 
geopolitical contexts does not, however, only add richness and complexity to an 
understanding of the Chinese trajectory. Overall, I have argued that the key to 
understanding why state/society and state/gentry relations were not characterised by 
stability and continuity, as the California School would have it, is to reintroduce into the 
analysis the role of the producers. The problematisation of the ‘economic’ rights to 
exploitation implied in the ‘political’ struggle for domination or prestige allowed me to take 
into account the object of contention between the state and the gentry, i.e. access to 
peasants’ surpluses. Such an understanding of authority relations as embedded in relations 
of exploitation led me to demystify the notion of a perennial Chinese ‘state’ and ‘society’ 
only represented under different dynastic denominations. The ultimate explanation of these 
variations resides in contentions around power, which took the form of control over land 
and people. 
 
Firstly, this allows for re-capturing the dynamics behind my findings – running contrary to 
the common understanding of China’s history - of eminently temporally divergent 
mobilisations of the office-system and tribute-system, the alleged permanence of which is 
commonly understood to have been a key component of China’s expanding market. This 
can uniquely explain a series of generally unacknowledged facts about China’s history. 
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Rather than abiding by meritocratic and efficiency principles, official positions primarily 
gave access to the means of appropriation and could also be granted as reward and bought. 
China’s (relative) political centralisation, as an unstable socio-political arrangement, 
therefore rested on an economy of privatisation of shares of public power. There was no 
uniform governing of ‘Chinese’ territories, which moreover were constantly being re-
mapped, because the ruling house had to adapt its ambitions to fit the regionally varying 
balance of class forces, itself maintained through a routine economy of violence. Rather 
than being periods of pacified relations, each dynastic cycle was, during most of the time, 
constituted of the dynamic of conquests of what is generally considered as ‘internal’ actors, 
and there was generally more than one contender for the Mandate of Heaven. Crucially, 
these features were not exclusive to times of dynastic change, as the dynastic cycles 
paradigm would have it; they were constitutive elements of the ongoing struggles around 
power.  
 
Yet this paradigm lacks a theory of social change, as it explains away processes of re-
conquest of mandates and periods of ‘disunification’. Why would the state naturally lose 
control over time? What explains the variations in lengths of unification periods? Answers 
cannot be provided by the state/gentry paradigm’s sociology of domination: its explanation 
of dynastic change devolves into a mere description of the relative distribution of power 
between the state and the elite.  This happens because the source of their contention is not 
analytically examined. To be sure, dynastic changes occurred in geopolitically challenging 
times and against a background of intra-elite conflict, but there is still the need to 
theoretically make sense of the way these events translated into dynastic change. To this 
end, I have argued that war-induced fiscal crises, arising from the relatively bellicose East 
Asian context, tested the balance of power within and between classes. Threats to the ruling 
house’s capacity of carrying out the ‘political tasks’ of social order and state survival were 
indeed simultaneously threats to the social arrangement of the distribution of revenues and 
the organisation and level of surplus extraction. The outcomes of such conflicts should be 
understood as agentially-led, and sociologically reconstructed. 
 
My alternative theoretical framework can also uniquely explain several ‘anomalies’ within 
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the dynastic cycles paradigm’s picture of declining state strength within each cycle, the 
endings of which are the exclusive instances of where geopolitical challenges are included. 
For example, the Song inherited from the start an economy of large gentry-owned estates 
and survived under constant and extreme geopolitical pressures, whilst the Ming reign 
ended in a context of radically devastated gentry power. These anomalies are doubly 
puzzling as they refer to ‘native’ regimes taken as ideal-types of China’s ‘true nature’. 
Deciphering such ‘anomalies’ requires recognising that the organisation of peasants’ and 
elites’ into communities varied significantly in terms of the capacity for resistance beyond 
the periods of dynastic change, and that these political organisations mattered because 
peasant resistance impacted upon levels of surplus extraction and how effective the 
collection of rent and taxes was, whilst landlords, officials, merchants, and lineages 
contended amongst themselves and with the imperial center for shares in the revenue 
redistribution originating from this surplus extraction. In short, revising the stable 
ontologies of traditional Sinology by theorising contestations around the political 
constitution of property is necessary in order to understand China’s ‘non-rise’ without it 
seeing it as ‘vegetating in the teeth of time’ (Marx, 1858). 
 
2. A new anti-Eurocentric theory of geopolitical relations 
Beyond its innovative empirical findings, this thesis’ had two key objectives regarding its 
theoretical contribution to the discipline of IR: to propose a non-Eurocentric way to 
theorise similarity and dissimilarity in developmental trajectories, and to offer a social and 
phenomenological method by which to understand historical variations in spatial orderings.  
 
In the theoretical section of the thesis, I have demonstrated that my PM-informed method 
can overcome three of the four main accusations of Eurocentrism levelled against IR in 
general and Marxism in particular: the superiority of Europe’s inherent proprieties 
(Orientalism); a stagist theory of history (historicism); and an inability to theorise the non-
Western world (Eurocentred categorisation of the world)241. In Chapter One, the PM 
                                                 
 
241
 Properly challenging the exteriorisation of the non-Western world from the constitution of modernity 
(methodological nationalism) has been deemed an empirical (rather than normative) endeavour beyond the 
scope of the thesis. 
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suspicion against taking Europe as a coherent unit was argued to set this approach apart 
from both the ‘Rise of the West’ narratives’ and their main detractor’s non-problematisation 
of the international, itself at the origins of the persisting ‘state-system vs. empire’ 
dichotomous perspective on the Western and non-Western worlds. Chapter Two went on to 
distinguish between Marxist theories of history and methodologies in order to unravel 
which readings of Marx led to a mechanical and teleological understanding of social 
development and to the congealing of historical praxes into sterile classifications. How this 
particular understanding of the HM project has led to PM’s emphasis on specificity, class 
struggles, and agentially-driven historicisation was then further elaborated in Chapter 
Three. It is there that I elaborated on the controversy over PM’s alleged internalism, which, 
if it cannot be fully refuted, can nonetheless be defended as a causal explanation of the 
emergence of modernity which does not neglect to weigh geopolitical or external factors 
against internal ones.  
 
However, my PM method has been announced not only as non-Eurocentric, but foremost as 
making a critical contribution to the problem of understanding world history through the 
prism of European modernity. This contribution, based on the countering of the four 
overlooked anti-Eurocentric pitfalls mentioned above, has taken the form of providing for 
an IR theory amenable to track immanently socio-political conflicts and social change in 
non-Western contexts, which has simultaneously led to a re-thinking of Europe-China 
comparative strategies.  
 
The PM project of radical historicisation through an agential reconstruction of social 
change has been applied to the comparative analysis of political development in China and 
Europe. This has further contributed to the underlining of structural accounts of the 
transition to the modern state-system, accounts that neo-Weberian HS and the English 
School have preserved from the neo-Realist domination of the field. In the discipline of IR, 
there is a widespread acceptance of the causal and historical links between war and state-
formation in Europe. Whereas European international competition is supposed to lead states 
to maximise their fiscal-military capacities, the absence of such pressures in East Asia is 
theorised by anti-Eurocentric scholars as pacifying its internal and external orders, thus 
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providing an alternate route to economic expansion. The thesis has aimed to critically 
evaluate this IR argument that spatial ordering principles, in the form of state-
system/anarchy or universal empire/hierarchy, govern state behaviour. This is what led the 
‘Great Divergence’ scholars to give the ‘international’ (or absence thereof) a causal role in 
the long-term developmental dissimilarity of China and Europe. 
 
By complementing the PM analysis of geopolitically mediated processes of state-formation 
in Europe with the study of comparable processes in China, I have further proven that we 
cannot derive expected outcomes from geopolitical environments. Both have to be 
historicised in order to make sense of the crucial empirical findings that the structural 
stimuli of a war-prone environment neither entailed identical and rational responses from 
European polities, nor was exclusive to Europe. In fact, finding the social origins of 
specifically pre-modern geopolitical competition within strategies of geopolitical 
accumulation can uniquely explain how this led to variegated responses in the differing 
forms of the privatisation (rather than rationalisation) of public power. Such anchoring of 
the sources of, and responses to, military pressures within the dynastic extra-economic 
constitution of the extraction and redistribution of revenue explains how the concrete 
results of war pressures contradicted the expected outcome of the rise of de-personalised 
modern states.  
 
In this regard, continental Europe was not different from Imperial China. Understanding 
this similarity carries in its wake the necessity to reintroduce the analysis of capitalism, and 
its distinctiveness, within a social theory of geopolitical relations. This is the case as 
submitting geopolitical and political orders to sociological enquiry implies contextualising 
the motivations of agents in terms of social reproduction, and therefore asking how power 
was differently deployed in pre-modern settings. As long as authority relations mediated 
dynamics of appropriation, strategies of social reproduction took the form of contentions 
over control of land and people via political privileges and the remodelling of frontiers.  
 
Teschke (2003) has already signalled that the ontology of IR is in strong need of revision 
because of this. This comparison with China has taken the argument one step further. 
  
221
Against the new anti-Eurocentric literature in IR, it has proved fundamentally that IR’s 
timeless notions of ‘state’ and ‘international’ should be abandoned for the pre-modern era, 
and not merely for the non-Western world presumed to abide by different principles. The 
‘Great Divergence’ scholars have attempted to disprove the universality of IR theories, 
regarding the causal relation between anarchy and development, by testing these theories in 
relation to non-Western cases. Understanding geopolitical diversity was argued to 
necessitate the addition of clauses to the main IR axioms, i.e. that East Asia’s alternatives to 
Westphalian principles (whether conceptualised as international society or international 
competition), in the form of hierarchy or the absence of a war-like environment, can also 
foster stability or development. I have demonstrated that this reiterates the Eurocentric 
legacy of the ‘Rise of the West’, and merely extends the reification of the ‘international’ 
from Europe to East Asia, whilst preserving this dichotomised understanding of the world. 
For the historicisation of the series of dichotomies on which the discipline of IR is based 
(state/society, economic/political, domestic/international) demonstrates that the modern 
dividing line is not a geographical one, but a social one.  
 
3. Implications for understanding China’s decline 
The California School takes the years 1750 or 1800 as the turning point where Europe 
caught up with, and outdistanced, China. The thesis has however demonstrated that 
continental Europe and Imperial China were on a pre-modern continuum until this period of 
the ‘Great Divergence’. Does the turning of the 19th Century mark the point from which we 
could finally speak of a ‘Great Divergence’ between China and Europe as a whole? I will 
rather contend that the 19th Century continental Europe state-transformations are best seen 
as modernising rather than modern (Teschke, 2006: 56), whilst outlining the implications of 
my alternative theoretical framework for understanding China 19th Century.  
 
The period following the Qianlong reign (1735-1796) is generally seen as the beginning of 
Imperial China’s decline. Rulers and officials started to worry about demographic 
pressures, domestic and external threats, and inflation. The Treaty of Nanjing following 
Britain’s victory in the First Opium war (1839-1842) imposed massive reparations, the 
ceding of Hong Kong, extraterritoriality for British citizens, and the opening up of five 
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cities to free trade with fixed tariffs. France and America soon secured the same privileges. 
The Taiping rebellions (1850-1864), cutting much of the Yangzi valley from imperial 
control, dealt a further weakening blow to the dynasty. This partly coincided also with the 
Arrow War, or Second Opium War (1856-60). Further setbacks contributed to the later fall 
of the dynasty in 1911, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Boxer 
rebellion (1898-1900), and the ‘scramble for concessions’ by Western, Japanese, and 
Russian powers (1898-1920). The Qing also lost its former tributary states of Liuqu (1870), 
Vietnam (1874/1893), Laos (1893), Burma (1886), and Taiwan and Korea (1895) in the 
process. 
 
From the mid-19th Century, the Qing started a wave of reforms aiming to overcome 
domestic distress and external threats. A part of these reforms are known under the name of 
yangwu (‘foreign matters’), i.e. the adaptation of Western innovations, especially its 
technology and diplomatic methods. It adopted the specific form of zhong xue wei ti, xi xue 
wei yong (or ti-yong - Chinese learning for the essentials and Western learning for practical 
application). The ‘self-strengthening’ program (ziqiang) had broad implications, seeking to 
modernise both its defence industry, by adapting Western innovations (such as the Jiangnan 
Arsenal and the Fuzhou Naval Dockyard), and its finance. Such examples include the 
guandu shangban system (translated as official supervision and merchant management), 
from which emerged the China’s Merchant Steam Navigation Company, and the 
reorganisation of taxes on trade (the lijin and the customs duties). Notable institutional 
innovations of the period also included the establishment in 1861 of a foreign office, the 
Zongli Yamen, to deal with Western powers and manage the Customs Administration. 
 
Even if this period is only glossed over by the ‘Great Divergence’ scholars, their 
understanding of 19th Century China illustrates the conundrums the commercial, 
geopolitical, and ideational model led to. These authors see this period foremost through 
the prism of increasing economic, geopolitical, and normative contact between China and 
the West. Given that these models predict that increasing commercial activities, geopolitical 
challenges, and socialisation with Western norms usher in modernity (whether defined in 
economic, military, or political terms), their proponents have great difficulty in explaining 
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the ‘incompletion’ of Chinese development in the 19th Century. Traditional explanations 
point to the entrenched Confucian traditional order, with its institutions and ideology 
inimical to changes (Feuerwerker, 1958; Ma, Brandt, and Rawski, 2004; Fairbank, 1953; 
Wright, 1957), and the limitations of Western economic penetration beyond the coastal 
cities (Platt, 1968; Dernberger, 1975; Murphey, 1977), as the causal factors explaining why 
the presupposed outcomes of yangwu and incorporation in the Western sphere of influence 
did not occur.  
 
As the California School preserves the commercial model but associates such explanations 
with Eurocentrism, this ‘dead-end’ is explained through external factors, such as the new 
ordering of international economy and imperialism countering the Chinese indigenous 
development (Frank, 1998; Hobson, 2004; Wong, 1997), or by historical or geographical 
contingencies (Pomeranz, 2000). Authors associated with the English School rather theorise 
19th Century China’s need to adapt to the European society’s norms (Suzuki, 2009; Zhang 
2001). According to them, the demise of the Sinocentric order led to disputes between 
reformists and Confucians, opposed to accepting the sovereignty and equality principles. 
Neo-Weberian scholars, such as Skocpol (1979) and Horowitz (1998), rather understand 
this period as one of unprecedented geopolitical challenges. They emphasise the gentry’s 
role in the incomplete imperial attempts at military modernisation and centralisation. All 
these authors however implicitly convey that Imperial China could (should) have adopted 
the Western path of development242, were it not for some obstacles it was confronted with. 
This is the case as their analysis is based on the singularity of China in comparison to 
Europe taken as a homogenous entity, or else the measures of success are derived from an 
idealised perspective on European development.  
 
I would rather suggest that China’s imperial decline had socio-economic origins, in the 
diminishing land/labour ratio and concomitant decline in labour productivity. This trend 
had been innovatively postponed by combining expansion with the promotion of 
                                                 
 
242
 This is less present in Skocpol work’s, who is incidentally not concerned with 19th Century decline per se, 
as she does not presuppose a unique path of development. Still, her theorisation of the ‘autonomous state’s 
interests’ is derived from the universalisation of the economic/political and inside/outside differentiations.  
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colonisation and inter-regional grain trade during the 18th Century. The domestic and 
geopolitical challenges of the mid-19th Century (the Taiping rebellions and the Opium wars) 
however threatened the social reproduction of the elites, notably by depriving them of their 
control over peasants’ surpluses in the Jiangnan and the revenues from the Canton system. 
Such ‘internal’ and ‘external’ challenges triggered war-induced fiscal crises which in turn 
prompted social conflicts as this threatened the social arrangement governing the access to 
sources of income. From the imposition of new commercial taxes, reestablishment of rent 
relations in the war-devastated Delta, negotiations around office venality, to the institution 
of new forms of enterprises, important reforms were thus undertaken. This was done in 
order to improve the extraction of social surplus (from the peasants) and the redistribution 
of revenues (amongst the elites) as much as to restore the throne’s finances, in its ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ aspects which were however not dissociated. The form and implementation of 
the reforms depended on how well different elite groups were organised and how producers 
resisted, through their political communities (whether in the form of villages, lineages, 
guilds, gentry bureaus, etc.). The aims of the modernisation, as part of the project of 
overcoming imperial decline, went parallel to the working political economy of state power. 
It did not overthrow and re-make it along properly ‘modern’ lines – or even intend to. This 
is not because ‘traditional’ Imperial China itself was not a fertile ground for modernity, but 
because no pre-modern society was. The crucial mistake made by scholars like Wright or 
Feuerwerker is not their identification of a ‘backward’ China per se, it is rather that they 
oppose it to Western industrialisation and enlightenment in general. 
 
I rather suggest that we should enquire into similarities with other revolutions from above 
in Europe in the broader context of state-led industrialisation. The dividing line is less 
between the West and the East than amongst historically distinct state-transformation 
projects led by pre-capitalist classes in times of imperial decline, on the European continent 
and in Imperial China alike. Industrialisation and ‘modernisation’ are however not 
necessarily coeval with qualitative changes, nor do they naturally and inevitably grow from 
all ‘commercial’ or geopolitically-challenged societies. The task of HS is to show how such 
processes arose from contending projects in specific socio-economic contexts.  
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I would argue that we must start such enquiry by theorising the unique case of Britain, in 
which industrial development took place as a maturation of agrarian capitalism (Brenner 
and Isett, 2002; Wood, 2002; Zmolek, 2013). Further investigating the elites’ contentions 
around power reveals how their social power still derived from the state, in Imperial China 
as in continental Europe during the long 19th Century. The case of China might thus be 
more comparable than is generally acknowledged to the long 19th Century understood as a 
period of ‘modernising, not modern’ state transformations made across Europe in response 
to British pre-eminence (Lacher, 2006; Lacher and Germann, 2012; Teschke, 2005). The 
case of China sheds light on the similarities shared by such states which, upon geopolitical 
pressures depriving the ‘state-class’ of their personal and politically-constituted sources of 
revenues, attempted reforms replicating pre-existing patterns. The long-term consequences 
of these certainly differed between Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, France, Germany, 
and China. All are parts however of the 19th Century history of dynastic re-organisations of 
the distribution of power along pre-modern lines, upon the impetus of geopolitically 
mediated social crises whose outcomes could not be predicted but only made sense of 
retrospectively. Such an understanding reiterates the need for an agentially-led theory of 
state transformations which revisits the classical IR periodisation which dichotomises 
‘Western’ and non-Western trajectories. 
 
Overall, this thesis has shown that Eurocentrism should not be considered as an issue 
peripherical to the discipline of IR. It has profound consequences for the way we theorise 
social changes, geopolitics, and agents’ behaviours. The ‘Great Divergence’ and the 
emergence of the modernity of IR can only be understood by transcending Eurocentric 
analytical anachronisms in terms of political geography and development. The project of 
socialising and historicising IR generic concepts still has consequences for our 
understanding of the later contestations of the implementations of these inside/outside and 
economic/political differentiations. Strategies of concrete historicisation of IR categories as 
praxes are crucial to overcome Eurocentrism. 
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